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and
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VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

1
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VS
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JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
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1
1

Supreme Court

1
1

Case No. 36364-2009
(Case No. 36365-2009)

)

HON. MICHAEL E. WETHERELL
DISTRICT JUDGE

ELMORE COUNTY

Lawrence G. Wasden
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Statehouse Mail
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

Molly Huskey
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703
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KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
190 South 4th East
Post Office Box 607
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-2 144 ext. 503
Facsimile: (208) 587-2147
I.S.B. No. 6090

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaints
VS.

)

JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
DOB
SSN:

1
1

COMPLAINT - CRIMINAL

1

1

PERSONALLY APPEARED Before me this 28th day of March 2007, Lee Fisher, Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney in and for the County of Elmore, State of Idaho, who, being first duly sworn,
complains and says: JUSTIN W. GOODGION, on or about the 22nd day of June 2006, in the County
of Elrnore, State of Idaho, then and there being, did then and there commit the crime of RAPE, a
felony, said crime being committed as follows, to-wit:
RAPE
Felony, I.C. Q 18-6101(3), 18-6104,18-112A, 18-8304
That the Defendant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, on or about the 22nd day of June 2006, in the
County of Elmore, State of Idaho, did penetrate the vaginal opening of S.T., a &male person, with
his penis, and where S.T. resisted but her resistance was overcome by force or violence in that the
Defendant held S.T. down by her wrists, all in violation of I.C. 18-6101(3).

-

COMPLAINT CRIMINAL - Page 1
p

004

d

~7
MU

q[a

~n

8

'7

WYU
bd r J

All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case made and

provided against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho.
Said Complainant therefore prays that the Defendant, JUSTIN W. WODGION, be brought
before the Court to be dealt with according to law.
DATED This 28th day of March 2007.
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
TY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN T

COMPLAINT - CRIMINAL - Page 2

8th day of March 2007.

KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
190 South 4thEast
Post Office Box 607
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-2 144 ext. 503
Facsimile: (208) 587-2 147
I.S.B. No. 6090

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
MAGISTRATE DIVISION

1
1
1

In The Matter Of the Arrest
of
Defendant.
Justin Wayne Goodgion
DOB
SSN:
STATE OF IDAHO,

1

COUNTY OF ELMORE,

)
)

Citation No.
AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE
CAUSE FOR ARREST

ss.

Detective Catherine Wolfe, being first duly sworn, deposes and states:
That I am an authorized peace officer, and on the 27th of March 2007, at approximately
10:10 p.m. o'clock (10 10 hours), I had probable cause to believe that Justin Wayne Goodgion,
the defendant herein, committed the following crime(s):
Rape, Idaho Code 18-6 10 1 (3)

AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE - Page 2
The probable cause for defendant's mest was as follows:
On June 22,2006, at approximately 2 100 hours, a juvenile female (S. T.) came to the Sheriffs
Ofice with her mother to report a rape. S. T. reported that a male subject that she knew as Justin
Goodgion came to her residence at 5556 Tenant Avenue, Mountain Home, Elmore County,
Idaho, at approximately 2000 hours, and raped her. S. T. told me that Mr. Goodgion held her
down on her living room floor by her wrists and placed his penis in her vagina after she told him
"no" and also "I don't want to do this."
On March 27,2007, at approximately 1010 hours, I was speaking to Justin Goodgion in the
interview room of the Elmore County Sheriffs Office, as he was a suspect in a rape that was
reported to the Sheriffs Office in June 2006. I read Mr. Goodgion his Miranda warnings via the
Miranda rights form, which he stated that he understood and initialed each line after each right.
He also signed the form and also signed that he would speak to me next to "I wish to speak to
Detective Wolfe." Mr. Goodgion admitted to me that he had sexual intercourse with S. T. and
that he knew that she was fourteen or fifteen-years-old and he had turned nineteen, two months
prior. Mr. Goodgion told me that the sexual intercourse was consensual and denied forcing
himself on S. T.
DATED This 27th day of March, 2007.

SUBSCRIBED AND

,2001.
~bkinisterOath

.
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF E + f ? q F E 1 2 ~ ~ ; 14:02
STATE OF IDAHO,

,,...

Case No.

Plaintiff,

0

Defendant.

,
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THIS IS TO ACKNOWLEDGE That David C Epis, Magistrate, who has
identified himself to me as a duly appointed, qualified, and
acting Magistrate of the District Court in and for Elmore County,
Idaho, has advised me of the following facts:
1. That I have an absolute right to remain silent and do not
have to make any statement.
2.
That in the event I did decide to make a statement,
anything I say can and will be used against me in a Court of law.
3. That I have an absolute right to have a lawyer advise and
represent me at all stages of the proceedings.
4. That I have the right to a lawyer even if I cannot afford
one, and if I cannot afford one, I may use the services of the
Public Defender at any time and at public expense.
5. That I have the right to have a preliminary examination.

I understand the above and have a full awareness of each of said
rights as explained to me by the above named Magistrate.

Witness

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
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STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CR-

" '

-

@

7

r

..\

L

$o~dIJYL 3
I

..

- .' I- .\

F;t 4: 0 1

Plaintiff,

NO CONTACT ORDER

;-:

(Criminal)

The above-entitled matter having come before the Court, and good caus ppearing,

/3"

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named Defendant shal
communicate with or knowingly remain within one hundred (100) fe
"Contact" means, but is not limited to contact in person, through third p
other electronic means, or knowingly remaining within the distance limit

4

Exceptions - the Defendant may have contact for the following

CbQ
[]

[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

None.
to contact by telephone between
, .m. and
, .m on
for the following purpose:
to participate in counseling or mediation;
to meet with or through attorneys and 1 or during legal proceedings;
to respond to emergencies involving the natural or adopted children of both parties;
Other:

J

,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above-named Defendant shall not go within three hundred (300) yards of the
above-named person's residence or workplace as follows:
Workplace Address

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order can be modified
will remain in effect until fUrther
order of the Court or upon dismissal of this case at 1159 p.m. on
,whichever occurs first.
NOTICES
1. A violation of this order is a separate crime under Idaho Code 4 18-920, for which no bail will be set until an appearance
before a Judge, and is punishable by a fine of up to $l,OOO.OOJ or by imprisonment up to one (I) year, or both. Any such
violation may also result in the modification of the above terms or the increase or revocation of the bond set on the
underlying charge in this matter.
2. When more than one domestic violence protection order is in place
ntrol any conflicting
terms of any other civil or criminal protection order.
3. This Order controls and supercedes any previous No Contact Order entered
4. This Order may subject you to federal prosecution under the United States
if you possess, receive
or transport a fir
Dated t h i s m d a y of
,

,m[h
h

NO CONTACT ORDER - 1
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rth Judicial District Court, State of
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In and For the County of Elmore
150 South 4th East, Suite #5
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647-3095
STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,
VS.

Justin Goodgion
1003 2nd Street N.
Nampa, ID 83687
Defendant.
DOB:
DL or SSN:

j
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CR-2007-0001156
ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC DEFENDER

1

The Court being fully advised as to the application of Justin Goodgion, and it appearing to be a proper case,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that an attorney be appointed through the:
Public Defender's Office
Elmore County Public Defender
290 South 2nd East
Mountain Home ID 83647

Public Defender for the County of Elmore, State of Idaho, a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is
hereby appointed to represent said Defendant, Justin Goodgion, in all proceedings in the above entitled case.
The Defendant is further advised that helshe may be required to reimburse the Court for all or part of the cost
of court appointed counsel.

DATED This 28th day of March, 2007.

Prosecutor

p
Deputy Clerk

Order Appointing Public Defender
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FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
STATE OF IDAHO,

1
1
1

Plaintiff,

Case No.

w-07-I1%

WAIVER OF PRELIMINARY
EXAMINATION
1

Defendant.

Being aware of the fact that a preliminary examination is a
Court hearing to determine if a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that I committed such
crime,

and being

fully

aware

of

my

right

to

have

such

a

ng criminal charge of

,

a

felony,

now

lodged

hereby waive my right to
such preliminary examination.

No promises or threats have been

made to me nor is any pressure of any kind been used against me to
encourage the signing of this Waiver.
Dated this

3:3a

day of

Magistrate

015

KRISTINA M.SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
190 South 4th East
Post Office Box 607
Mouatain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-2144 ext. 503
Facsimile: (208) 587-2 147
I.S.B. No 6090

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

C a ~ NO.
e CR-2007-0001156
Plaint%

)
)

1

VS.

JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
SSN:
DOB:
Defendant.

ORDER HOLDING DEFENDANT
TO ANSWER

1

1

1
1

ON THE 6th day of April 2007, at the hour of 1:45 P.M.,the D e w appeared befbre the
undersignedMagistrate with Terry S. RatW Attorney at Law, his attorney of record, tbis being the

time and place set for the preliminary examination herein. The State of Idaho was represented by Lee
Fisher, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in and for the County of Elrnore, State of Idaho. The Defendant
waived the reading of the Complaint on file herein. The Defkndant was advised of the right to a
prebinary examination, the nature of which was explained to the Defendant. The Defendant

thereupon waived his preliminary examination.
The Court, being M y advised in the premises, finds that the crime oE RAPE, a fklony, as
set forth in the Infbrmation on file herein, have been committed in EImore County, State of Idaho,

and that there is suflEicient cause to believe that the Defendant committed said crime.

-

ORDER HOLDING DEFENDANT TO ANSWER Page 1

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED That the Dekndant be and hereby is held to answer to the
charges as set forth in the Information on file berein, before a District Judge in the District Court of
the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Tbat Defendant'
DATED This

&ay

of A@ 2007.

-

ORDER HOLDING DEFENDANT TO ANSWER Page 2

KRISTINA M.SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
190 South 4th East
Post Office Box 607
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-2144 ext. 503
Facsimile: (208) 587-2 147
1,S.B. No. 6090

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaint8,
VS.

JUSTIN W. WODGION,
SSN:

DOB
Dekdant.

1
1

Case No. CR-2007-000 1156

1
1

1
1

INFORMATION

1
1

1
1

Lee Fisher, Deputy Prosecuting Attomy in d for the County of Elmore, State of Idaho,
who, in the name of and by the authority of said State, prosecutes in its behalf, in proper person,
comes now before the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
the County of Elmore, and gives the Court to understand and be informed that the Defendant is
accused by this Infbrmafion of the Mime o f RAPE,a felony, upon which charge the said Defendant,
having duly appeared before a Magistrate on the 6th day of April 2007, and then and there having

waived his prelimimy examhation upon said charge, was, by said Magistrate, thereupon held to

answer befbre the District Judge of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the
County of Elmore, to said charge, which crime was committed as fbllows:

INFORMATION - Page 1

-

-

.

ORIGINAL

RAPE

Felony, I.C. 8 18-6101(1), 1&6104,1&112A, 18-8304
That the Defendant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, on or about the 22nd day of June 2006, in the
County of Elmore, State of Idaho, did penetrate the vaginal opening of S.T., a female person, with
his penis, and where S.T.resistedbut her resistance was overcome by fi,rce or violence in tbat the
Defendant held S.T.down by her wrists, all in violation of I.C. 8 18-6101(3).
All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and

against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho.

DATED This 6th day of April 2007.
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I

eputy Prosecuting Attorney

INFORMATION - Page 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

APRIL 16, 2007

HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL

COURT MINUTES

1
1
1

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-2007-1156

)

vs .

1
1
1
1

JUSTIN GOODGION,
Defendant.

RAPE

)

1
1

APPEARANCES:

Lee Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

Counsel for State

Terry Ratliff
Public Defender

Counsel for Defendant

Tape No. A132-07

1325 to 2307

10:ll a.m. Call of case.
Time and date set for INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT, defendant present, in
custody, bond set at $$lo,000.00.
Information and papers filed.
The Court informed the defendant of the charge(s1 filed against
him being a felony and of the possible penalties which could be
imposed.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff.
Statement made by Mr. Fisher.
The Court has received an Amended.Information.
No objection by Mr. Ratliff.

COURT MINUTES - APRIL 16, 2007
Page - 1

The Court advised the defendant of,his right to counsel at public
expense in all the proceedings in this Court.
The Court advised the defendant of his right to appeal from any
Judgment entered, to be represented by counsel in said appeal and
payment of costs incurred in said appeal at public expense and of
the appeal time being forty-two (42) days.
True copy of the Information furnished to the defendant and
counsel.
True name of defendant, JUSTIN GOODGION.
Formal reading of the Information waived by defendant.
The Court advised the defendant of the different pleas he could
enter to the charge(s) set forth in the I'nformation and of the
statutory time, not less than one (1) day, he would be entitled to
before entering his plea.
Defendant advised that he understood his rights, the charge(s) and
the possible penalties that could be imposed.
Statement by Mr. Ratliff.
Mr. Ratliff advises the Court the defendant will plea "Guilty" to
the charge of Aggravated Battery in the Amended Information. The
Staters recommendations are:
the defendant will receive a
Psychosexual evaluation and a PSI. If defendant is not a high
risk then the fines and fees will be $1,000.00 with $750.00
suspended with public defender and court costs reimbursed. No less
than 2 years and no more than 10 years of jail. The defendant
will be placed on felony probation for 5 years. The defendant
will have no contact with anyone under the age of 18 unless they
are a family member.
The defendant will complete all
recommendations on the psychosexual evaluation. 120 days of jail
with work release if qualifies. Restitution will be aid if need
be determined.
State will request retained jurisdiction if
defendant does not do recommendations.
Mr. Fisher advises that the full fee will be suspended if
completes his recommendations. The defendant will have no contact
with the victim.
Mr. Ratliff
defendant.

states that he has had

COURT MINUTES - APRIL 16, 2007
Page - 2

adequate time with

the

The Court advised the defendant that by pleading GUILTY, he would
be giving up his constitutional right to a trial by jury and the
right to confront witnesses and accusers and the privilege against
self incrimination. Further advised that the Court is not bound
by the negotiations of counsel at sentencing.
Defendant sworn and examined as a witness in own behalf and for
information of the Court.
In answer to the Court, defendant entered a plea of "GUILTYu.
The Court found that the defendant understood the rights he would
be giving up by his plea of guilty and that he understands that
the Court is not bound by the negotiations of counsel at the time
of sentencing in this matter.
The Court accepted the defendant's plea of "GUILTY"; and directed
the clerk to enter said plea.
Mr. Ratliff requests bond reduction or release.
No objection by Mr. Fisher.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff.
Statement made by Mr. Fisher.
The Court will reduce bond to $5,000.00.
The defendant was
advised absolutely no contact with the victim or any children
under the age of 18 accept for family members.
The Court ordered a presentence report and continued this matter
to June 18, 2007, at 1:30 o'clock p.m. for SENTENCING.
Defendant remanded to the custody of the Elmore County Sheriff.
10:34 a.m. End.

MARSA GRIMMETT
Clerk of the District Court

Reporter: K. Redlich
Clerk: K. Johnson
Reporter's Est. $

BYY
eput

Clerk

COURT MINUTES
Page - 3
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APRIL 16, 2007

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

vs

1
1

.

Case No. a-2-7

-\\%

1

1
1
1

DOB:
SSN

ORDER REDUCING BOND

Defendant.
TO:

The S h e r i f f o f Elmore County, S t a t e o f Idaho.

You are hereby notified that the bond in the above
entitled matter has been reduced to the amount stated below.
CHARGE

w-

Y

REDUCED BOND AMOUNT
CONDITIONS: No law violations, maintain contact with attorney,
make all scheduled court appearances,

\ '.Dated this

\b%ay

ORDER REDUCING BOND

of

\% .~ L - T

KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
190 South 4th East
Post Office Box 607
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-2 144 ext. 503
Facsimile: (208) 587-2 147
I.S.B. No. 6090

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
CW NO. CR-2007-0001156
plaints

AMENDED INFORMATION
vs.
JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
SSN:
DOB
efht.

1
1
)

1
1

Lee Fisher, Deputy Prosecuting Attomey in and for the County of Elmore, State of Idaho,
who, in the name of and by the authority of said State, prosecutes in its behalf, in proper person,
comes now before bDistrict Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
the County of Elmore, and gives the Court to understand and be informed that the Defendant is
accused by this Amended Idormation of the crime oE AGGRAVATED BATTERY,a felony, which
crime was committed as follows:

AGGRAVATED BATTERY
Felony, LC. b) 1&907(a), 18-903
That the Defendant, Justin W. Goodgion, on or about the 22nd day of June 2006, in the County
of Elmore, State of Idaho, did wilfully and unlawfully use force upon the person of S.T., causing

AMENDED MFORMATION - Page 1

great bodily harm permanent disfigurement, and/or permanent disability, to-wit: by having sexual
relations with S.T.,all in violation of I.C. $8 18-907(a) and 18-903.
All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against

the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho.
DATED This 16th day of April 2007.
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
1

BY:
Lee %her, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

AMENDED INFORMATION - Page 2

TERRY S. RATLIFF, ISB No. 3598
RATLIFE' LAW OFFICES, CETD.

2007 APR 30 AH 9: 43

290 South Second East
Mountain Home, ID 83647
Telephone: (208)587-0900
Facsimile: (208)587-6940

t.i,:i;i3A GfiitilYETT

CLERK OF THE COURT

1

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICI' COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAFIO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
STATE OF IDAHO,
)

Case No. CR-2007-0001156

Plaintiff,
)
VS.

JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
Defendant.

1

ORDER FOR PSYCHOSEXUAL
EVALUATION AT COUNTY EXPENSE

1

THE COURT having considered the stipulation of the parties herein, to wit, that the
Defendant have a psychosexual evaluation for the court to consider at sentencing herein, and
good cause appearing therefrom, and the Defendant being still in custody, therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That Dr. John Morgan will conduct' a Psychosexual
Evaluation of the Defendant and will have access to the Defendant at the Elrnore County Jail to
conduct said evaluation. Payment for the purpose of conducting said evaluation of the Defendant
shall be at County Expense in that the Defendant is both indigent and in need of said evaluation.

ORDER FOR PSYCHOSEXUAL EVALUATION AT COUNTY EXPENSE 1

Sy

Dated this

of April, 2007

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on t h i s a w d a y of April 2007, served a copy of the
within and foregoing ORDER FOR PSYCHOSEXUAL EVALUATION AT COUNTY
EXPENSE to:
Marsa Grimmett
C/O Elmore County Courthouse
Mountain Home, ID 83647
Boise, ID 83702

BY:

Kristina M. Schindele
Elrnore County
Prosecuting Attorney
190 South 4' East
P.O. Box 607
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Fax No. (208) 587-2147

By:

Terry S. Ratliff
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CHTD.
290 South 2ndEast
Mountain Home, ID 83647
Fax No.(208) 587-6940

By:

/hand

delivery
Federal Express
Certified Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile

-

HandDelivery
Federal Express
Certified Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission

/

Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Certified Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission

ORDER FOR PSYCHOSEXUAL EVALUATION AT COUNTY EXPENSE 2

027

Dr. John Morgan
704 Main Street
Caldwell, ID 83605-3744
Fax No. (208) 455-3495

By:
J

Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Certified Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL

JUNE 18, 2007

COURT MINUTES
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)

1
1
1
1
1
1

Plaintiff,
vs .
JUSTIN GOODGION,

Case No. CR-2007-1156
AGGRAVATED BATTERY

)

1
1

Defendant.

1

APPEARANCES:
Lee Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

Counsel for State

Terry Ratliff
Public Defender

Counsel for Defendant

Tape No. A216-07
4:48 p.m.

0132 to 0180

Call of case.

Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant not present for
proceedings, in custody, bond set at $$10,000.00.
The Court advises that they psychosexual evaluation has not been
received.
The Court set this for SENTENCING on August 6, 2007 at 1:30
o'clock p.m.
4:45 p.m. End.
MARSA GRIMMETT
Clerk of the District Court

-Y
e uty Clerk

COURT MINUTES - JUNE 18, 2007
Page - 1

Reporter: N. Omsberg
Clerk: K. Johnson
Reporter's Est. $
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TERRY S. R A W
RATLIFP LAW OIFJFICES, CBTD.
290 South Second East Street
Mountain Home, ID 83647
Tclqbne: (208) 587-0900
Facsimile:
(208) 587-6940
TSB: 3598

bi53.4 c;iiinHiTT

CLERK OF THE COURT

Attorney for the Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TBE F0T.TR'l.XJUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR l"HE COUNTY OF ]ELMORE

1

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

1
1
1
1

-VS-

1
1

JUSTIN W.GOODGTON,

Defendant.

Case No. CR-2007-1156

MOTION TO SEAL
]PSY~OsExuAL
EVALUATION

1
1

COMES NOW The Defendant and his attorncy of =cord, TERRY S= RATLIFF, of Ratliff
Law Offices, CM.,and hereby moves this Court to Seal, , b r n both the Court and the State, the

Psychosexual Evaluation conducted with the Defendant, until such time as the Defendnnt and
Counsel review the m e , first, and determiae whcthcr or not such evaluation comports with the
dictates of thc Dcf&tt's
.

,

rights pursuant to the Fifth and Sixth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution, 'mdsuch similar rights pursuant to the Constitution of the ~tate'of~daho.
Said Motion
is baxd on Estrad' v. State, 149 P.3d 833 (2006).

MOTION TO SEAL PSYCHOSEXUAL EVALUATION - Page 1
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The Sixth Amendment gurvantew a criminal defendant the right to counsel during all
"criticaI stages" of the adversarial proceedings against him. Unitcd States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 224, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967); Sme v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638,
637 P.2d 415 (1981). A defenbi's right to effective assistance [**9] of counsel
"extends to all critical a g e s of the prosecution where his substantial rights may bc
afZected, and stntmcing is one such m e . " Retamoza v. State, 125 Idaho 792, 796, 874
P.2d 603,607 (Ct.App. 1994) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128,134,88 S. Ct. 254,
256, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1967)). In determining whether a particular stage is "criticd," it is
necessary "to analyze whether potential substantiJ prejudice to defendant's rights inheres
in the particular conftontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prcjudicc."
Wade,388 U.S.at 227, 87 S. Ct. at 1932. "mf the stage is not criticat, thcre can be no
constitutional violation, no mattcr how dcficicnt counsel's performance." United Stotes v.
Benlian, 63 F.3d 824,827 (gmCir. 1995).
It makes no sense that a defendant would be entitled to counsel up through conviction or
entry of a guilty plea, and would also be entitled to representation at sentencing, yet
would not be entitled to the advicc of counscl in thc inkdm period regarding a
psychoscxual cvduation. Thc analysis in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S.454, 101 S. Ct,1866,
68 L. Ed. 359 (1981), [**I01 is instructive. In Estelle, the United States Suprcmo Court
ruled that the capital deftndant's prc-trial psychiatric evaluation was a critical stage of the
proceedings. Id at 470, 101 S. Ct. at 1877. Thc Court stated the m47de~mdanthad a
Sixth Amcndmcnt right to the assistance of counsel befoe submitting to the interview,
observing that it "is centnil to [the Sixth Amendment] principle that in addition to
counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against
the State at my stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where
counsel's absence might derogate fiom the accused's right to a fair
Id. at 470-71,
101 S. Ct.at 1876-77 (quotation omitted).
A psychosexual exam concerned with the future dafigmusness of a defendant is
distinguishable fiam a "mutine"Wsentencc investigation. Specifically, HNwdahoRule
of Criminal Procedure 32 does not require a defendant's participation in a presentonce
investigation report, whereas I.C. 8 18-8316 states, "lf ordcrcd by thc court, an oEender
, , shall submit to [a psychosexualJ twaluation..
The presmtence [**I11 report relics
greatly on infiirmation already available in public records, such as educational
background, residence history and employment information. See LC.R 32(b). In contrasf
a psychoscxual cvaluation liko thc one Estrrda faced is more in-depth and personal, and
includes an inquiry into the defmdantls sexual history, with verification by polygraph
being highly recommended. Because of the nature of the information sought, a defendant
is more liktiy to make incriminating statements during a psychosexual cvduation than
during a routine prcscntcncc investigation. As the district court in this casc concluded,
"the psychosexual cvaluation contained information concerning Esh.adavr > w e

.

,."

dangerowness."'
Importantly, the Estelle Court recognized b t the defendant was not seeking a right to
have counsc1 actually present during the exam. Id. at 471, a14, 101 S. Ct,at 1877, n.14.

MOTION TO SEAL PSYCHOSEXUAL 1EVAI;UA~ON-Page 2

This clarification reflects a diffmcc betwcen the "limited fight to the appointment and
presence of counsel rccopized as a F i f i Amendment safeguard in M r h " and a
defendants Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. See id; scc also State v.
Tinkham, 74 Wn. App. 102,871 P.2d 1127,1131 (Wd~CtApp.1994) [[**I21(ruling a
court-ordered psychological cxam to determine a defmdant's future dangerousness for
sentencing purposes is a critical stage requiring the aPis&nce of counsel, but cki@ing
"wc arc not holdin that counseI has a right to be present, only that the dcfcndmt has the
right to advice"). '%is
Court's hding that a Sixth Ammdment right to assiscnnce of
counsel in the critical stage of a psychosexual evaluation inquiring to a defendant's firturt
dangerousness, does not necessarily require the presence of counsel during the exam.
Because Estrada does not argue his attorney should h v c bccn present duting the
evaluation, this ruling is limited to the finding that a defendant has a [*838] Sixth
Amendment right to counsel regarding only the decision of whether to submit to a
psychoscxual exam.
Oral argument is requcstcd.
3 4
DATED This
of ~ u l 2007.
y

// 'day

-

MOTION TO SW PSYCHOSEXUALEVALUATION Page 3

032

OF SERVICE
/
-

I IlEREBY CERTW That I haw on this // day of July 2007, sewed a copy of thc
within and foregoing MOTION TO SEAL PSYCHOSEXUAL EVALUATION to:
Kristina Schindelc
Elmore County Prosecutor
190 south 4' East
Mountah Home, ID 83647

b

Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Certified Mail
U.S. Mail
% Facsimile Transmission

Fax NO.(208) 587-2 147

-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Plaintiff,
)

Case No. CR-2007-1156

VS.

)

JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
)
)
)

ORDERRE:
MOTION TO SEAL
PSYCHOSEXUAL EVALUATION

Defendant.
The defendant, through counsel, has filed a motion to seal psychosexual
evaluation. In his motion, the defendant "moves this Court to Seal, from both the Court
and the State, the Psychosexual Evaluation conducted with the Defendant, until such time
as the Defendant and Counsel review the same, first, and determine whether or not such
evaluation comports with the dictates of the Defendant's rights . . . Said Motion is based
on Estrada v. State, 149 P.3d 833 (2006)."
The defendant pled guilty in this case. Pursuant to his guilty plea and in open
court, the defendant was advised that in entering his guilty plea he waived any right to
object to participating in a psychosexual evaluation to assist the court in sentencing.
Consequently, Estrada is not applicable here.
If the defendant's position is that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently enter his guilty plea, the court would entertain a motion to withdraw the plea
and go to trial. The defendant may not have it both ways, however, by entering a guilty

plea and then asserting a right he was specifically advised he was waiving at the time he
entered his guilty plea.
Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, the defendant's motion is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED AND DATED this

/"

D' rict Judge

+

day of July 2007.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the following:
Lee Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Interdepartmental Mail
Terry Ratliff
Public Defender
Interdepartmental Mail
Dated this 12th of July, 2007.

" I

MARSA G ~ I M M E ' ~ ' ,
Clerk of the biitrict Court
, I

. -

h

By
Depu

erk

I
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
AUGUST 6 , 2007

HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL

COURT MINUTES
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs .
JUSTIN GOODGION,
Defendant .

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Case No. CR-2007-1156
AGGRAVATED BATTERY

APPEARANCES :
Lee Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

Counsel for State

Terry Ratliff
Public Defender

Counsel for Defendant

CD NO. D02-07
10:49 to 10:51
10:49 a.m. Call of case.
Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant present, in custody,
bond set at $$10,000.00.
The Court advises that there has been a letter received that the
PSI has not been completed.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff.
The Court continued this matter for SENTENCING on September 17,
2007 at 1:30 o'clock p.m.
Defendant remanded to the custody of the sheriff.
10:51 a.m. End.
MARSA GRIMMETT
he District Court

COURT MINUTES - AUGUST 6, 2007
Page - 1

Reporter: N. Omsberg
Clerk: K. Johnson
Reporter's Est. $

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHEREU

SPETEMBER 17, 2007

COURT MINUTES
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs .
JUSTIN GOODGION,
Defendant .

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Case No. CR-2007-1156
AGGRAVATED BATTERY

)

1
1
1

APPEARANCES :
Lee Fisher
Deputy Prosecutinq Attorney

Counsel for State

Terry Ratliff
Public Defender

Counsel for Defendant

3:37 p.m. Call of case.
Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant present, in custody,
bond set at $$10,000.00.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff regarding the corrections to the PSI
and he will stipulate to the defendant going on a rider.
All parties have received and had adequate time to review the
report.
Mr. Fisher states corrections.
Mr. Ratliff states corrections.
The defendant had no corrections.
No testimony.

COURT MINUTES - SEPTEMBER 17, 2007
Page - 1

Statement made by Mr. Fisher.
Mr. Fisher's recommendations:
Both parties stipulate to a rider. He advises that there is no
restitution that the State knows of. The entire fine be suspended
but the court costs and public defender reimbursement shall
remain.
The defendant pay reimbursement for the psychosexual
evaluation.
And the defendant is to register for Selective
Service.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff.
Mr. Ratliff's recommendations:
The defendant to go on a rider.
No statement by the defendant.
No legal cause shown.
The Court sentenced the defendant to 15 years incarceration with 5
years fixed and 10 years indeterminate and the Court will retain
jurisdiction. The defendant will have credit for 174 days against
the fixed portion of the sentence. The defendant will pay a fine
of $1,000.00 with $700.00 suspended plus standard court costs and
No order for
$250.00 reimbursement to the public defender .
restitution at this time. The defendant will have no additional
jail time. The defendant is to have no contact with the victim or
any member of the family. No fine will be imposed. The defendant
is to receive relationship and anger programs, substance abuse
programs, cognitive based programs, obtain his GED, and any other
such programs deemed appropriate by rider personnel..
The Court advised the defendant of his right to appeal.
The defendant understands his right to appeal.
No legal cause shown.
The defendant remanded to the custody of the sheriff's office.
3:51 p.m.

End.

MARSA GRIMMETT
Clerk of the District Court
'

B

C

D pu y Clerk
y

y

COURT MINUTES - SEPTEMBER 17, 2007
Page - 2

Reporter: N. Omsberg
Clerk: K. Johnson
Reporter's Est. $
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 0

U

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs .

)

Case No. CR-2007-1156

JUST
DOB:
SSN:

)
)

JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT
RETAINED JURISDICTION

Defendant.

)

On the 17th day of September, 2007, before the Honorable
Michael E. Wetherell, District Judge, personally appeared Lee
Fisher, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Elmore,
State of Idaho, and the defendant with his attorney Terry
Ratliff, this being the time fixed for pronouncing judgment in
this matter.
The defendant was informed by the Court of the nature of the
Information filed against him for the crime of RAPE, Felony, I.C.
5 18-6101(1); of his arraignment thereon on April 16, 2007; plea

of "Guiltyn thereto on April, 2007 to the crime of AGGRAVATED
BATTERY as charged in the Amended Information; and of the receipt
and review of a presentence investigation report.

JUDGMENT - Page 1

The Court asked whether the defendant had any objections
or corrections to be made to the presentence report to which
minor correction were made.
The Court asked whether the defendant had witnesses or
evidence to present on a hearing in mitigation of punishment;
heard statements from counsel; and gave defendant an
opportunity to make a statement.
The defendant was asked if he had any legal cause to show
why judgment should not be pronounced against him, to which he
replied that he had none.
And no sufficient cause being shown or appearing to the
Court why judgment should not be rendered;
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
defendant is guilty as charged and convicted; that the offense
for which the defendant is adjudged guilty herein was committed
on or about the 22nd day of June, 2006.
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant is sentenced
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-2513 to the custody of the
Idaho State Board of Correction, to be held and incarcerated by
said Board in a suitable place for a period of fifteen (15) years
with five (5) years fixed and ten (10) years indeterminate; with
credit for 174 days served; with the court retaining jurisdiction
for 180 days pursuant to I.C. 5 19-2601(4).
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IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that pursuant to Idaho Code Section
31-3201A(b) the defendant shall pay Court costs in the amount of
$17.50; County Administrative Surcharge Fee in the amount of
$10.00 pursuant to I.C. 5 31-4602; P.O.S.T. Academy fees in the
amount of $10.00 pursuant to I.C. 5 31-3201B; ISTARS technology
fee in the amount of $10.00 pursuant to I.C. 5 31-3201(5);
$50.00 to the Victims Compensation Fund pursuant to I.C. 5 721025; $250.00 for reimbursement of public defender fees pursuant
to I.C. 5 19-854(c), $10.00 drug hotline fee;
IT IS FURTHER

ORDERED that pursuant

to

Idaho Code

Section 19-5304 the defendant shall pay restitution to be
reserved until completion of the rider;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Fines, Court Costs and
Restitution shall be paid through the Clerk of the District
Court, upon the defendant's release from custody, as directed by
the Department of Probation and Parole;
Defendant shall obtain his GED, receive cognitive based
programs, relationship and anger programs, substance abuse
programs, and such other programs deemed appropriate by rider
personnel.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant be committed to the
custody of the Sheriff of Elmore County, Idaho, for delivery
FORTHWITH and within 7 days, to the custody of the Idaho State
Board of Correction at the Idaho State Penitentiary or other
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facility within the State designated by the State Board of
Correction.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk deliver a certified

copy of this Judgment and Commitment to the said Sheriff, which
shall serve as the commitment of the defendant.
Dated this

17

6
day of September, 2007.

/

D'strict Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

\")

day of September,

2007, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the within
instrument to:

Elmore County Prosecutor
Interdepartmental Mail
Terry Ratliff
Public Defender
Interdepartmental Mail
Carolee Kelly
Department of Correction
Central Records
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110
Boise, Idaho 83706
Elmore County Jail
Interdepartmental Mail
\

, ' ,

MARS^ G R I ~ E ~ T
Clerk of thql~ihtrkctCourt
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 0
;
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C0UNTy OF
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THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs .

1
1

JUSTIN GOODGION,
DOB:
SSN:

ORDER TO TRANSPORT

Defendant.
It appearing that the above-named defendant is in the custody
of the Idaho State Board of Correction, and that it is necessary
that he be brought before the Court for further proceedings.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that the Sheriff of Elmore County,
State of Idaho, bring the defendant to the Court in Mountain Home,
Idaho, County of Elmore, State of Idaho, on Monday the 3rd day of
March, 2008, at the hour of 11:OO o'clock a.m.
IT

IS FURTHER

ORDERED, that

the

Idaho State Board

of

Correction release the said defendant to the Sheriff of Elmore
County, State of Idaho, for the purpose of the aforementioned
appearance and for the Sheriff of Elmore County, State of Idaho,
to hold said defendant until such time as he is released on
probation or ordered returned to the Board of Correction.
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Dated this

day of February,

t

D' kkict Judge
..

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Marsa Grimmett, hereby certify that on this 20th day of
February, 2008, a true and correct copy of the ORDER was served or
mailed, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:
Carolee Kelly
Records Administrator
Dept. of Corrections
Central Records
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110
Boise, ID 83706
Faxed to: 327-7444
Interdepartmental Mail
Sheriff
Prosecutor
Public Defender

I

MARSA GRIMMETT '
Clerk of the District Court
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KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
190 South 4th East
Post Office Box 607
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-2144 ext. 503
Facsimile: (208) 587-2147
I.S.B. No. 6090

2C3C FEB 28

PH 2: 57

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

1

1
1

VS.

JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
Defendant.

TO:

1
1

1
)

Case No. CR-2007-0001156
NOTICE OF FILING OF MATERIALS
FOR RETAINED JURISDICTION REVIEW
HEARING

1
1

THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT AND TO HIS ATTORNEY,
YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE TAKEN NOTICE That the State has filed the

attached materials for considerationof the Court at the retainedjurisdiction review hearing scheduled
before the above-entitled Court at the ElrnoreCounty Courthouseon March 3,2008, at the hour of 11:00

DATED This 28th day of February 2008.
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
t
/

-

Lee Fisher
Elmore County Deputy Prosecutor

NOTICE OF FILING OF MATERIALS FOR RETAINED JURISDICTION REVIEW HEARING

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 28th day o f F e b ~ 2 0 0 8I ,caused a copy of the foregoing
document, together with the attachmentsthereto, to be served upon the Defendant's attorney of record by
facsimile andlor hand delivery/interofficemail.
Terry Ratliff
290 South 2ndEast
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
KRZSTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORJ,COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
a

BY:
Lee Fisher
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CASE #:

SUBJECT:

07-2749

EVENT #:

0712180013.A15

RAPE
GOODGION, JUSTIN W.; TAYLOR, AMANDA RUTH; CORCORAN, KELSEY
MAY; UNKNOWN, JOHN (aka SQUISHY); UNKNOWN, SIERRA; TAYLOR,
ELIZABETH; UNKNOWN, GAVIN

Approximately sometime in January of 2007, I received a telephone
call from ELIZABETH TAYLOR. Ms. Taylor said she used to reside in
Mountain Home, but is now located in Montley, Minnesota. She
informed me she wanted a report done because her daughter, AMANDA
TAYLOR, was raped while they resided in Mountain Home, Idaho. Ms.
Taylor stated the suspect was JUSTIN GOODGION. She went on to say
Amanda was currently having psychological problems as she is trying
to deal with what happened to her.
I spoke to Ms. Taylor in regards to this case and informed her I
needed Amanda to complete a written statement and send it to me at
the Mountain Home Police Department. Ms. Taylor stated she would
email the statement to me. I provided Ms. Taylor with my email
address; however, I did not receive a statement.
Later in the year I spoke with Ms. Taylor again and informed her I
never did receive the email of the statement I requested. Ms. Taylor
advised me once again she would send the statement via email.
The last time I spoke with Ms. Taylor was approximately October of
2007, at which time I again told her I had not received anything from
her in regards to the rape. Ms. Taylor stated she would attempt to
mail the statement, through the U.S. Postal Service, at that time.
I finally received letters from the Taylor's, one written by Ms.
Taylor - dated November 7, 2007, and the other a two (2) page letter
from Amanda. In Amanda's letter she describes the incident that
occurred between Justin and her, and stated the first incident
occurred June 21, 2006. Amanda said Justin walked up to one of her
friends, KELSEY CORCORAN, and told Kelsey they decided to go to a
subject's, JOHN
(NFI), house, as Kelsey wanted to engage in
sexual acts with Justin.
Amanda stated Justin and Kelsey went inside a camper, outside of
"Squishy's" house, and shortly thereafter Amanda heard Justin calling
her name. Amanda stated she then went into the camper and, as she
did, Justin grabbed her by the back of the hair and threw her on the
bed next to Kelsey. Amanda asked Justin what he was doing to which
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She s a i d J u s t i n t h e n took o f f h e r s h i r t
he t o l d h e r t o " s h u t up".
and b r a and began c a r e s s i n g and l i c k i n g h e r b r e a s t . She s a i d s h e
t o l d him t o s t o p and t h a t he d i d n o t have t o do t h a t . Amanda s a i d
J u s t i n a g a i n t o l d h e r t o be q u i e t and took h e r p a n t s and underwear
o f f . He t h e n began t o i n s e r t h i s f i n g e r s i n t o h e r vagina.
Amanda a l s o s t a t e d s h e was a v i r g i n s o , a s J u s t i n had h i s f i n g e r s
i n s i d e h e r vagina i t was v e r y uncomfortable.
She s t a t e d s h e t o l d
J u s t i n t o s t o p and began t r y i n g t o f i g h t him o f f , and a g a i n he would
n o t s t o p . She s t a t e d Kelsey was l y i n g t h e r e w i t h h e r back t u r n e d t o
them, n o t watching what was going on. Amanda s t a t e d s h e asked Kelsey
t o , "Do something", b u t Kelsey i g n o r e d h e r . Amanda s a i d t h a t i s when
J u s t i n took h e r , Amanda's, p a n t s o f f . She t r i e d t o s i t up t o r u n ,
b u t h i t h e r head on t h e s h o r t c e i l i n g of t h e camper. She s a i d t h a t
h i t t i n g h e r head h u r t h e r a l o t and, t h e r e f o r e , i t took a second f o r
h e r t o g e t h e r " w i t s w back.
Amanda s t a t e d a t t h a t time J u s t i n had h i s p a n t s and b o x e r ' s o f f and
grabbed a condom, p u t it on h i s p e n i s and began p e n e t r a t i n g h e r
vagina w i t h h i s p e n i s . She s t a t e d s h e begged him t o s t o p b u t he
r e f u s e d . A t t h a t t i m e Kelsey was s t i l l l y i n g w i t h h e r back t u r n e d t o
them. Amanda s t a t e d J u s t i n had an orgasm and, w h i l e doing s o ,
grabbed h e r by t h e back of t h e head and 'forced h e r t o conduct o r a l
s e x on him. She s a i d a t t h a t time he f i n a l l y l e t h e r go. She s a i d
s h e was c r y i n g w h i l e g e t t i n g d r e s s e d and J u s t i n t o l d h e r i f s h e t o l d
anyone about t h e i n c i d e n t he would k i l l h e r and h e r family. Amanda
s a i d he t o l d h e r no one would b e l i e v e h e r because Kelsey would n o t
t e l l , and he would j u s t t e l l everyone she, Amanda, wanted i t . Amanda
s t a t e d t h a t t h e condom broke d u r i n g t h e r a p e and he threw i t o u t s i d e
t h e camper.
The second i n c i d e n t Amanda d e s c r i b e d i n h e r l e t t e r was d a t e d J u l y 1 4 ,
2006. She s t a t e d t h a t a f t e r t h e f i r s t rape, s h e went "down-hill"
f a s t because s h e began d r i n k i n g a l c o h o l and smoking m a r i j u a n a . She
s a i d s h e a l s o began sneaking o u t of h e r house and even r a n away once
a f t e r b e i n g grounded by h e r mother f o r a v e r y l o n g time. She s a i d
s h e snuck out of h e r window on J u l y 1 4 , 2006 and went t o a f r i e n d s ' ,
HOLLY (NFI) house.
According t o Amanda's l e t t e r , H o l l y ' s mother
would n o t l e t Amanda s t a y a t t h e i r r e s i d e n c e , s o Amanda c a l l e d a
f r i e n d of t h e i r s , TOM (NFI), t o p i c k h e r up. Amanda s t a t e d s h e went
t o Tom's mother's house, a t which time Tom and h i s mom d e c i d e d t o go
t o Boise, Idaho; t h e r e f o r e , Amanda ended up on t h e s t r e e t s walking
around. Amanda s a i d s h e was n e a r t h e movie t h e a t e r and J u s t i n was
walking toward Tom's house. She s a i d when J u s t i n saw h e r , he grabbed
h e r by wrapping h i s arms around h e r v e r y t i g h t - l i k e i n a b e a r hug,
and took h e r t o Tom's house. Amanda s t a t e d s h e t r i e d t o f i g h t him a s
b e s t s h e could, b u t J u s t i n i s 6 f e e t t a l l and s t r o n g e r t h a n a 5 ' 4
female.
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Amanda stated Justin forced her through Tom's door and into the
living room, where he began removing her clothing. She stated that
around that time she gave up hope and had nothing left to fight with.
Justin inserted his fingers into her vagina and also penetrated her
with his penis without a condom. Amanda said when he was finished
raping her, she was crying while getting dressed, and he made the
same threats he had the first time he raped her. Amanda stated she
ran out of the house and went to her friend, GAVIN's (NFI), house.
Amanda stated her mother discovered her missing and found her at
Gavin's house. She said Gavin's mother made her leave and at that
time she was "high" and would not get into her mother's vehicle. Ms.
Taylor called the Police and reported Amanda as a runaway and the
Police came and arrested Amanda, Case# 06-1400. Ms. Taylor stated at
that time Amanda was taken to Intermountain Hospital in Boise, Idaho.
Amanda stated Ms. Taylor was never aware of her being raped, and she
did not tell her mother until September as she, Amanda, was placed in
a mental facility in Texas. Amanda said they moved because Ms.
Taylor wanted to get her out of the environment she was in while in
Mountain Home. Amanda stated phe did not choose to press charges at
that time as she says she was not mentally stable to do so. Amanda
stated she "broke downn in January, and then informed a school
counselor in Minnesota. The counselor then contacted law
enforcement, who then contacted the Mountain Home Police Department.
Amanda stated she emailed the report at that time; however, she
understood we did not get it. She apologized for taking so long to
send another report, but went on to say she is in counseling and was
not ready to relive the two rapes again. Amanda stated she has
nightmares and just wanted her life back. She stated she was not
ready to relive the rapes one more time so she decided to email the
statements. The name at the bottom of the statement is Amanda R.
Taylor, 64 Harrison, Montley Minnesota.
I was able to find out through my investigation that Justin was sent
to the Department of Correction's due to a charge of statutory rape
with another female. He is currently in the Idaho Department of
Correction, Cottonwood.
I contacted the Department of Corrections to see if they would
interview Justin for me, and was told they do not do things like
that. They advised I contact the Idaho County Sheriff's Office.

I then contacted the Idaho County Sheriff's Department and spoke with
Detective MIKE QUINTAL. I asked him if he could conduct an interview
for me and he stated he would. I then faxed Detective Quintal
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everything I had in regards to this case so he could conduct the
interview. I sent him a fax on November 27, 2007 at approximately
1030 hours.
I received a telephone call on November 29, 2007 from Detective
Quintal stating he did not receive the fax. I faxed the paperwork
again on November 29, 2007 at approximately 1230 hours. I also sent
Detective Quintal a PDF file of the information via email. He called
me back again and stated he had not received the fax, but did receive
the PDF file via email. Detective Quintal stated he would interview
Justin in a couple days.
I received a telephone call from Detective Quintal stating that he
interviewed Justin in the Department of Corrections. Detective
Quintal later emailed the recorded interview he had with Justin. I
received a telephone call from Detective Quintal and he stated he
would send me the report as soon as he had it finished. He stated
Justin admitted to having sex with Amanda Taylor and Kelsey Corcoran.
I am currently awaiting Detective Quintal's report so I can attach it
to this report.
After learning some information of the interview from Detective
Quintal, I was able to find out that Kelsey still resides in Mountain
Home, 463 NW Sandpiper Avenue. I was able to contact THERESA
AGUIRRE, Kelseyfs mother, at her place of employment, 366-2614, on
December 13, 2007. I attempted to try Theresa's home telephone with
negative results. When I spoke to Theresa I informed her of the
information that I had received and that I needed to speak with her
daughter as soon as possible. Theresa stated that was okay but she,
Theresa, wanted to be present. Theresa stated she would not be able
to do that until December 17, 2007 at 1800 hours':
On December 17, 2007 I received a telephone call from Theresa asking
if I still wanted to meet with them and I advised that I did.
Theresa and Kelsey arrived at the Mountain Home Police Department on
December 17, 2007 at 1800 hours. I spoke to Kelsey and she confirmed
she did have sex with Justin on one occasion. When I asked Kelsey
about the rape Amanda is reporting and the allegations that she,
Kelsey, was present at the time, Kelsey stated that a rape never
happened. Kelsey said Amanda and Justin did have sex, but Amanda
went into the trailer knowing what was going to happen, and she
wanted to have sex with Justin. When I asked Kelsey when she thought
thiq incident occurred, she stated it was the summer of 2004.
I had been informed earlier by someone that Justin had sex with three
(3) girls in one evening. Kelsey stated that allegation was not true
and that she did have sex with Justin but it was before he had sex
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with Amanda. Kelsey identified the third female as SIERRA (NFI), and
said Justin and Sierra had sex on a different evening. I asked
Kelsey how she knew Amanda and Justin had sex and she stated that she
was sitting in the truck of the camper and that she "just knew they
were having sex".
I informed Kelsey and Theresa of the possibility of a court trial,
and told them they might be receiving a telephone call from the
Elmore County Prosecutor in regards to this case.

As of the date of this report, I have not received Deputy Quintal's
report; however, as soon as it arrives I will attach it to this
report and send it to the Elmore County Prosecutorls Office.
Nothing further.

Detective Humberto Fuentes
Mtn. Home Police Department
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Officer Melanie Rhodes
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CASE #:
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EVENT #:

0712180013.B15

RE: ORIGINAL REPORT 07-2749; 0712180013.A15; DATED 01/??/07
SUBJECT :

RAPE
GOODGION, JUSTIN W. ; TAYLOR, AMANDA RUTH;
CORCORAN, KELSEY MAY; UNKNOWN, JOHN (aka
SQUISHY); UNKNOWN, SIERRA; TAYLOR, ELIZABETH;
UNKNOWN, GAVIN

On December 20, 2007, I received an emailed copy of Detective MIKE
QUINTAL'S, of the Idaho County Sheriff's Department, report. It is
now attached to this report and will be sent to the prosecutor's
office.
As of this time there is nothing further.

Detective Humberto Fuentes
Mtn. Home Police Department

CC:

County Prosecutor
Officer Melanie Rhodes
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hfuentes
From:

Mike Quintal [mquintal@idahowunty.org]

Sent:
To:

Thursday, December 20,2007 253 PM
hfuentes

Subject:

Goodgien interview

Attachments: GoodgienJustin.wav; Goodgien reportdoc
Attached is a brief narrative and the audio from the interview. Let me know if you need anything else.
Mike Quintal

INCIDENT REPORT
OFFENSE:

Agency Assist (Courtesy Interview)

SUSPECT:

Justin W. Goodgien 6-18-87

LOCATION:

North Idaho Correctional Institute

D A T mME:

12-4-07/19:00

Ireceived a request by Detective Sgt. Fuentes, with Mountain Home Police Department; to

conduct a courtesy Interview with Goodgien in regards to a rape investigation.
On the above listed date and time I made contact with Goodgien for the purpose of conducting
an interview. When Imade contact with Goodgien Iidentified myself and informed him why Iwas there
to talk with him. Ialso advised Goodgien that he didn't have to speak with me and he could leave at any
time. Goodgien indicated that he would speak with me. Iadvised Goodgien of his Miranda rights prior
to questioning him.
Goodgien informed me of the following during the interview:
See audio recording for full detail.
Iasked Goodgien if he knew the victim and other persons listed in the case report. Initially Goodgien

denied knowing any of the parties from the case. Goodgien stated to me that he knows twenty-three
Amanda's from Mountain Home. Iasked Goodgien about whether he was in Mountain Home during the
alleged incident. He told me that he was in Nampa staying with Gary Hubbard, who happened to also
be an inmate at North ldaho Correctional Institute. Goodgien said that he was in Mountain Home until
around June 26m. He then went to Nampa, where he worked intermittently and stayed at different
places.
Iasked Goodgien if he ever had intercoursewith a girl named Kelsey from Mountain Home. He told me
that he had not. Iasked if he ever had sex with a girl named Amanda from Mountain Home. He told me
that he had sex with Amanda Wilson over two years ago.

Goodgien then told me that he knew a Kelsie, unknown last name; I asked Goodgien if he ever had
intercourse with a girl named Kelsey from Mountain Home. He told me that he had not. Iasked if he
ever had sex with a girl named Amanda from Mountain Home. He told me that he had sex with Amanda
Wllson over two years ago.

Iexplained to Goodgien that it would be very easy for investigatorsto prove that he wasn't being honest
with me about knowing the people involved in the case. Itold him that if he lied about knowing the
people involved it might seem that he was lying about committing the offense.

Goodgien told me that he did have sex with a girl named Kelsie while in a camper at Josh Moyefs house.
After havingsex with Kelsie a girl he knew as Amanda Able came by the camper and Kelsie yelled for her
to come in. Amanda came in the camper and she (Amanda) asked for him to take her virginity.
Goodgien said that he didn't know Amanda's age at the time and he had drunk a bottle of Jack Daniels
about three hours prior. He hadjust had sex with Kelsie and didn't have any pants on at the time. He
stated that he knew what he was doing was wrong, but he did it anyway. Goodgien told me that he had
sex with Amanda while wearing the same condom that he had used while having sex with Kelsie. Iasked
ifAmanda made any statements or indicated that she didn't want to have sex with him. He said that
she didn't.
Goodgien told me that after having sex with Kelsie and then Amanda that they left Moyer's camper and
went to a girl's house named Sierra. Goodgien said that while there he had sex with Sierra, which he
said he was subsequently charged for. He and Amanda later left Sierra's house and he walked her close
to her house and then gave her a hug and a kiss before saying goodbye.
Goodgien told me that the above inadent is the only sexual encounter he had with Amanda. He denies
meeting her on the street and having sex with her at Tom's house. Goodgien also told me that Amanda
had e-mailed him messages on his "myspace" account saying that she wanted to get back together with
him. I asked i f he still had his account on "Myspace". He gave me an account name of "sexyymanbeast"
with a password of "mikalal" and an e-mail address of sexwdaddv4u@vahoo.comwith a password of
"augustus3".
Ispoke with Goodgien about whether he would be willing to submit to a polygraph examination to
confirm his honesty about what he had told me. Goodgien indicated that he would be willing to take an
examination.

Detective Mike Quintal
Idaho County Sheriff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL

MARCH 3, 2008

COURT MINUTES
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs .

1
1
)

Case No. CR-2007-1156

1
1

AGGRAVATED BATTERY

JUSTIN GOODGION,
Defendant.

j
APPEARANCES :
Lee Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

Counsel for State

Terry Ratliff
Public Defender

Counsel for Defendant

11:39 a.m.

Call of case.

Time and date set for JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW, defendant present, in
custody, bond set at $$10,000.00.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff.
Mr. Ratliff advises that he has gone over the rider review but
needs to discuss some new information to the State.
Mr. Ratliff advises that he will be filing a 19-2524.
Statement made by Mr. Fisher.
Response by the Court. The Court advises that it will exercise
its discretion and continue this matter for an additional 30 past
the 180 days.

COURT MINUTES
Page - 1

- MARCH 3, 2008

The Court set this matter for HEARING on March 17, 2008 at 11:OO
o'clock a.m. and SENTENCING on April 7, 2008 at 1:30 o'clock p.m.
The defendant remained in custody of the sheriff.
11:43 a.m.

End.

MARSA GRIMMETT
Clerk of the District Court

COURT MINUTES - MARCH 3, 2008
Page - 2

Reporter: N. Omsberg
Clerk: K. Johnson
Reporter's Est. $

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHEREU

MARCH 17, 2008

COURT MINUTES

1
1
1
1

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs .

)

Case No. CR-2007-1156
AGGRAVATED BATTERY

1

1

JUSTIN GOODGION,

1
1
1
1

Defendant.
APPEARANCES:

Lee Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

Counsel for State

Terry Ratliff
Public Defender

Counsel for Defendant

CD NO. D9-08

11:51 to 12:07

11:51 a.m. Call of case.
Time and date set for HEARING, defendant present, in custody.
The reviews the rider review.
Statement made by Mr. Fisher.
Mr. Ratliff advises that the defense didn't order an evaluation
pursuant to 19-2524.
Statement made by Mr. Fisher regarding the time limit for the
evaluation.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff requesting the Court to take this
under advisement.
The Court advises that it cal issue a written opinion as rapidly
as it can.

COURT MINUTES - MARCH 17, 2008
Page - 1

The Court addresses counsel regarding 19-2524.
The Court advises that time has past for that evaluation and that
evaluation must be requested before the original sentence was
imposed.
The Court further advises that the request for the evaluation is
not timely and is not appropriate to order when a rider is
relinquished.
The Court will not have a 19-2524 evaluation performed where
relinquished jurisdiction is recommended.
The Court advises that this is set for SENTENCING on April 7, 2008
at 1:30 o'clock p.m.
The defendant remained in the custody of the sheriff.
12:07 p.m. End.

MARSA GRIMMETT

COURT MINUTES - MARCH 17, 2008
Page - 2

Reporter: N. Omsberg
Clerk : K. Johnson
Reporter's Est. $

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
APRIL 7 , 2008

HONORABLE MICHAEL E . WETHERELL

COURT MINUTES
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

1
1
)

1

vs .

Case No. CR-2007-1156
CR-2008-932

)
)

JUSTIN GOODGION,
Defendant.

1
1
)

1
)

APPEARANCES :
Lee Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

Counsel for State

Terry Ratliff
Public Defender

Counsel for Defendant

5:58 p.m.

Call of case.

Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant present, in custody.
Mr. Fisher advises that the defendant will be pleading guilty to
CR-2008-932 Count I. The updated PSI will be waived and will use
the rider review. The fine amount will be left in the Courtfs
discretion and the defendant will pay reimbursement to the public
defender's office and standard court costs. The defendant would
be incarcerated for a period of 15 years with 5 years fixed and 10
years indeterminate to run concurrent with CR-2007-1156. The
restitution is to be determined and the restitution report would
be pending until the defendant returns from a 2nd rider.
Response by the Court.
Statement made by Mr. Fisher.
Mr. Ratliff advises that the defendant will waive his arraignment
of the new case.

COURT MINUTES - APRIL 7, 2008
Page - 1

The Court addresses the deft of his arraignment rights.
The defendant requested that the he would
arraignment rights read to him again.

like to have the

The Court advised the defendant of his arraignment rights on case
CR-2008-932.
Mr. Ratliff advises that the defendant has dyslexia.
The Court read the Information to the defendant.
The Court advises that the defendant will be entering a guilty
plea on CR-2008-932 to Count I.
Mr. Ratliff has had adequate time with the defendant.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff.
The defendant advises that he understands that his counsel can
file a Motion to Suppress but waives the right of the Motion to
Suppress regarding his admissions.
Mr. Ratliff consents to the guilty plea.
The defendant agrees with his representations.
The defendant sworn and examined on his own behalf.
Mr. Ratliff advises that the defendant will waive his updated PSI.
Mr. Ratliff advises the Court about the medical issues that the
defendant has.
The Court accepts the guilty plea and directs that they be
entered.
The Court advises that it will move directly to sentencing.
The Court advises counsel about the 19-2524 evaluation.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff.
Response by the Court.
Statement made by Mr. Fisher regarding the State has no objection
to the defendant remaining in custody for the evaluation.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff.

COURT MINUTES
Page - 2

-

APRIL 7, 2008

Counsel is ready to proceed to sentencing on both cases.
The Court advises that on CR-2007-1156 the Court will place the
defendant on probation for a period of 15 years with 377 days
That sentence is being imposed for the purpose for
credit .
allowing the defendant in CR-2007-1156 to obtain a 19-2524
evaluation pursuant to Idaho law.
The Court advises that the
underlying sentencing is incarceration for a period of 15 years
with 5 years fixed and 10 years indeterminate. The Court further
advises that the only condition of probation is that the defendant
will remain in custody of the Elmore County Jail pending
completion of the evaluation and then be brought back in front of
the Court for sentencing. The Court reserves the right to send
the defendant on a 2nd rider upon completion of the evaluation
without violation of probation. The Court will order a 19-2524
evaluation in case CR-2008-932. The 2 matters will be brought
back in front of the Court for sentencing. The Court will impose
a joint rider on both cases as agreed by both parties with
reviewing the evaluation at that sentencing.
Statement made by Mr. Fisher.
The Court order a 2nd psychosexual evaluation will be down.
Mr. Fisher requests that restitution be left open.
Response by the Court regarding the restitution.
Mr. Fisher gave the Court victim statements.
The Court set this matter for SENTENCING on June 2, 2008 at 1:30
o'clock p.m.
The defendant remained in the custody of the sheriff.
6:40 p.m. End.

MARSA GRIMMETT
Clerk of the District Court

COURT MINUTES
Page - 3

-

APRIL 7, 2008

Reporter: N. Omsberg
Clerk: K. Johnson
Reporter's Est. $
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL

, . - ' \ 5 1; 8:45

%&'~~\IcT

OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE: COUNTY 0
1

1

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

i

Plaint if P,

JUSTI

1

i

N,

DOB:
SSN:

I

~ M E N T SUSPENDED
,
SENTENCg, ORDER OF
PROBATION and CoMMZTMENT

)

1

Defendant.

)

O n the 7th day of April, 2 0 0 6 , before

the Honorable Michael

E. Watharell, District ~ u d g e ,pereonally appeared Lee Fisher,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Elmore, State of
Idaho, and the defendant with h i e attorney Terry Ratliff, this

being the tima fixed f o r pronouncing judgment in this matter.

The defendant w a s informed by the Court of the nature o f the
Information filed against h i m for the crime of RAPE, Fmlany, I.C.
§i

of

1 8 - 6 z O l ( l ) ; o f hia
' ' G u i l t y 1 thereto

arraignment thsreorl on April 16, 2 0 0 7 ; plea
on April

1 6 , 2007

of the crime of AGGRAVATED

aATTERY as charged in the Amcnded Infm-mation; and of the receipt

and review of a presentence investigation report.
The Court aaksd whether the defendant had any objections
or corrcctione to be made to the presentence report, which the

defendant stated he had none.

04/14/2008

073

HON 13:46

CTI/RX NO

90311

The Couxt asked whether the defendant had witnesses or
evidence to preetent on a hearing in mitigation of punishment;

heard statementsl Prom counael; and

gave

defendant an ~pportunity

to make a statement.
The defendant was asked if he had any legal cause to show

why judgment ahould not be pronounced against him, to which ha
replied that he had none.
And no sufficient cauae being shown or appearing to the
Court why judgment ehould not be rendered;

IT IS THIGREFORE ORDEmD, ADJIJbGED AND DECREED that the
defendant is g u i l t y as charged and convicted~ that the offense

for which the defendant; is adjudged guilty herein

w a s connnitted

on or about the 22nd day of June, 2 0 0 6 .
IT IS F U R ~ R
ADJUDGED that the defendant is sentenced

pursuant to Idaho Coda Seetion 19-a513 to the custody of the
Idaho S t a t e Board of Correction, to bm held and incarcerated by

eaid Board in a suitable place for a period fifteen (15) years
with f i v e ( 5 ) years fixed and ten (10) yeara indeterminate;
That pursuant to Idaho Code Section 1 8 - 3 0 9 , the defendant

shall be .given credit for the t i m e already served upon the charge
specified herein of 377 daya.
Execution of such judgment is euspended and defendant,
JUSTIN W. O O D Q T O N , ia placed on probation f o r a period of
fifteen (15) years, under the following conditions, to w i t :

S U S P W E D GENTENCB AND ORDER OF PRORATION

-2

A.

That the probation is granted subject to the below

listed special condition and with the understanding and agreement
of the parties that the Court may at any time, cause the
probationer to be returned to the Court for the imposition of
sentence as prescribed by law or any other punishment as the
Court may see fit to hand down, after the completion of the
evaluation pursuant to I.C. Section 19-2524 in his other pending
criminal case CR-2008-932 which is currently before the Court.
The 19-2524 evaluation was requested by the defense and the
defendant has specifically agreed in open Court to placement on
probation temporarily in this case to allow the evaluation to be
done prior to sentencing on the other charges.
B.

Special conditions, to-wit:
1.Defendant will remain in the custody of the Elmore
County Jail pending completion of the 19-2524
evaluation and upon completion of said evaluation the
defendant will be brought back before the Court to be
sentenced to a 2nd rider to run concurrent with CR2008-932 if deemed appropriate by the Court following
review of the evaluation. Defendant will be given
credit for all time sewed against the fixed portion
of his sentence in his case for the time spent in
obtaining the evaluation in case CR-2008-932.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk deliver a certified

copy of this Judgment and Commitment to the said Sheriff, which
shall serve as the commitment of the defendant.
The probation agreement is to be hereto attached and by
reference made a part hereof.

SUSPENDED SENTENCE AND ORDER OF PROBATION

-

3

Dated this

day of

SUSPENDED SENTENCE AND ORDER

April,

1008.

OF PROBATION

-

4

This is to certify that I have read or had read co me and
fully understand and accept a l l the conditions, regulations and
restriction8 under which 1 am being granted probation. I will
abide by and conform to them s t r i c t l y and fully understand that
my failure to do ea may reault in the sevocacion of my probation
and commitment to the Board o f Correction to serve t h e sencence
originally imposed,

Probatianer's Signature

Date ?
o

acceptance

WITNESSED :

Probation and Parole Ofricer
S t a t e of Idaha

SUSPENDED SEWIZNCE AND ORDER OF PROEATION

-

5

-*

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on thie
day o f A p r i l , 2008. I

1- -

mailed (served) a true and correct copy a£ the within

ingtrumnt to:
E l m o r e County Proeecutor

Interdepartmental Mail
E l m o r e County Sheriff

Interdepartmental Mail

Elmore C o u t y Public Defender
fnterdepartmntal Mail

Probation & Parole
Interdepartmental Mail
I

, i

GRIMMETT , ' 1
Clerk of the Disvqict Court

MARSA

1

SUSPE3fDQ) SEN'I'ENCE AND ORDER

OF PROBATION

04/14/2008

n 7 ~

-

8

6

KON 13:40

tTX/R.X NO 90311

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

JUNE 2 , 2008

HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL

COURT MINUTES
1
1
1
1
1
1

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs .
JUSTIN GOODGION,

Case No. CR-2007-1156
CR-2008-932

)

1
1
1

Defendant.

)

APPEARANCES :
Lee Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

Counsel for State

Terry Ratliff
Public Defender

Counsel for Defendant

2:26 p.m. Call of case.
Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant present, in custody.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff.
Response by the Court.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff.
The Court will sign the order as of today's date for the mental
health access.
Mr. Fisher advises that the 2nd psychosexual evaluation will be
withdrawn.

Mr. Ratliff
withdrawn.

had

no

objection

COURT MINUTES - JUNE 2, 2008
Page - 1

to

the

2nd

evaluation being

The Court advises that there
psychosexual evaluation done.

will

not

be

an

additional

Mr. Ratliff will stipulate to use the first evaluation.
Statement made by Mr. Fisher.
Response by the Court.
The Court set this matter for SENTENCING on July 7, 2008 at 1:30
o'clock p.m.
The defendant remained in custody.
2:31 p.m. End.

MARSA GRIMMETT
Clerk of the District Court
By

ha$DR

ty Clerk

COURT MINUTES
Page - 2

-

JUNE 2, 2008

Reporter: N. Omsberg
Clerk: K. Johnson
Reporter's Est. $
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL

JULY 7 , 2008

COURT MINUTES
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

1
1
)

vs .
JUSTIN GOODGION,

1
1
1
1

Case No. CR-2007-1156
CR-2008-932

1

Defendant.

)
)

1
APPEARANCES :
Lee Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

Counsel for State

Terry Ratliff
Public Defender

Counsel for Defendant

5 : 3 4 p.m.

Call of case.

Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant present, in custody.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff regarding the defendant being
evaluated for Mental Health Court.
The Court advises that it does not believe that the defendant
would qualify for Mental Health Court.
Mr. Ratliff advises that the agreement was that the defendant
would be sent on a second rider on CR-2007-1156.
Response by the Court regarding the Mental Health Court.
Mr. Fisher advises that the State is not willing to agree to the
Mental Health Court.
The Court addresses counsel.

COURT MINUTES
Page - 1

-

JULY 7, 2008

Response by Mr. Fisher.
All parties have received and have had adequate time to review the
materials.
Mr. Fisher had no corrections.
Mr. Ratliff had no corrections.
The defendant had no corrections.
Statement made by Mr. Fisher.
Mr. Fisher's recommendations:
CR-2007-1156 - the Court revoke his probation and send the
defendant, on a second rider.
CR-2008-932 that the defendant
register as a sex offender. The fines, fees, court costs, and
public defender reimbursement are in the Court's discretion. That
the underlying sentence would be 15 years incarceration with 5
years fixed and 10 years indeterminate. That the rider is ran
concurrent for both CR-2007-1156 and CR-2008-932. Restitution
would be left open for the victim A.T. in CR-2008-932 and in CR2007-1156would request to reserve restitution in that case.
The Court advises that it will order a restitution report in CR2008-932.
Objection made by Mr. Ratliff.
Response by the Court.
Response by Mr. Fisher.
Response by the Court.
Statement continued by Mr. Fisher.
Statement made by Mr.
attached to the PSI.

Ratliff requesting

the

evaluation be

Mr. Ratliff's recommendations:
The defendant would be sent on a 2nd rider. That the Court hold
off sex offender determination until after the rider review. That
the defendant be evaluated for mental health medication while on a
rider.
That on CR-2008-932 that the defendant would have an
underlying sentence of 15 years with 5 years fixed and 10 years
indeterminate to run concurrent with his other case and would
request that the Court not go beyond that amount and run them
concurrent.

COURT MINUTES - JULY 7, 2008
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Statement made by the defendant.
The Court advises that it will add in capitals and underlined the
following: the copy of the Idaho Code Section 19-2524 mental
evaluation of the defendant is attached hereto assist in the
defendant's treatment and programming while on the rider. And the
evaluations will be attached to both CR-2007-1156 and CR-2008-932.
No legal cause shown.
The Court sentenced the defendant on CR-2007-1156 to incarceration
for 15 years with 5 years fixed and 10 years indeterminate with
credit for 468 days against the fixed portion. The Court will
retain jurisdiction for the 2nd time. While the defendant is on a
rider he will receive cognitive based programs, substance abuse
treatment, obtain his GED, and any other programs deemed
appropriate by rider personnel. The defendant will participate in
sex offender group.
The Court will reserve restitution upon
completion of the rider. On CR-2008-932 the Court sentenced the
defendant to 25 years with 10 years fixed and 15 year
indeterminate with credit for 468 days served with the Court
retaining jurisdiction and sending the defendant on a rider to run
concurrent with CR-2007-1156. While the defendant is on a rider
the defendant will receive cognitive based programs, substance
abuse treatment, obtain his GED and any other programs deemed
appropriate by rider personnel. The defendant will participate in
sex offender group. The defendant will pay a fine in the amount
of $2,500.00 with standard court costs and fees. The defendant
will pay reimbursement to the public defender in the amount of
$500.00. Restitution will be reserved pending completion of the
rider. The defendant shall supply a DNA sample and thumbprint.
The Court will reserve any determination of sex offender
registration pending completion of the rider.
The Court advises the defendant of his right to appeal.
The defendant understands his right to appeal.
Statement made by Mr. Fisher regarding the credit for time served.
The Court advises that on CR-2008-932 the defendant will receive
credit for time served of 130 days against the fixed portion of
the sentence.
The Court advises the defendant of his right to appeal.
The defendant understands his right to appeal.
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the sheriff.

COURT MINUTES - JULY 7, 2008
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6 : 0 0 p.m.

End.

MARSA GRIMMETT
Clerk of the District Court

Dep ty Clerk

COURT MINUTES - JULY 7, 2008
Page - 4

Reporter: N. Omsberg
Clerk : K. Johnson
Reporter's Est. $

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF EL

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
1

vs .

!

case No.

C&- m-@13a

1
I

SSN

)

1
)

Defendant.

ORDER FOR
RESTITUTION REPORT

1
1

In order that the Court may have at its disposal, an
accurate view of the Restitution involved in the above-entitled
case, it is ordered that the restitution be investigated by the
Elmore County Restitution Officer and an amount be presented in
a written restitution report filed with the Court prior to

sentencing.
MICHAEL E. WETHERELL
*A report is needed prior t

Defense Attorney:

ORDER FOR RESTITUTION REPORT - Page
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL

- -- -r

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY O Q , W m E

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
)

Plaintiff,
vs

.

JUSTIN GOODGION,
DOB:
SSN:
Defendant.

)
)

Case No. CR-2007-1156

)
)
)
)

JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT
RETAINED JURISDICTION FOR
THE SECOND TIME

On the 7th day of July, 2008, before the Honorable Michael
E. Wetherell, District Judge, personally appeared Lee Fisher,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Elmore, State of
Idaho, and the defendant with his attorney Terry Ratliff, this
being the time fixed for pronouncing judgment in this matter.
The defendant was informed by the Court of the nature of the
Information filed against him for the crime of RAPE, Felony, I.C.
5 18-6101(1); of his arraignment thereon on April 16, 2007; plea

of "Guiltyn thereto on April 16, 2007 to the crime of AGGRAVATED
BATTERY as charged in the Amended Information; and of the receipt
and review of a presentence investigation report.
The Court asked whether the defendant had any objections
or corrections to be made to the presentence report to which
correction were made.

JUDGMENT

-

Page 1

086

The Court asked whether the defendant had witnesses or
evidence to present on a hearing in mitigation of punishment;
heard statements from counsel; and gave defendant an
opportunity to make a statement.
The defendant was asked if he had any legal cause to show
why judgment should not be pronounced against him, to which he
replied that he had none.
And no sufficient cause being shown or appearing to the
Court why judgment should not be rendered;
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the

defendant is guilty as charged and convicted; that the offense
for which the defendant is adjudged guilty herein was committed
on or about the 22nd day of June, 2006.
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant is sentenced
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-2513 to the custody of the
Idaho State Board of Correction, to be held and incarcerated by
said Board in a suitable place for a period of fifteen (15) years
with five (5) years fixed and ten (10) years indeterminate to run
concurrent with CR-2008-932;with credit for 468 days served;
with the court retaining jurisdiction for the second time for 180
days pursuant to I.C. 5 19-2601(4). The Court recommends the
defendant receive cognitive based programs, substsnce abuse
treatment and to receive any other programs,including obtaining
his GED,deemed approriate by rider personnel, and participate in

JUDGMENT - Page 2

the sex offender group.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant

to

Idaho Code

Section 19-5304 the defendant shall pay restitution to the
victims reserved until completion of the rider.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Fines, Court Costs and
Restitution shall be paid through the Clerk of the District
Court, upon the defendant's release from custody, as directed by
the Department of Probation and Parole;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant be committed to the
custody of the Sheriff of Elmore County, Idaho, for delivery
FORTHWITH and within 7 days, to the custody of the Idaho State
Board of Correction at the Idaho State Penitentiary or other
facility within the State designated by the State Board of
Correction.
A COPY OF THE IDAHO CODE SECTION 19-2524 MENTAL EVALUATION
OF THE DEFENDANT IS ATTACHED HERETO TO ASSIST IN DEFENDANT'S
TREATMENT AND PROGRAMMING WHILE ON THE RIDER.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk deliver a certified
copy of this Judgment and Commitment to the said Sheriff, which
shall serve as the commitment of the defendant.
Dated this

7*

day of July, 2008.

C

D strict Judge

JUDGMENT - Page 3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

qb

day of July, 2008, I

mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the within
instrument to:
Lee Fisher
Elmore County Deputy Prosecutor
Interdepartmental Mail
Terry Ratliff
Public Defender
Interdepartmental Mail
Carolee Kelly
Department of Correction
Central Records
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110
Boise, Idaho 83706
Elmore County Jail
Interdepartmental Mail
;, ',

I

,

1

'

MARSA GRIMMETT'
Clerk of the ~idtkict:
Court
I

By :
e p u t ' Court Clerk
'
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF C
E
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

b-,:.

Plaintiff,

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

JUST
DOB
SSN
Defendant.

- ,
:t*.

-

-.-

Liii.+~Z-I I

C L E ~ ! : # , ~
DEPUT
Case No. CR-2007-1156
u
CR-2008-932
ORDER TO TRANSPORT

It appearing that the above-named defendant is in the custody
of the Idaho State Board of Correction, and that it is necessary
that he be brought before the Court for further proceedings.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that the Sheriff of Elmore County,
State of Idaho, bring the defendant to the Court in Mountain Home,
Idaho, County of Elmore, State of Idaho, on Monday the 5th day of
January, 2008, at the hour of 11:OO o'clock a.m.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED,

that

the

Idaho State Board

of

Correction release the said defendant to the Sheriff of Elmore
County, State of Idaho, for the purpose of the aforementioned
appearance and for the Sheriff of Elmore County, State of Idaho,
to hold said defendant until such time as he is released on
probation or ordered returned to the Board of Correction.

ORDER TO TRANSPORT- Page 1

Dated this 30th day of December,

Dist Yct Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Marsa Grimmett, hereby certify that on this 30th day of
December, 2008, a true and correct copy of the ORDER was served or
mailed, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:
Carolee Kelly
Records Administrator
Dept. of Corrections
Central Records
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110
Boise, ID 83706
Faxed to: 327-7444
Interdepartmental Mail
Sheriff
Prosecutor
Public Defender

I

'

MARSA GRIMMETT
Clerk of the District Court

ORDER TO TRANSPORT- Page 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL

JANUARY 5 , 2009

COURT MINUTES
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs .
JUSTIN GOODGION,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES :

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Case No. CR-2007-1156
CR-2008-932

Kristina Schindele
Prosecuting Attorney

Counsel for State

Terry Ratliff
Public Defender

Counsel for Defendant

11:lO a.m. Call of case.
Time and date set for JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW, defendant present, in
custody.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff regarding getting an updated
polygraph and requests a 30 day extension.
The Court addresses counsel regarding disclosure.
Response by Mr. Ratliff.
Discussion between the Court and counsel regarding disclosure.
The Court will retain jurisdiction for an additional 30 days and
sets this matter for JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW on January 20, 2009 at
11:OO o'clock a.m.

COURT MINUTES - JANUARY 5, 2009
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The defendant remained in the custody of the sheriff.
11:14 a.m.

End.

MARSA GRIMMETT
Clerk of the District Court

COURT MINUTES - JANUARY 5, 2009
Page - 2

Reporter: N. Omsberg
Clerk: K. Johnson
Reporter's Est. 4 pages

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

JANUARY 20, 2009

HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHEFLL

COURT MINUTES
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

1
)

Plaintiff,
VS

.

JUSTIN GOODGION,
Defendant.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Case No. CR-2007-1156
CR-2008-932

APPEARANCES:
Lee Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

Counsel for State

Terry Ratliff
Public Defender

Counsel for Defendant

11:49 a.m.

Call of case.

Time and date set for JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW, defendant present, in
custody.
The Court advises that the Notice of Authority was just received
today .
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff regarding the late filing.
The Court advises that it will give the State time to respond.
Mr. Fisher advises that if the Court is ready to proceed then the
State is also.
The Court advises that it will set it over on the calendar until
3:30 o'clock p . m .

COURT MINUTES - JANUARY 20, 2009
Page - 1

11:52 a.m. End.
3:38 p.m.

Recall of case.

The Court advises that it has received additional case law and
will continue this one more time.
The Court set this matter for SENTENCING on February 2, 2009 at
11:OO o'clock a.m.
The Court advises that the State may respond to the citation of
case law by January 28, 2009 and Mr. Ratliff can file a reply by
January 30, 2009.
The Court further advises that this will not get delayed again
after February 2, 2009.
The defendant remained in the custody of the sheriff.
3:40 p.m.

End.

MARSA GRIMMETT
Clerk of the District Court

COURT MINUTES - JANUARY 20, 2009
Page - 2

Reporter: N. Omsberg
Clerk: K. Johnson
Reporter's Est. 5 pages
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KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
190 South 4th East
Post Office Box 607
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-2 144 ext. 503
Facsimile: (208) 587-2147
I.S.B. No. 6090
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

1
1

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

vs.
JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
Defendant.

1
1

Case No. CR-2008-00000932 &
CR-2007-000 1156
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
SUBMISSION OF CASE LAW FOR
RETAINED JURISDICTION REVIEW
HEARING

COMES NOW, The State of Idaho, by and through Lee Fisher, Elmore County Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby responds to the Defendant's submission of case law as follows.

BACKGROUND AND FACTS
Defendantpled guilty to one count of aggravated battery reduced from rape in case number CR2007-1 156and was sent on a rider. During the rider, he was interviewed by law enforcement regarding
two other potential victims. Based on that interview, this matterwas filed with two counts ofrape. The
Defendant retunedh m his lint rider witha recommendation to relinquishjurisdiction. The Defendant was
placed on probation in case number CR-2007-1156pending the resolution of this matter. The Defendant

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S SUBMISSION OF CASE LAW
FOR RETAINED JURISDICTION REVIEW HEARING - Page 1

entered a guiltyplea to one count ofrape in this matter and was sent on a rider in both cases with the Court
reservingthe issueof sex offender registrationin this case and restitution in both cases. During his second
rider, the Defendant completed a sexual history as part ofhis treatment. He submitted to apolygraphto
determine the truthllness ofhis sexual history. The polygraph indicated that he had not beentruthfbl and
he subsequentlyadmitted that he had left another victim out ofhis history. The Defendant did not invoke
his Fifth Amendment rights at any time during this process.
LAW

The case ofstate v. Crowq governsthis matter. In Crowe, the Defendant was placed on probation
and required him, as conditions ofhis probation, to complete a specialized sex offender therapy program
through SANE and have no unsupervised contact with minors following a conviction for sexual abuse of
a minor. State v. Crowe, 131 Idaho 109,110- 11 (1998). The Defendant failed a polygraph examination
as part of his SANE treatment. "When confkonted about this," the Defendant admitted that he had
unsupervised contact with his ten-year-old niece and had inappropriatelytouched her buttocks.

u.at 111.

The Defendant, at the SANE counselor's request, "made verbal and written admissions to his probation
officer about the incidents."u. The statementsto the counselor and probation officer, including the written
statement,were admitted at the probation violation hearing. The Defendant was found to have violated his
probation, and his sentence was imposed. See id.
On appeal, Crowe argued that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated by the admission ofthe
statement to his counselor at the probation violation hearing. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected that
argument. The Court first noted that 'Tilt is well-established that the Fifth Amendment must be invoked by

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S SUBMISSION OF CASE LAW
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the person claiming the privilege or the privilege is deemed lost."u. at 112(citations omitted). Crowe did
not assert his Fifth Amendment right. Id.The Court then reviewed the United States Supreme Court
decision in Minnesota v. Mumhy. The Crowe court noted that Murpb held the "Fifth Amendment applies,
even if not invoked, if the State compels an individual to forego the Fifth Amendmentprivilegeby a threat
to impose apenalty ifthe privilege is invoked."U. Thecourt in Murph~thenlimitedits own holding," 'a
State may validly insist on answers to even incriminatingquestions and hence sensiblyadminister its
probation system, as long as it recognizes that the required answers may not be used in a criminal
proceeding and thus eliminatesthe threat of incrimination.'

"u.(quotingMinnesotav. Mmhy, 465 U.S.

420,436 n. 7, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1146 n. 7 (1984) (citation omitted)).
The Crowe court held that a probation violation proceeding is not a subsequent criminal
proceeding. ,-a. Therefore, the admission ofthe statementsto the counselor did not violate Crowe's
Fifth Amendment rights. & &J.A copy of the Crowe decision is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
The case ofMadison v. Cravw is a civil rights violation case involving Mr. Madison, "a prison
inmate," who sued the Executive Director ofthe Commission ofpardons and Parole and two therapists
at the Idaho Department ofcorrection. Madisonv. Crava, 144Idaho 696,698,169 P.3d 284,286 (Ct.
App. 2007). Madison's claims included that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated when he was forced
to tell a counselor that he was "sexually attracted to his daughter who was the victim ofhis crime." 144
Idaho at 699, 700, 169 P.3d at 288. The Idaho Court of Appeals noted that there was no Fifth
Amendment violation for two reasons, the admissions did not incriminateMadison and were never used
against him in a criminal pr0ceeding.a. at 700,169 P.3d at 288. The Madison court went on to quote
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a t e v. Crowg in support of this holding, noting that there was no violation in crows because the
statements had not been used in a criminal trial. &

u., 144 Idaho at 701, 169 P.3d at 289.

Madim also notes that if a Defendant does not claim the Fifth Amendment privilege and answers

voluntarily, the privilege is lost, i.e. the answersare not considered to be compelled within the meaning of

1

the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 700,169 P.3d at 288 (citingM i ~ e s o t v.
a Murphy, 465 U.S.420,427-

28 (1984)). A copy of Madison is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

The case ofstate v. Radford, submitted by the Defendant, also supports the State's position. In
Radford, the Defendant was r e q W to participate in counselingthrough SANE. As part of the counseling,
he completed a sexualhistory and was given a polygraph on that history. Statey&dfor& 134 Idaho 187,
189 (2000). ")uring the polygraph, Radford revealed" that he had committed a separateoffensein 1991.

u.Radfordhad signed an agreementwith SANE that SANEwould disclose "information regardinghis
treatment to law personnel" and the contract specificallystated that "previous1y committed crimesmust also

be reported, and maybe prosecuted . ..."Id. at 188. After the disclosure to the counselor, Radford met
with his probation officerand made the same statement to the probation officer. At a later date, Radford
met with his probation officerand two detectives. At that meeting, Radford wasMirandized,told he was
not in custody, and signed a "Miran& waiver."u. at 189. Radford then made admissionsregarding the
same prior crime. See id.
Radford was charged with new crimes basedon his statements and filed amotion to suppressthe
statementsas being obtained inviolation ofhis Fifth Amendment rights. At first the district courtjudge
denied the motion to suppiess.a d .AAer the Crowq case discussed above was decided, Radford filed
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a motion to reconsider, which the district court granted and suppressed all ofthe statements.
State then appealed only the suppression of the statement made to the detectives.

The

at 189,190

(notingthat the Statedid not appeal the suppression of the statementsin the new case that were required
by the polygraph as part o f i s probation). The Radford court then held that the statementsto the detectives
should not have been suppressedbecause they were voluntary and were not the fruits of the polygraph
statements. See id. at 191-93.
ARGUMENT
Based on the foregoingcases and the facts in this matter, the Def-t

'S

Fifth Amendment rights

have not been violated. First, the Defendantdid not invokehis Fifth Amendment right. He omitted avictim
fiom his sexual history and failed the polygraph examinationbecause ofhis omission. As the cases above
note, the failure of the Defendant to invoke his Fifth Amendment right waives the right.
Second, even ifthe Court were to find no waiver, there was no Fifi Amendment violation because
the law in Idaho is clearlysettled that statementsmade to a SANE counselor aspart ofprobation cannot
be the basis for a new criminal prosecution.-we

specificallyheld that such statementscan be used for

a probation violation hearing but not in anew trial. Statev. Crowg, 131 Idaho 109,112(1998); see also
State v. Radford, 134 Idaho 187,193 (2000) (noting the Crowe decision stands for the premise that
disclosures required by probation were admissible in a probation violation proceeding but not in a
"subsequent criminal trial"). This is a retained jurisdiction hearing. The Defendant has even fewer
constitutionalrights on a rider thanhe would have on probation. This proceeding is not anew or subsequent
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criminaltrial but is more akin to a probation violation hearing. Sincethe Defendant's omission is not being

used in a new prosecution, there is no violation of the Defendant's F i f i Amendment right.
Third, as noted above, the law is clearly settled in Idaho that the Statecannot use the in-g

. .

statements of a person in a new case when such statements are made pursuant to a requirement of
probation. Here, the Defendant made the false statementspursuant to the requirements ofhis treatment on
the retainedjurisdiction program, which should be consideredto be akin to the probation situation The
Statehas longrecognized that it cannot use these statementsfor anew prosecution. The Statecannot use
the Defendant's admission that he has another victim as evidence in a new case. The most the Defendant
faces fiom his admissions or failures to admit are the impositionof sentencein this matter, which clearly
does not implicatethe Fifth Amendment under the binding Idaho authoritydiscussed above. Therefore, the
State's use of the Defendant's lies on his sexual history in this matter does not violate the Fifth Amendment
Sincethe Defendant was not at risk for a new criminal proceeding ifhe had revealed his other
victim, the persuasive case ofunited States v. Antelousdoesnot indicate a different result. The Antelo-w
court's holding provides that ifthere was immunityfrom prosecution for the answersto the sex offender

.

treatment counselor's questions, there would be no Fifth Amendment violation. See. e.p Antelopq, 395
F.3d 1128,1141 (9th Cir. 2005). T h e m court also affirmed that for the Fifth Amendment to be
implicated "the government has [to seek] to 'impose substantialpenalties becausea witness elects to
exercisehis Fifth Amendment right not to give incnminating
'
testimony a

m himself' "Antelooe.at 1135

(quoting Lekowitz v. Cunninehaq,43 1 U.S. 801,805 (1 977)). The Defendant's other case is similarly
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unavailingof any additional relevant standard in light of the binding, directlyrelevantdecisions of the Idaho
courts in crow^, Madison, and bdford.

CONCLUSION
The Defendant cannot prove a violation ofhis Fifth Amendment rights. The State is fiee to argue
his failure to disclose another victim on his sexualhistory and the subsequentfailed polygraph together with
any other arguments arising therefiom as reasons to impose his sentence.
k
DATED This L8 day of January 2009.
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
BY:
V
Lee ~'Irsher

I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on today's date, I served a copy of the attached document to the following
parties by the following means:
Terry S. Ratliff
ATTORNEY AT LAW
290 South 2nd East
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647

-

-

The Honorable Michael E. Wetherell
Bench Copy

Hand Delivered (Interoffice Mail)
U.S. Mail
Certified Mail
Next Day Delivery
Facsimile
Facsimile (208) 487-7529

DATED this a % a y of lanuary 2009.
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

2*

BY:
/u,
Lee Fisher
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131 Idaho 109; State v. Crowe; 952 P.2d 1245
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John David CROWE, Defendant-Appellant.
[Cite as State v. Crowe, 131 Idaho 1091
No. 23325.
Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, December 1997 Term.
February 27, 1998.
Following conviction on defendant's plea of guilty to sexual abuse of a minor, the Fourth Judicial
District Court, Ada County, Joel D. Horton, J. revoked defendant's probation, and defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court, Silak, J., held that admission of defendant's statements to sex offender counselor
that he had fondled his niece's buttocks, in violation of probation agreement, did not
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violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Affirmed.
Alan E. Trimming, Ada County Public Defender, David J. Smethers, Deputy Public Defender, Boise, for
appellant. David J. Smethers argued.
Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, Kenneth M. Robins, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Kenneth M. Robins argued.
SILAK, Justice.
This is an appeal from an order revoking probation. At the probation revocation hearing,
incriminating statements made by the probationer to his counselor and probation officer were admitted.
The appellant claims that admission of the statements at the hearing violated his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination. We affirm the decision of the district court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant John David Crowe (Crowe) was indicted on charges of lewd and lascivious conduct on
September 25, 1990. He subsequently pled guilty to an amended charge of sexual abuse of a minor on
October 2, 1990. Crowe was placed on probation.
The relevant terms of the probation included Crowe's completing a specialized sex offender therapy
program through the Sexual Abuse Now Ended (SANE) program, Crowe's abiding by all laws of the
State and Crowe's not "associat[ing] with any juveniles unless accompanied by [a] responsible adult as
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approved by the probation officer and

therapist." The terms of the probation also included Crowe submitting to polygraph examinations upon
request of a probation officer. As a condition of the treatment at SANE, therefore a condition of the
probation, Crowe was required to report any contact with minor children and to submit to polygraph
examinations upon request.
At the SANE facility, Crowe signed a treatment contract which allowed counselors during treatment
to disseminate information to Crowe's probation officer. During a SANE treatment session around May
15, 1996, Crowe underwent a polygraph exhnation as part of his SANE treatment. Crowe failed the
examination. When confronted about this, Crowe related to D.F., his SANE counselor, that he had failed
the examination because he had been alone with his ten-year old niece, and had improperly touched her
by placing his hand on her buttocks. At the counselor's request, Crowe made verbal and written
admissions to his probation officer about the incidents. Crowe was arrested for violating his probation.
On May 28, 1996, a motion and order for a Bench Warrant for Probation Violation was filed. After a
violation hearing, at which the statement to D.F.,the statement to the probation officer and Crowe's
written statement were admitted, the district court found that Crowe violated his probation by having
unsupervised contact with a minor and committing the crime of sexual abuse of a minor. The district
court ordered Crowe's probation revoked and ordered the execution of the previously suspended
sentence, a unified sentence of ten years imprisonment, with three years fixed.

ISSUE ON APPEAL
Whether Crowe's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated at his probation
revocation hearing by the admission of statements Crowe made to a counselor during a sex offender
counseling session required by his probation agreement.

ANALYSIS
A. Standard Of Review.

[I, 2) This Court exercises fiee review in determining whether "constitutional requirements have
been satisfied in light of the facts" found by the trial court. State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449,452,776 P.2d
458,461 (1989) (quoting State v. Heinen, 114 Idaho 656,658, 759 P.2d 947,949 (Ct.App. 1988)).
Deference will be given to the findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.

B. Additional Issues Raised For The First Time On Appeal At Oral Argument Are Not
Properly Before This Court.
(3,4] Preliminarily, we note that counsel for Crowe tried to raise at oral argument the issues of

whether an extra-judicial confession was sufficient to convict Crowe absent more corroborating
evidence and whether Crowe's right to confiont witnesses at the probation violation hearing had been
violated. These issues were not presented by Crowe's counsel in the statement of issues or argued in the

10s

Page 3 of 4
briefs. Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(4) requires that a list of issues be presented on appeal. This Court has
acknowledged that this rule will be relaxed when the issues are supported by argument in the briefs.
State v. Prestwich, 116 Idaho 959,961,783 P.2d 298,300 (1989), overruled on other grounds, State v.
Gwman, 122 Idaho 981,842 P.2d 660 (1992). Counsel for Crowe did not argue these additional issues
in his brief. Therefore, these additional issues are not properly before this Court and will not be
addressed on appeal.
(5) Additionally, Crowe's counsel argued at oral argument that the Idaho Constitution provides
greater protection than the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The appellant's brief did
not argue for a different interpretation of the Idaho Constitution nor was there any authority cited for a
different interpretation. Therefore, this issue also was not properly raised on appeal. The only issue
properly before this
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Court is the application of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution to the present facts.
C. The District Court Was Correct In Holding That The Admission Of Statements Made By
Crowe To His Court Ordered Counselor Did Not Violate The Appellant's Fifth Amendment Right
Against Self-incrimination.
(6) It is well-established that the Fifth Amendment must be invoked by the person claiming the
privilege or the privilege is deemed lost. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,427-28,104 S.Ct 1136,
424 U.S. 648,654,96 S.Ct 1178, 1182,47 L.Ed.2d 370
1142,79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984); Gamer v. US.,
(1976). It is undisputed that Crowe did not assert his Fifth Amendment right.

17) Crowe relies on Minnesota v. Murphy in arguing that his statements to his counselor should be
suppressed because the questions posed to him forced him to answer or to be punished as a probation
violation for asserting his privilege against self-incrimination; thus, he argues he was forced into the
"classic penalty" situation. The Court in Murphy held that the Fifth Amendment applies, even if not
invoked, if the State compels an individual to forego the Fifth Amendment privilege by a threat to
impose a penalty if the privilege is invoked. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434,104 S.Ct at 1146. The Court in
Murphy limited this exception to situations in which the statement obtained was to be used in a
subsequent criminal proceeding. The Court in Murphy stated:

[A] State may validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions and hence
sensibly administer its probation system, as long as it recognizes that the required answers
may not be used in a criminal proceeding and thus eliminates the threat of incrimination.
Under such circumstances, a probationer's "right to immunity as a result of his compelled
testimony would not be at stake," and nothing in the Federal Constitution would prevent a
State from revoking probation for a refusal to answer that violated an express condition of
probation.

Id. at 436 n. 7, 104 S.Ct. at 1146 n. 7 (quoting Sanitation Men v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S.
280,284,88 S.Ct 1917, 1920,20 L.Ed.2d 1089 (1968)). In this case, the statements were used against
Crowe in a probation revocation hearing, not a subsequent criminal trial. A probation revocation
proceeding is not a separate criminal proceeding. Id. at 435 n. 7, 104 S.Ct at 1146 n. 7. See also, United
States v. Phelps, 955 F.2d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 1992) ("a person may not claim the self-incrimination
privilege merely because his answer to a question might result in revocation of his probationary status.
His answer, however, cannot be used against him in a criminal prosecution."); United States v.
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Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485, 1489 (9th Cir. 1985) ("in general, a probationer is not entitled to invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination in response to questions about his probation status.").

This case does not present a "classic penalty" situation. The statements were not used in a
subsequent criminal proceeding. We hold that the admission of the statements to the counselor at the
probation revocation proceeding did not violate Crowe's Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.

IV.
CONCLUSION

The order of the district court revoking Crowe's probation and placing his previously suspended
sentence into execution is affirmed.
TROUT, C.J., and JOHNSON, SCHROEDER and WALTERS, JJ., concur.
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169 P.3d 284; MADISON v. CRAVEN; 169 P.3d 284
MADISON v. CRAVEN
169 P.3d 284 (ID 2007)
Carl Lewis MADISON, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Olivia CRAVEN, Ed Chenney and David Trial, Respondents.
No. 33710.
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
August 6,2007.
Review Denied October 15,2007
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This Page Contains Headnotes.
Appeal fiom the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, Daniel C. Hurlbutt, J.
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Carl Lewis Madison, Boise, pro se appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; William M. Loomis, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for
respondent.
LANSING, Judge.
Carl Lewis Madison, a prison inmate, filed an action against the Executive Director of the
Commission of Pardons and Parole ("Commission") and two therapists at the Idaho Department of
Correction, requesting that certain information be removed fiom his prison record and not considered in
any future parole proceedings because the information was allegedly obtained through violations of his
privilege against self-incrimination. The district court granted summaryjudgment dismissing the action,
and Madison appeals.

BACKGROUND

In 1997, Madison was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor under sixteen, Idaho Code § 18-1506,
for which he received a sentence of fifteen years with three years determinate. During the course of his
incarceration, Madison participated in a sexual offender therapy program. He contends that during that
program, he was forced to falsely(fn1) admit a sexual attraction to the victim, his daughter, and was later
terminated fiom the group when he accused the therapists and Department of Correction personnel of
colluding to make him appear to be a serial pedophile. In May of 1999, he was denied parole. The
minutes of that parole hearing contain a notation that Madison had molested fifteen victims. Madison
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later asserted that this statement in the minutes was false and that he had only one victim.
On November 14,2003, Madison filed a prisoner civil rights complaint asserting that the therapists'
acts and the allegedly false information in the parole hearing minutes violated his civil rights. The
district court treated Madison's complaint as a habeas corpus petition and dismissed it when Madison did
not pay the filing fee. He appealed, and in Madison v. Craven, 1.41-Idaho-45, lOSP._3d_7_Q5
(Ct.App.2005), we reversed and remanded. After remand, Madison amended his complaint.

The nature of the claims that Madison intends to be presenting in his pro se complaint and
subsequent filings is difficult to discern or characterize. His general claim seems to be that various posttrial admissions he made, including those contained in the presentence investigation report (PSI), and
statements made at the parole hearing and during sexual offender treatment, were obtained in violation
of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and must therefore be purged from his record
and not considered in any future therapy or parole proceedings. He also contends that he has been
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, and raises several other related claims.
The district court initially characterized the amended complaint as a habeas corpus petition before
deciding to handle it as an action for violation of civil rights. Ultimately, the district court dismissed the
action on the respondents' summary judgment motion. Madison appeals, asserting that the district court
misinterpreted one of his claims, did not address several others, and misapplied the law.

ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment may be entered only if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'' Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). See
also Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745,747,890 P.2d 33 1,333 (1995); Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v.
City of Coeur dylene, 126 Idaho 740, 742,890 P.2d 326,328 (1995). On review, this Court liberally
construes the evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and
conclusions in that party's favor. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson,
Id&o 270,272, _86P
P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994). If the evidence reveals no material disputed factual issues, however, only a
question of law remains over which this Court exercises fiee review. Roell v. Boise City, 130-Idaho 199,
200-01,938 P.2d 1237, 1238-39 (1997).
In this case, there are no disputed issues of fact; the respondents' summary judgment motion did not
challenge Madison's allegations that the minutes of the parole hearing erroneously state that he had
fifteen victims or that Madison's therapist required him to make statements regarding his sexual
attraction toward the victim. Therefore, the issue presented is whether these alleged events violated
certain of Madison's constitutional rights. Because we exercise de novo review over this legal issue,
Madison's assertions that the district court misinterpreted his arguments or erred in its legal analysis
need not be specifically addressed.

B. Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-incrimination
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Madison's primary argument on appeal is that information elicited after his conviction-including the
statement in his parole hearing that he had fifteen victims, statements made during therapy regarding his
sexual attraction to his daughter, and information in the PSI report-was obtained in violation of his F i f i
Amendment right against self-incrimination and must therefore be purged from his record. The thrust of
his argument is that these statements were elicited to make him appear to be a serial pedophile, which he
contends has undermined his ability to trust his therapists and participate in therapy. He notes that this
will make it difficult for him to be paroled, and speculates that if this characterization of his criminal
nature remains in his record, it could be used against him in future matters.
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." It has long been held that this prohibition not only permits a person to refuse to
testitjl against himself at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant, but also "privileges him not to
answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where
the answers might incriminate him in fbture criminal proceedings." Lejkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70,77,
94 S.Ct 316,322,38 L.Ed.2d 274,281 (1973).
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See also Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S.420,426,104 S.Ct 1136,1141,79 L.Ed.2d 409,418 (1 984).
The availability of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination "does not turn upon the
type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission
and the exposure which it invites." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,49, 87 S.Ct 1428, 1455, 18 L.Ed.2d 527,
558 (1967). A witness protected by the privilege may rightfblly refuse to answer unless and until the
witness is granted immunity from the use of the compelled answers in any subsequent criminal case in
which the witness is a defendant. Murphy, 465 U.S.at 426, 104 S.Ct at 1141,79 L.Ed.2d at 418. If he
or she is nevertheless compelled to answer without immunity, the answers are inadmissible against the
witness in a later criminal prosecution. Id. An individual does not lose this protection by reason of
conviction of a crime; notwithstanding that a person is imprisoned at the time he or she makes
incriminating statements, if those statements are compelled they are inadmissible in a subsequent
criminal trial of that person. Id.; State v. Curless, 137 Idaho 138, 143,44 P.3d 1193, 1198
(Ct.App.2002).
1. Statement that Madison had fifteen victims

To the extent that Madison contends that the inclusion of the statement at the parole hearing that he
had fifteen victims violated his right against self-incrimination, this argument is undermined by
Madison's own assertions. He does not suggest that he was unlawfully compelled by the parole board to
admit this fact, but claims that he did not say it. Accordingly, the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination is not implicated here.
2. Statements contained in the PSI
Madison also argues that any statements he made to the presentence investigator should be purged
from his record. A defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies both at the
sentencing hearing and in presentence evaluations. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558,563, 149 P.3d 833,
838 (2006); State v. Wilkins, 125 Idaho 215,217-19,868 P.2d 1331, 1233-35 (1994); State v. Lanuord,
1 16 Idaho 860,871,781 P.2d 197,208 (1989). However, if a defendant desires the protection of the
Fifth Amendment, he generally must claim it or it will be lost. That is, if one who is being questioned
does not assert the privilege and instead voluntarily responds without protest, the responses are not
considered to have been compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Murphy, 465 U.S.at
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427-28, 104 S.Ct. at 1142-43,79 L.Ed.2d at 419-20; Curless, 137 Idaho at 143,44 P.3d at 1198 (holding
that the defendant's failure to assert the Fifth Amendment during a psychosexual evaluation precluded
him from asserting the privilege on appeal). In this case, Madison has presented no evidence suggesting
that during the preparation of the PSI, he claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege and was nevertheless
compelled to answer, nor that compulsion prevented him from asserting the privilege. Because Madison
never asserted the privilege, he is not entitled to its protections, and his claim that the presentence
investigation interview violated his Fifth Amendment privilege therefore fails.
3. Statements made during therapy

We next examine whether Madison's Fifth Amendment rights were implicated by the allegedly
compelled admission, during treatment by a Department of Correction therapist, that he was sexually
attracted to his daughter who was the victim of his crime. We hold that this claim is without merit for at
least two reasons. First, there has been no Fifth Amendment violation because Madison's statements
were not used against him in a criminal proceeding and, second, the statements were not incriminating.
In Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760,123 S.Ct 1994, 155 L.Ed.2d 984 (2003), the United States
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had no cause of action for damages for violation of the Fifth
Amendment where his allegedly compelled statements were never used against him in a criminal
prosecution. In that case, Martinez brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 8 1983 on the theory that his right
against self-incrimination was violated
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by an officer who interrogated him while he was in an emergency room receiving treatment for several
gunshot wounds. Martinez was not charged with a crime, and his answers were never used against him
in any criminal case. A four-justiceplurality of the Supreme Court was of the view that when statements
have been compelled by police interrogations, "it is not until their use in a criminal case that a violation
of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs." Id. at 767, 123 S.Ct. at 2001, 155 L.Ed.2d at 993. The mere
use of compulsory questioning, without more, the plurality said, does not violate the Constitution. Id.
Two additional justices who did not join in the plurality opinion nevertheless also rejected Martinez's
argument that the questioning alone was a completed violation of the Fifth Amendment subject to
redress by an action for damages under § 1983. Id. at 777-79, 123 S.Ct at 2006-08, 155 L.Ed.2d at
1000-01 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
The Idaho Supreme Court earlier reached the same conclusion in State v. Crowe, 1.3 1 Idaho 109,952
P.2d 1.245 (1998), where the defendant had been required to participate in sex offender therapy as a
condition of his probation. During therapy, he admitted that he had fondled a minor while on probation,
and this statement was used against him in a subsequent probation revocation hearing. The defendant
argued that his right against self-incrimination had been violated. The Idaho Supreme Court held that no
violation had occurred because the statements were used in a probation revocation hearing, not in a
criminal trial. Thus, we conclude that because Madison does not assert that any of his allegedly
compelled statements were used against him in a criminal prosecution, he has not alleged a cognizable
civil claim for violation of the Fifih Amendment.
Madison's claims also fail for the additional reason that he has not shown that the allegedly
compelled admissions were incriminating. The Fifih Amendment provides a privilege against answering
official questions "where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings." Murphy,
465 U.S. at 426, 104 S.Ct. at 1141,79 L.Ed.2d at 418 (quoting Lefiowitz, 414 U.S. at 77,94 S.Ct. at
322, 38 L.Ed.2d at 281). That is, the privilege applies only if there is some rational basis for believing
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that the answer to a question will incriminate the individual and no assurance has been given that neither
the statement nor its h i t s will be used against him in a subsequent prosecution. Murphy, 465 U.S. at
429, 104 S.Ct. at 1143,79 L.Ed.2d at 420; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591,599-600,16 S.Ct. 644,64748,40 L.Ed 8 19,821-22 (1896). In dicta. the Murphy Court observed that the Fifth Amendment
privilege is not available when a defendant is being questioned about violations of conditions of
probation that do not constitute new criminal acts because the answers could not be used to incriminate
the probationer in another crime. While the answer to the questions might result in termination of
probation, the Court said, a probation revocation proceeding is not a separate criminal proceeding.
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 n. 7, 104 S.Ct. at 1146 n. 7,79 L.Ed.2d at 425 n. 7. Thus, information is not
incriminating if disclosure poses no realistic threat of criminal prosecution.
In this case, Madison's admission that he had been sexually attracted to his daughter could not be
used against him in a criminal prosecution, for he had already been convicted and sentenced for
molestation of his daughter before he made the statement. Double jeopardy protections insure that he
cannot be reprosecuted for this offense.(=) Madison speculates that his statement could negatively
impact potential future parole eligibility proceedings, sex offender classification proceedings, eligibility
for prison therapy programs, or civil cases. None of these, however, are criminal proceedings. See Folk
v. Pennsylvania, 425 F.Supp.2d 663,667-68 (W.D.Pa.2006) (no violation of defendant's
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right against self-incrimination when parole board declined to grant parole after defendant refused to
admit guilt to sexual crimes during therapy, for parole eligibility proceedings do not constitute a
criminal cases); In re Mark, 292 Wis.2d 1,718 N.W.2d 90, 100 (2006) (statements regarding the crime
of which defendant was convicted, or confession to activities that are not criminal but violate conditions
of parole, are not incriminating for Fifth Amendment purposes); Bankes v. Simmons, 265 Kan. 341,963
P.2d 412,419 (1998) (statements compelled during prison sexual abuse treatment program may be used
against inmate in a civil commitment proceeding as a sexually violent predator). Because the
proceedings in which Madison alleges that his statements could be used against him are not criminal
proceedings and the statement does not implicate him in a separate crime, he has no Fifth Amendment
claim.(fh3)
C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Madison also alleges that forcing him to falsely admit a sexual attraction to his daughter, in
combination with the allegedly incorrect statement that he had fifteen victims, constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. He contends that he is being stigmatized by family, friends, inmates, and prison
officials as a serial pedophile, that he is no longer able to trust his therapists and prison officials, and that
he experiences mental anguish at being forced to say that he perceived his daughter in a sexual light.
The Eighth Amendment, which restrains the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments" on those convicted of crimes.
The Supreme Court has explained its application as follows:
[Tlhe Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may not, for example,
use excessive physical force against prisoners. The Amendment also imposes duties on
these officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must
ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must
"take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates."
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[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met.
First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, "sufficiently serious"; a prison official's
act or omission must result in the denial of "the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities."

The second requirement follows from the principle that "only the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment." To violate the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, a prison official must have a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." In
prison-conditions cases that state of mind is one of "deliberate indifference" to inmate
health or safety.
Farmer v. Brennan, 51 1 U.S. 825,832,834,114 S.Ct. 1970, 1976,1977,128 L.Ed.2d 811,822,823
(1994) (internal citations omitted). When considered against this articulation of what constitutes "cruel
and unusual punishment," it is readily apparent the unpleasant emotional and social conditions of which
Madison complains are not sufficientlyserious to amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.
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D. Other Issues
Madison's pro se appeal brief also mentions several other claims that he contends were alleged in his
civil rights complaint, but were not addressed by the district court. As to these additional claims, we
have either considered them and find them to be without merit or have been presented with no coherent
legal argument that we are able to identify and address.

CONCLUSION

Madison's factual allegations and evidence, even when accepted as true and liberally construed in his
favor, show no right to relief in this civil rights action on any of the theories he has advanced. Therefore,
the district court correctly granted summaryjudgment dismissing the action. Summary judgment for the
respondents is affirmed.
Chief Judge PERRY and Judge GUTIERREZ concur.
Footnotes:
FN 1. He advances the theory that he should not be branded as a pedophile because he imagined his
victim as an adult when he molested her.

FN2. The time for appeal of Madison's conviction has long since passed, as has the statute of
limitation for any post-conviction action challenging the conviction. Madison does not contend that
there exist any pending post-conviction actions challenging the validity of his conviction or any other
proceeding that could lead to a new trial on the charge for which he was convicted, such that the
admission of sexual attraction to his daughter could be used against him in a new trial.
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FN3. A W e r word concerning the scope of Fifth Amendment protections is appropriate to ensure
that our holding in this case will not be misunderstood nor applied too expansively. We have addressed
today only whether an individual who did not invoke the self-incrimination privilege and who made
statements allegedly under compulsion may obtain the remedy of removal of the statements from his
prison records. We do not address the quite different issue of whether the government may penalize a
person who, not having been offered immunity, legitimately invokes the privilege and refuses to provide
potentially incriminating information. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Chavez did not
overturn decades of precedent allowing the self-incrimination privilege to be asserted in contexts other
than criminal cases and granting relief where the govenunent has penalized persons for their refusal to
waive the privilege. To the contrary, the Chavez plurality expressly recognized the continuing authority
of those decisions and characterized them as establishing "prophylactic rules" that are necessary to
protect the "core constitutional right." Chavez, 538 U.S. at 768 n. 2,770-72, 123 S.Ct. at 2001 n. 2,
2002-04, 155 L.Ed.2d at 994 n. 2,995-97.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

FEBRUARY 2 , 2009

HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL

COURT MINUTES
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

1
1
)

1
1
1

vs .

Case No. CR-2007-1156
CR-2008-932

JUSTIN GOODGION,
Defendant.

1
APPEARANCES :
Lee Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

Counsel for State

Terry Ratliff
Public Defender

Counsel for Defendant

11:35 a.m. Call of case.
Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant present, in custody.
The Court reviews the file.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff regarding CR-2007-1156.
Response by the Court.
The Court continues to review the file.
All parties have received and have had adequate time to review the
materials.
Mr. Fisher had no corrections.
Mr. Ratliff had no corrections.

COURT MINUTES - FEBRUARY 2, 2009
Page - 1

The defendant had no corrections.
No testimony or statements.
Statement made by Mr. Fisher.
Mr. Fisher's recommendations:
That the Court relinquish jurisdiction and asks that the Court
reserve the restitution.
And if it is needed the State will
notice it for a hearing. That the defendant register as a sex
offender.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff.
Mr. Ratliff's recommendations:
That the defendant be placed on probation.
No statement made by the defendant.
No legal cause shown.
The Court imposes the underlying sentences in both cases. The
defendant will receive sex offender treatment. In case CR-20071156 the defendant is sentenced to incarceration for a period of
15 years with 5 years fixed and 10 years indeterminate with credit
for 688 days against the fixed portion of the sentence. This
sentence is to run concurrent with CR-2008-932. In case CR-2008932 the defendant is sentenced to incarceration for a period of 25
years with 10 years fixed and 15 years indeterminate with credit
for 340 days against the fixed portion to run concurrent with CR2007-1156. The Court using its discretion under Rule 35 reduces
the sentence in CR-2008-932 to 29 years with 6 years fixed and 19
years indeterminate.
While the defendant is incarcerated the
Court recommends that he receive cognitive based programs, sex
offender treatment, anger management treatment, and such other
programs deemed appropriate by prison personnel.
The Court advises the defendant of his right to appeal.
The defendant understands his right to appeal.
Copies of the materials returned.
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the sheriff.
Statement made by Mr. Fisher regarding custody.

COURT MINUTES - FEBRUARY 2, 2009
Page - 2

The Court advises that the defendant will be required to register
as a sex offender for the remainder of his life in case CR-2008932. The Court will reserved restitution for a period of 90 days.
The Court set this matter for RESTITUTION HEARING on May 4, 2009
at 9:00 o'clock a.m.
12:ll p.m. End.

MARSA GRIMMETT
Clerk of the District Court

COURT MINUTES - FEBRUARY 2, 2009
Page - 3

Reporter: N. Omsberg
Clerk: K. Johnson
Reporter's Est. 36 pages

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIfjTwFr
0
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
1

vs .

)

JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
DOB:
SSN:

)
)

Case No. CR-2007-1156
ORDER RELINQUISHING
JURISDICTION

Defendant.

TO:

STATE OF IDAHO BOARD OF CORRECTIONS:

On the 2nd day of February, 2009, before the Honorable
Michael E. Wetherell, District Judge, personally appeared Lee
Fisher, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Elmore,
State of Idaho, and the defendant with his attorney Terry
Ratliff, this being the time for jurisdictional review in this
matter.
At which time the Court relinquished jurisdiction and the
defendant is hereby remanded to the custody of the Idaho State
Board of Correction for execution of the original sentence that
being for a period of fifteen (15) years with five (5) years

ORDER RELINQUISHING JURISDICTION - 1

If8

fixed and ten (10) years indeterminate. The defendant is to
receive cognitive based programs, sex offender treatment,
relationship and parenting programs, anger management
treatment, and such other programs as are deemed appropriate by
prison personnel;
That pursuant to Idaho code Section 18-309, the defendant
shall be given credit for the time served in the Elmore County
Jail upon this time of 688 days, including the retained
jurisdiction time.
All of the defendant's fines, fees, and costs are forgiven
due to indigency resulting from the incarceration.
The defendant is to have no contact with the victim of his
offense while incarcerated or on parole should parole be
granted.
The Clerk shall deliver a certified copy of this Order to
the said Sheriff, which shall serve as the commitment of the
defendant.
Dated this 2*Lday

of February, 2009.

ORDER RELINQUISHING JURISDICTION

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

--enday of
5-

February,

2009, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the
within instrument to:
Lee Fisher
Elmore County Deputy Prosecutor
Interdepartmental Mail
Terry Ratliff
Elmore County Public Defender
Interdepartmental Mail
Central Records
Idaho Department of Correction
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110
Boise, Idaho 83706
Elmore County Jail
Interdepartmental Mail

MARSA GRIMMETT\{
Clerk of the District Court
I

'

ORDER RELINQUISHING JURISDICTION - 3
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TERRY S. RATLIFF
R A W LAW OFFICES, CHTD.
290 South Second East Street
Mountain Home, LD 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-0900
Facsimile: (208) 587-6940
I.S. B. No. 3598
.
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.

Attorney for Appellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
.
THE
.
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

VS.

1
1
1
1

Respondent,

Case No. CR-2007- 1156

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)

JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
Appellant.
TO:

1
1
)

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND ITS AlTORNEYS,
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE; LAWRENCE G. WASDEN ATTORNEY GENERAL,
STATEHOUSE, BOISE, IDAHO 83720; AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
COURT:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GrVEN THAT:
1. The above-named Appellant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, appeals against the above named
Respondent to the February 3, 2009, Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction, by the Honorable Michael E.
Wetherell, District Judge, presiding.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Decision

described in paragraph 1 above is applicable for an Appeal order under and pursuant to Rule 1 1(c)(l)
and or (9), I.A.R. and Idaho Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 1(a)(2).

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1
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3.

Issues on Appeal:
(a) Whether the District Court abused its discretion, when it revoked probation of

Justin, due to the allegation that "on 12/05/08 he was DECEPTIVE during a polygraph
examination conducted while he was on a second rider, in Elrnore County Case CR-20080932?
(b) Whether the District Court denied Justin due process of law pursuant to the Fifth

and Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, by revoking probation of him, when he was
required to participate in a polygraph examination, as set forth above, without allowing him
access to his court appointed attorney pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, nor advising him of
his F i f i Amendment right against self-incrimination, prior to and during the polygraph
examination.
4.

The Pre-Sentence Investigation Report is routinely sealed by the Court, and is

requested herein.
5.

(a) Is reporter's standard transcript requested? Yes.
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's

transcript as defined in Rule 25(b), I.A.R.:
(1) Hearing held on 9/17/07

(2) Hearing held on 4/07/08
(3) Hearing held on 7/07/08
(4) Sentencing hearing held on 2/02/09
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in
addition to those automatically included under' Rule 28, I.A.R.

a. All memorandums or briefi filed herein.

-

NOTICE OF APPEAL 2
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b. Addendum to the Pre-Sentence Investigation and Cover Letter dated

12/08/08, by Darla Maqueda, in Elmore County Case CR-2008-0932.
7. I certify:
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter.
(b)

(1)-That

either the reporter of the clerk of the district court or

administrative agency has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of the transcript.
( 2 ) X T h a t the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee
because this is a criminal appeal. The Appellant is also indigent.
(c)

(1)-That

the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record

(2)-That

the appellant is exempt fiom paying the estimated fee for the

has been paid.

preparation of the record because this is a criminal appeal. The Defendant is also indigent.
(d)

(1)-That

the appellate filing fee has been paid.

( 2 ) L T h a t appellant is exempt fiom paying the appellate filing fee because
this is a criminal appeal. The Appellant is also indigent.
(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to

Rule 20. (And the Attorney General of Idaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), Idaho Code.)
DATED this

/ 7 Pday of March 2009.
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CIFII).

Attorney for ~ ~ p e l l ~

-

NOTICE OF APPEAL 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That I have on this

1 7'P
day of March 2009, served a copy of the

within and foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to:
Kristina Schi'ndele
Elmore County Prosecutor
P.O. Box 607
Mountain Home, ID 83647

BY:

Lawrence Wasden
Attorney General
Attention: Criminal Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

BY:

Molly J. Huskey
State Appellate Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703

BY:

Nicole Omsberg
Court Reporter
Elmore County Courthouse
Mountain Home, ID 83647

BY:

Steve Kenyon
Idaho Supreme Court
45 1 State St.
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101

BY:

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4

Hand Delivery
Federal' Express
Certified Mail
y U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission

-Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Certified Mail
)C U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission

-Hand Delivery
)r

Federal Express
Certified Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission

-Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Certified Mail
,& U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission

-Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Certified Mail
& U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
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TERRY S. RATLIFF
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CHTD.
290 South 2ndEast Street
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-0900
Facsimile: (208) 587-6940
Idaho State Bar No.: 3598

i
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CLERK OF THE COURT
DEPUTY

..

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,
VS.

JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
Defendant.

1

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: CR-2007-1156
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT
OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER

COMES NOW the Defendant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, by and through his attorney,
Terry S. Ratliff of Ratliff Law Offices, Chtd., and hereby moves this Court for its Order pursuant
to Idaho Code 9 19-867, et seq, and Rule 13 '(b), (12) and (19) appointing the State Appellate
Public Defender's Office to represent the above-named Defendant-Appellant in all further
appellate proceedings and allowing trial counsel for Defendant to withdraw as counsel of record.
This motion is brought on the ground and for the reason that the Defendant-Appellant is
currently being represented by this Counsel and Office, as Public Defender in and for the County
of Elmore, and the State Appellate Public Defender is authorized by statute to represent the
Defendant-Appellant in all felony appellate proceedings.

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
amr
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Further, it is in the interest of justice for that Office to represent the Defendant-Appellant
in this case since the Defendant-Appellant is indigent, and any fiuther proceedings in this case
will be at the appellate level.
DATED this

18 day of March, 2009.
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CHTD.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this / g day of March, 2009, served a copy of the
within and foregoing MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER to:
Molly J. Huskey
State Appellate Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703

By:

Kristina Schindele
Elmore County Prosecutor
P.O. Box 607
Mountain Home, ID 83647

By:

_$L

,'

Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Certified Mail
U.S.Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Federd Express
U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission

Legal Assistant

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER - Page 2
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TERRY S. RATLIFF
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CHTD.
290 South 2"d East Street
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-0900
Facsimile: (208) 587-6940
Bar Number: 3598
Attorney for DefendantlAppellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
STATE OF IDAHO

Case No.: CR-2007-1156

)

Plaintiff,

)

VS.

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT
OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER

1
1

JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
Defendant.

)

The Court having reviewed the Defendant's Motion for Appointment of State Appellate
Public Defender and Defendant-Appellant being indigent, and good cause appearing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That Molly J. Huskey of the State's Appellate Public
Defender's Office is hereby appointed as Counsel for the Defendant and Terry S. Ratliff, of Ratliff
Law Offices, Chtd. is hereby withdrawn as counsel of record.
DATED this &+day

of

/

,2009.

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER - I
amr

IZI

j K I [ - i Irr
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this
served a copy of the within and foregoing ORDER to:
Kristina Schindele
Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney
190 South Fourth East
P.O. Box 607
Mountain Home, ID 83647
Terry S. Ratliff
Ratliff Law Ofice, Chtd.
290 South Second East
Mountain Home, ID 83647

By:

day of

h\ a

dand
Delivery
-Federal Express
-Certified Mail
-U.S. Mail
-Facsimile Transmission

/ H a n d Delivery

-Federal Express
-Certified Mail
-U.S. Mail

-Facsimile Transmission
Molly J. Huskey
State Appellate Public Defender
3627 Lake Harbor Ln.
Boise, ID 83703

-Hand Deliverv
-Federal E X ~ ~ S S
-Certified Mail
~ u . sMail
.
-Facsimile Transmission

.&Pp
F THE COURT

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER - 2
arnr
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In the Supreme Court of the Stata,q&J&&poo 4"
-

+

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

JUSTIN W. GOODGION,

)
)
)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

1

ORDER CONSOLIDATING APPEALS

1

v.

Supreme Court Docket No. 36364-2009
(36365-2009)
Elrnore County Docket No. 2007- 1156
(2008-932)

It appearing that these appeals should be consolidated for all purposes for reasons of
judicial economy; therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that appeal No. 36364 and 36365 shall be
CONSOLIDATED FOR ALL PURPOSES under No. 36364, but all documents filed shall bear
both docket numbers.

IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare a CLERK'S
RECORD, which shall include the documents requested in the Notices of Appeal, together with
a copy of this Order.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Reporter shall prepare a
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT, which shall include the transcripts requested in the Notices of
Appeal.
~ of April 2009.
DATED this 1 0 day
Fo*e

cc:

Supreme Court

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Court Reporter
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ORDER CONSOLIDATING APPEALS - Docket No. 36364-2009
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KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
190 South 4th East
Post Office Box 607
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-21 44 ext. 503
Facsimile: (208) 587-2 147
I.S.B. No. 6090
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

1

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

93 4

)

Case No. CR-2008-

1
1
1
1

COMPLAINT - CRIMINAL

Plaintiff,
VS.

JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
DOB
SSN:
Defendant.

PERSONALLY APPEARED Before me this 29th day of February 2008, Lee Fisher,
Deputy ProsecutingAttorney in and for the Countyof Elmore, Stateof Idaho, who, being firstduly swom,
complains and says: JUSTIN W. GOODGION, on or about the 22nd day of June 2006, in the County
of Elrnore, State of Idaho, then and there being, did then and there commit the crimesof RAPE, I1counts,
felonies, said crimes being committed as follows, to-wit:
COUNT I

RAPE
Felony, I.C.

8 18-6101(I), 18-6104,18-112A, 18-8304

COMPLAINT - CRIMINAL - Page 1

That the Defendant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, on or about the 22nd day of June 2006, in the
County of Elmore, Stateof Idaho, did penetrate the vaginal opening of A.T., a female person, with his
penis, and where A.T. was under the age of eighteen years, to-wit: of the age of 14years, all in violation
of I.C.

8 18-6101(1).
COUNT U

RAPE
Felony, I.C. $j1&6101(1), 1&6104,1&112A, 18-8304
That the Defendant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, on or about the 22nd day of June 2006, in the
County of Elmore, Stateof Idaho, did penetrate the vaginal opening ofK.C., a female person, with his
penis, and where K.C. was under the age of eighteen years, to-wit: of the age of 13years, all in violation
of I.C. § 18-6101(1).
All ofwhich is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statutein such case made and provided
against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho.
Said complainant therefore prays that the Defendant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, be brought
before the Court to be dealt with according to law.
DATED This 29th day of February 2008.
KFUSTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I
Zc
I

Lee Fisher, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this 29th day o$February 2008.

COMPLAINT - CRIMINAL - Page 2

-

#

IN THE DISTR@
OURT OF THE FOURTH JUDIC
STATE .. IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN

-q

Docket No.

R Norton

CLERK

ISTRICT OF THE
F ELMORE
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A m a i f l n m e n t -In Custodu

TYPE OF ACTION

.........................................................................................

NO. 5

N 0 . L
Counsel for
NO.4.
Counsel for

Defendant

NO.&
Counsel for

Index )
No's. I

Phase of Case

I

1 1 3 I .Case Called. Advised
1

1 4.Understand

equest P.D.

(

)Will Hire Own

(

)Request Continuance

(

)Waives Attorney

I

I Enters Plea Of ( )Not Guilty

(

)Guilty

I

I&

Obiection to P.D

(

)Objects to P.D.

11.

Subiect to Reimbursment ( )P.D. Denied ( )Acce~tsPlea

I

13. ( )Recommendations ( )No Objection to OR release

COURT MINUTES

(

)Comments on Bond

132

(

)Cannot Accept Plea

In and For the County of Elmore
STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,
VS.

Justin Goodgion
Defendant.

.,.. cri
a,.- -..

F..s - i i

Fourth Judicial District Court, State of Idaho

r

,

-

2008 HAR 3

1
1
1
)

1

c a s e No: CR-2008-0868#J;

)

1
1
1

DOB:

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF
NOTIFICATION

THIS IS TO ACKNOWLEDGE That David C. Epis, Magistrate, who has identified himself
to me as a duly appointed, qualified, and acting Magistrate of the District Court in and for Elmore
County, Idaho, has advised me of the following facts:

1.

That I have an absolute right to remain silent and do not have to make any statement.

2.

That in the event I did decide to make a statement, anything I say can and will be
used against me in a court of law.

3.

That I have an absolute right to have a lawyer advise and represent me at all stages of
the proceeding.

4.

That I have the right to a lawyer even if I cannot afford one, and if I cannot afford
one, I may use the services of the Public Defender at any time and at public expense.

5.

That I have the right to have a preliminary examination.

I understand the above and have a full awareness of each of said rights as explained to me by
the above named Magistrate.
/

DATED This

<

o'clock

-

21

61

h Judicial District Court, State
In and
--.. For the County of Elmor
150 South 4th
Suite #5
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647-3095
~

as<

- - !.,,\
,

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,
VS.

Justin Goodgion
1003 2nd Street N.
Nampa, ID 83687
Defendant.

c-r;

I...

*..

i

1
1
)
)
)

Case No: CR-2008-000
ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC D-NDER

1

DL:

The Court being fully advised as to the application of Justin Goodgion, and it appearing to be a proper case,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that an attorney be appointed through the:
Public Defender's Office
Elmore County Public Defender
290 South 2nd East
Mountain Home ID 83647

Public Defender for the County of Elmore, State of Idaho, a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is
hereby appointed to represent said Defendant, Justin Goodgion, in all proceedings in the above entitled case.
The Defendant is further advised that helshe may be required to reimburse the Court for all or part of the cost
of court appointed counsel.

DATED This 3rd day of March, 2008.
Copies to:

% Public Defender
Prosecutor

Order Appointing Public Defender
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I N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORB

1
1
1

STATE OF IDAHO,

.
&&!In

plaintiff ,

Casa No.

1

i

kooliqlm ,
Defendant.

1, >

WAIVER OF SPEEDY
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION

1
1
1
1

~ t (~; ~nc ~nn
I

, hereby

waive my right

I understand that I am antitled

to a speedy preliminary haaring.

to a preliminary hearing within 14 days if incarcerated or 21 days
if not incarcerated.

By signing this document I am not waiving my

right to a preliminary hearing or any other rights that I am
entitled to under the united States Constitution or the Idaho
constitution.

DATED This

5
o'clock

day of

&

lnfi~ch
.H.

WAIVER OF SPEEDY PRELIMINARY HEARING

, of

20&8

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

Jusn

1
1

G~~MI~N
JUDGE

David C Znis

CLERK

%. Fardis

CD NO.

A-~-u-oS'

Docket No.

CFr-2co84C)32

)
)

1

~ fm
! p'

DATE

TIME

9
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TYPE OF ACTION

........................................................................................

NO. 5
Counsel for Phintiff /Frosecutor 34
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NO.4.

N O . 6
Counsel for

........................................................................................
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Fourth Judicial District Court. State of Idaho
In and For the County bf Elmore
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff.

1
1
1
1

VS.

Justin Goodgion
1003 2nd Street N.
Nampa, ID 83687

)
)

.
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T I E COURT

DEPUT
Case No:

1

Defendant.

DL:

.,

ID

i

1
)
)

WAIVER OF PRELIMINARY
EXAM1NATION

Being aware of the fad that a preliminary examination is a Court hearing to determine if a crime
has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that I committed such crime, and
being fully aware of my right to have such a preliminary examination upon the pending criminal charge of
Rape-Female Under the acre of 18 (Statutorv Rape) Rape-Female Under the aqe of 18 (Statutory
Rape) , a felony, now lodged against me, it is my desire to and I do hereby waive my right to such
preliminary examination. No promises or threats have been made to me nor is any pressure of any kind
been used against me to encourage the signing of this Waiver.
Dated this 4th day of April, 2008,

Magistrate

WAIVER OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION

KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
190 South 4th East
Post Office Box 607
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-2144 ext. 503
Facsimile: (208) 587-2 147
I.S.B. No 6090
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i
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

Case No. CR-2008-00000932

1
)

VS.

JUST
SSN
DOB

ON,

)
)

ORDER HOLDING DEFENDANT
TO ANSWER

1
Defendant.

)
)

ON THE 4th day of April 2008, at the hour of 1:15 p.m., the Defendant appeared before the
undersigned Magistratewith Terry S. Ratliff, Attorney at Law, his attorneyof record, this being the time
and place set for the preliminary examinationherein. The State of Idaho was represented by Lee Fisher,
Deputy ProsecutingAttorney in and for the County of Elmore, Stateof Idaho. The Defendant waived the
reading of the Complaint on file herein. The Defendant was advised of the right to a preliminary
examination, the nature ofwhich was explained to the Defendant. The Defendant thereupon waived his
right to a preliminary examination.
The Court, being hlly advised in the premises, finds that the crimes of RAPE, a felony, IIcounts,

as set forth in the Information on fileherein, have been committed in Elmore County, State of Idaho, and

ORDER HOLDING DEFENDANT TO ANSWER - Page 1

ORIGINAL

that there is sufficient cause to believe that the Defendant committed said crimes.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED That the Defendant be and hereby is held to answer to the
charges as set forth in the Information on file herein, before a District Judge in the District Court ofthe
Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Elmore.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That Defen&?emain

as previously set.

EPIS, Magistrate Judge

ORDER HOLDING DEFENDANT TO ANSWER - Page 2
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KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
190 South 4th East
Post Office Box 607
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-2 144 ext. 503
Facsimile: (208) 587-2147
I.S.B. No. 6090
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
VS.

JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
SSN:
DOB:
Defendant.

1
1
1
1
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-2008-00000932
INFORMATION

Lee Fisher, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in and for the County of Elmore, Stateof Idaho, who,
in the name of and by the authority of said State, prosecutes in its behalf, in proper person, comes now
before the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Elmore, and gives the Court to understand and be informed that the Defendant is accused by this
Information ofthe crimes o t RAPE, a felony, I1counts, upon which charges the said Defendant, having
duly appeared before a Magistrate on the 4th day of April 2008, and then and there having waived his
preliminary examination upon said charges, was, by said Magistrate, thereuponheld to answer before the
District Judge of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the Countyof Elmore, to said

INFORMATION - Page 1

charges, which crimes were committed as follows:
COUNT I

RAPE
Felony, I.C. § 18-6101(1), 18-6104,18-112A, 18-8304

That the Defendant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, on or about the 22nd day of June 2006, in the
County of Elmore, State of Idaho, did penetrate the vaginal opening of A.T., a female person, with his
penis, and where A.T. was under the age of eighteen years, to-wit: ofthe age of 14years, all in violation
of I.C.

5 18-6101(1).
COUNT I1

RAPE
Felony, I.C. § 18-6101(1), 18-6104,18-112A, 18-8304
That the Defendant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, on or about the 22nd day of June 2006, in the
County of Elmore, State of Idaho, did penetrate the vaginal opening of K.C., a female person, with his
penis, and where K.C. was under the age of eighteen years, to-wit: ofthe age of 13years, all in violation

All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against
the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho.
DATED This 4th day of April 2008.
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

-7

BYJ&
Le isher, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL

APRIL 7 , 2008

COURT MINUTES
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

)

1
1
)
)

vs .

Case No. CR-2007-1156
CR-2008-932

1

JUSTIN GOODGION,
Defendant.
)

APPEARANCES:
Lee Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

Counsel for State

Terry Ratliff
Public Defender

Counsel for Defendant

5:58 p.m.

Call of case.

Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant present, in custody.
Mr. Fisher advises that the defendant will be pleading guilty to
CR-2008-932 Count I. The updated PSI will be waived and will use
the rider review. The fine amount will be left in the Court's
discretion and the defendant will pay reimbursement to the public
defender's office and standard court costs. The defendant would
be incarcerated for a period of 15 years with 5 years fixed and 10
years indeterminate to run concurrent with CR-2007-1156. The
restitution is to be determined and the restitution report would
be pending until the defendant returns from a 2nd rider.
Response by the Court.
Statement made by Mr. Fisher.
Mr. Ratliff advises that the defendant will waive his arraignment
of the new case.

COURT MINUTES - APRIL 7, 2008
Page - 1

d

The Court addresses the deft of his arraignment rights.
The defendant requested that the he would
arraignment rights read to him again.

like to have the

The Court advised the defendant of his arraignment rights on case
CR-2008-932.
Mr. Ratliff advises that the defendant has dyslexia.
The Court read the Information to the defendant.
The Court advises that the defendant will be entering a guilty
plea on CR-2008-932 to Count I.
Mr. Ratliff has had adequate time with the defendant.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff.
The defendant advises that he understands that his counsel can
file a Motion to Suppress but waives the right of the Motion to
Suppress regarding his admissions.
Mr. Ratliff consents to the guilty plea.
The defendant agrees with his representations.
The defendant sworn and examined on his own behalf.
Mr. Ratliff advises that the defendant will waive his updated PSI.
Mr. Ratliff advises the Court about the medical issues that the
defendant has.
The Court accepts the guilty plea and directs that they be
entered.
The Court advises that it will move directly to sentencing.
The Court advises counsel about the 19-2524.evaluation.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff.
Response by the Court.
Statement made by Mr. Fisher regarding the State has no objection
to the defendant remaining in custody for the evaluation.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff.

COURT MINUTES - APRIL 7, 2008
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Counsel is ready to proceed to sentencing on both cases.
The Court advises that on CR-2007-1156 the Court will place the
defendant on probation for a period of 15 years with 377 days
credit.
That sentence is being imposed for the purpose for
allowing the defendant in CR-2007-1156 to obtain a 19-2524
evaluation pursuant to Idaho law.
The Court advises that the
underlying sentencing is incarceration for a period of 15 years
with 5 years fixed and 10 years indeterminate. The Court further
advises that the only condition of probation is that the defendant
will remain in custody of the Elmore County Jail pending
completion of the evaluation and then be brought back in front of
the Court for sentencing. The Court reserves the right to send
the defendant on a 2nd rider upon completion of the evaluation
without violation of probation. The Court will order a 19-2524
evaluation in case CR-2008-932. The 2 matters will be brought
back in front of the Court for sentencing. The Court will impose
a joint rider on both cases as agreed by both parties with
reviewing the evaluation at that sentencing.
Statement made by Mr. Fisher.
The Court order a 2nd psychosexual evaluation will be down.
Mr. Fisher requests that restitution be left open.
Response by the Court regarding the restitution.
Mr. Fisher gave the Court victim statements.
The Court set this matter for SENTENCING on June 2, 2008 at 1:30
o'clock p.m.
The defendant remained in the custody of the sheriff.
6:40 p.m. End.

MARSA GRIMMETT
Clerk of the District Court

COURT MINUTES - APRIL 7, 2008
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Reporter: N. Omsberg
Clerk: K. Johnson
Reporter's Est. $

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL

JUNE 2 , 2 0 0 8

COURT MINUTES
1

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)

1
1

Plaintiff,
vs .

Case No. CR-2007-1156
CR-2008-932

)

1
1
1

JUSTIN GOODGION,
Defendant.

)
)
)

APPEARANCES :
Lee Fisher
De~utvProsecutina Attornev

Counsel for State

Terry Ratliff
Public Defender

Counsel for Defendant

2:26 p.m. Call of case.
Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant present, in custody.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff.
Response by the Court.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff.
The Court will sign the order as of today's date for the mental
health access.
Mr. Fisher advises that the 2nd psychosexual evaluation will be
withdrawn.
Mr. Ratliff
withdrawn.

had

no

objection

COURT MINUTES - JUNE 2, 2008
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to

the

2nd

evaluation

being

The Court advises that there
psychosexual evaluation done.

will

not

be

an

additional

Mr. Ratliff will stipulate to use the first evaluation.
Statement made by Mr. Fisher.
Response by the Court.
The Court set this matter for SENTENCING on July 7, 2008 at 1:30
o'clock p.m.
The defendant remained in custody.
2:31 p.m.

End.

MARSA GRIMMETT
Clerk of the District Court
-5
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Reporter: N. Omsberg
Clerk: K. Johnson
Reporter's Est. $

TERRY S. RATLIFF, ISB No. 3598
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CHTD.
290 South Second East
Mountain Home, ID 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-0900
Facsimile: (208) 587-6940
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
VS.

JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR 2008-0932
ORDER FOR MENTAL HEALTH
EVALUATION, ACCESS, & FUNDS

WHEREAS, on the 7' day of April, 2008, the above-named Defendant appeared before
this Court with counsel TERRY S. RATLIFF and admitted to one count of RAPE in the above
case, and the Defendant's mental health being at issue therein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that pursuant to Idaho
Code tj 19-2524 the Defendant above-named shall undergo a mental health examination, at the
direction of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare and shall report to the Court as
specified herein.
The report shall include the following:
1)

A description of the nature of the examination;

2)

A diagnosis, evaluation, or prognosis of the mental condition of the
defendant;

3)

An analysis of the degree of the Defendant's illness or defect and level of
functional impairment;

ORDER FOR MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION, ACCESS, & FUNDS
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4)

A consideration of whether treatment is available for the Defendant's
mental condition;

5)

An analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatment;

6)

A consideration of the risk of danger which the Defendant may create for
the public if at large, and;

7)

A plan of treatment if the mental health examination indicates that:
a. The Defendant suffers from a severe and reliably diagnosable
mental illness or defect;
b. Without treatment, the immediate prognosis is for major distress
resulting in serious mental or physical deterioration of the
defendant;
c. Treatment is available for such illness or defect, and;
d. The relative risks and benefits of treatment or non-treatment are
such that a reasonable person would consent to treatment.

Said evaluation shall be performed at no cost to the Defendant, as the defendant is a
"needy person."

Idaho Code 4 19-85l(c). All expenses incurred for the preparation of the

evaluation shall be borne by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (I.C. $ 19-2524(6)).
The Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy hereof upon the Department of Health and
Welfare, the Elrnore County Detention Center, the Elrnore County Prosecutor, and attorney for

. the Defendant, Ratliff Law Offices, Chtd., forthwith.
Upon completion, said evaluation shall be filed in triplicate with the Clerk of the District
Court, or her deputy. The Clerk shall provide copies of the evaluation to the prosecutor and
defense counsel.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED,that the Elmore County Detention Center shall allow the
Department of Health & Welfare, or its designee, to complete the evaluation, entry into the
Elmore County Detention Center for the purposes of conducting a mental health examination of
the Defendant at any and all reasonable times. The Detention Center shall also provide a quiet,
private area with a table and any and all other reasonable facilities and necessary equipment to
the Department of Health & Welfare or its designee to complete the examination of the
Defendant.

ORDER FOR MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION, ACCESS, & FUNDS
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,

FURTHER,the Defendant may be subject to making restitution to or reimbursing the
State of Idaho for monies used to pay for the evaluation.
SO ORDERED AND DATED, this

~ t day
d o f 3M
L O 8 .

ORDER FOR MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION, ACCESS, & FUNDS
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

qL <T-

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this
served a copy of the within and foregoing ORDER to:

KRISTINA SCHINDELE
Elmore County
Prosecuting Attorney
190 South 4' East
P.O. Box 607
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Fax No. (208)587-2147

By:

Teny S. Ratliff Law Offices, Chtd.
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CHTD.
290 South 2ndEast
Mountain Home, ID 83647
Fax No. (208)587-6940

By:

Mary Jo Beig
DAG, Human Services Div.
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0026
Fax No. (208) 334-6738

By:

Elrnore County Detention Center
P.O. Box 665
Mountain Home, ID 83647

By:

day

/Hand
Delivery
Federal Express
Certified Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission

/

Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Certified Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission

_
J

Deputy ~ i e + -

, 2008,

/

Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Certified Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission

J

ORDER FOR MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION, ACCESS, & FUNDS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
HONORABLE MICHAEL E . WETHERELL

JULY

7, 2008

COURT MINUTES
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs .
JUSTIN GOODGION,
Defendant.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Case No. CR-2007-1156
CR-2008-932

)
)

APPEARANCES:
Lee Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

Counsel for State

Terry Ratliff
Public Defender

Counsel for Defendant

5:34 p.m. Call of case.
Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant present, in custody.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff regarding the defendant being
evaluated for Mental Health Court.
The Court advises that it does not believe that the defendant
would qualify for Mental Health Court.
Mr. Ratliff advises that the agreement was that the defendant
would be sent on a second rider on CR-2007-1156.
Response by the Court regarding the Mental Health Court.
Mr. Fisher advises that the State is not willing to agree to the
Mental Health Court.
The Court addresses counsel.

COURT MINUTES - JULY 7, 2008
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Response by Mr. Fisher.
All parties have received and have had adequate time to review the
materials.
Mr. Fisher had no corrections.
Mr. Ratliff had no corrections.
The defendant had no corrections.
Statement made by Mr. Fisher.
Mr. Fisher's recommendations:
CR-2007-1156 - the Court revoke his probation and send the
defendant on a second rider.
CR-2008-932 that the defendant
register as a sex offender. The fines, fees, court costs, and
public defender reimbursement are in the Court's discretion. That
the underlying sentence would be 15 years incarceration with 5
years fixed and 10 years indeterminate. That the rider is ran
concurrent for both CR-2007-1156 and CR-2008-932. Restitution
would be left open for the victim A.T. in CR-2008-932 and in CR2007-1156would request to reserve restitution in that case.
The Court advises that it will order a restitution report in CR2008-932.
Objection made by Mr. Ratliff.
Response by the Court.
Response by Mr. Fisher.
Response by the Court.
Statement continued by Mr. Fisher.
Statement made by Mr.
attached to the PSI.

Ratliff

requesting

the

evaluation be

Mr. Ratliff's recommendations:
The defendant would be sent on a 2nd rider. That the Court hold
off sex offender determination until after the rider review. That
the defendant be evaluated for mental health medication while on a
rider.
That on CR-2008-932 that the defendant would have an
underlying sentence of 15 years with 5 years fixed and 10 years
indeterminate to run concurrent with his other case and would
request that the Court not go beyond that amount and run them
concurrent.

COURT MINUTES - JULY 7, 2008
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Statement made by the defendant.
The Court advises that it will add in capitals and underlined the
following: the copy of the Idaho Code Section 19-2524 mental
evaluation of the defendant is attached hereto assist in the
defendant's treatment and programming while on the rider. And the
evaluations will be attached to both CR-2007-1156 and CR-2008-932.
No legal cause shown.
The Court sentenced the defendant on CR-2007-1156 to incarceration
for 15 years with 5 years fixed and 10 years indeterminate with
credit for 468 days against the fixed portion. The Court will
retain jurisdiction for the 2nd time. While the defendant is on a
rider he will receive cognitive based programs, substance abuse
treatment, obtain his GED, and any other programs deemed
appropriate by rider personnel. The defendant will participate in
sex offender group.
The Court will reserve restitution upon
completion of the rider. On CR-2008-932 the Court sentenced the
defendant to 25 years with 10 years fixed and 15 year
indeterminate with credit for 468 days served with the Court
retaining jurisdiction and sending the defendant on a rider to run
concurrent with CR-2007-1156. While the defendant is on a rider
the defendant will receive cognitive based programs, substance
abuse treatment, obtain his GED and any other programs deemed
appropriate by rider personnel. The defendant will participate in
sex offender group. The defendant will pay a fine in the amount
of $2,500.00 with standard court costs and fees. The defendant
will pay reimbursement to the public defender in the amount of
$500.00. Restitution will be reserved pending completion of the
rider. The defendant shall supply a DNA sample and thumbprint.
The Court will reserve any determination of sex offender
registration pending completion of the rider.
The Court advises the defendant of his right to appeal.
The defendant understands his right to appeal.
Statement made by Mr. Fisher regarding the credit for time served.
The Court advises that on CR-2008-932 the defendant will receive
credit for time served of '130 days against the fixed portion of
the sentence.
The Court advises the defendant of his right to appeal.
The defendant understands his right to appeal.
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the sheriff.

COURT MINUTES - JULY 7, 2008
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6:00 p.m.

End.

MARSA GRIMMETT
Clerk of the District Court

COURT MINUTES - JULY 7, 2008
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Reporter: N. Omsberg
Clerk: K. Johnson
Reporter's Est. $

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
)

Plaintiff,
vs .
JUST
DOB:
SSN:
Defendant.

i
)

Case No. CR-2008-932

)
)
)
)

JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT
RETAINED JURISDICTION

On the 7th day of July, 2008, before the Honorable Michael
E. Wetherell, District Judge, personally appeared Lee Fisher,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Elmore, State of
Idaho, and the defendant with his attorney Terry Ratliff, this
being the time fixed for pronouncing judgment in this matter.
The defendant was informed by the Court of the nature of the
Information filed against him for the crimes of RAPE, Felonies,
I.C. 5 18-6101(1); the defendant waiving his right for a formal
thereon on April 7, 2008; plea of "Guiltyv thereto on April 7,
2008 to the crime of RAPE as charged in the information, Count I1
having been dismissed; and the defendant waiving his update
presentence investigation report.

JUDGMENT - Page 1

The Court asked whether the defendant had witnesses or
evidence to present on a hearing in mitigation of punishment;
heard statements from counsel; and gave defendant an
opportunity to make a statement.
The defendant was asked if he had any legal cause to show
why judgment should not be pronounced against him, to which he
replied that he had none.
And no sufficient cause being shown or appearing to the
Court why judgment should not be rendered;
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
defendant is guilty as charged and convicted; that the offense
for which the defendant is adjudged guilty herein was committed
on or about 22nd day of June, 2006.
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant is sentenced
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-2513 to the custody of the
Idaho State Board of Correction, to be held and incarcerated by
said Board in a suitable place for a period of twenty-five (25)
years with ten (10) years fixed and fifteen (15) years
indeterminate to run concurrent with CR-2007-1156; with credit
for 130 days served; with the court retaining jurisdiction for
180 days pursuant to I.C. 5 19-2601(4).

The Court recommends

the defendant receive cognitive based programs, substance abuse
treatment, obtain his GED, and to receive any other programs
deemed appropriate by rider personnel including the sex offender

JUDGMENT - Page 2

assessment group.
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant be, and hereby is,
assessed and Ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $2,500.00,
with $0.00 suspended;
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that pursuant to Idaho Code Section
31-3201A(b) the defendant shall pay Court costs in the amount of
$17.50; County Administrative Surcharge Fee in the amount of
$10.00 pursuant to I.C.

§

31-4602; P.O.S.T. Academy fees in the

amount of $10.00 pursuant to I.C.

§

31-3201B; ISTARS technology

fee in the amount of $10.00 pursuant to I.C.

§

31-3201(5);

$50.00 to the Victims Compensation Fund pursuant to I.C.

§

72-

1025; $500.00 for reimbursement of public defender fees pursuant
to I.C.

§

19-854(c),

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED

that pursuant

to

Idaho Code

Section 19-5304 the defendant shall reserve restitution to be
reserved pending completion of the rider, to be paid through
the Clerk of the District Court as arranged through the
probation officer;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Fines, Court Costs and
Restitution shall be paid through the Clerk of the District
Court, upon the defendant's release from custody, as directed by
the Department of Probation and Parole;

JUDGMENT - Page 3
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant be committed to the
custody of the Sheriff of Elmore County, Idaho, for delivery
FORTHWITH.and within 7 days, to the custody of the Idaho State
Board of Correction at the Idaho State Penitentiary or other
facility within the State designated by the State Board of
Correction.
A COPY OF THE IDAHO CODE SECTION 19-2524 MENTAL EVALUATION
OF THE DEFENDANT IS ATTACHED HERETO TO ASSIST IN DEFENDANT'S
TREATMENT AND PROGRAMMING WHILE ON THE RIDER.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk deliver a certified
copy of this Judgment and Commitment to the said Sheriff, which

*

shall serve as the commitment of the defendant.
Dated this

day of July, 2008.

cstrict Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

qm day of July.

2008, I

mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the within
instrument to :
Lee Fisher
Elmore County Deputy Prosecutor
Interdepartmental Mail
Terry Ratliff
Public Defender
Interdepartmental Mail
Carolee Kelly
Department of Correction
Central Records
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110
Boise, Idaho 83706
Elmore County Jail
Interdepartmental Mail
MARSA

GRIMMET+',

Clerk of this' ~istrictCourt
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KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
190 South 4th East
Post Office Box 607
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-2144 ext. 503
Fax: (208) 587-2147
ISB #6090
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
VS.

JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
Defendant.

Case No. CR-2008-00000932
MOTION TO DISMISS
COUNT I1

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Lee Fisher, Elmore County Deputy
Prosecutor, and herebymoves for dismissal ofcount I1based upon the following factors: pursuant to plea
negotiations, Defendant pled guilty to count I in exchange for dismissal of count 11. This Motion is made
in the interests of justice and of the People of the State of Idaho.
DATED This

s"day of July 2008.
I

Elmore County Deputy Prosecutor

-

MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT I1 Page 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifythat on today's date, I served a copy of the attached document to the following
parties by the following means:

Teny S. Ratliff
Attorney at Law
290 South 2nd East
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647

First Class Mail
X Hand Delivery
-Certified Mail
-Next Day Delivery
-Facsimile

P-

DATED this -day of July 2008.
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

Zfi
-;7

Lee Fi er
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KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
190 South 4th East
Post Office Box 607
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-2 144 ext. 503
Fax: (208) 587-2 147
ISB #6090
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CR-2008-00000932
Plaintiff,

1

VS.

1
1
1

JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
Defendant.

ORDER TO DISMISS
COUNT n

BASED UPON Motion by the State, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That Count II is hereby DISMISSED.
DATED ~ h i s e d ofa July
~ 2008.

-

ORDER TO DISMISS COUNT I1 Page 1

1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

9-

I HEREBY CERTIFYThat on the
?fay of July 2008, I caused a true and correct copy
- - of the
foregoing document, to be served upon the following people by the following methods.
Elmore County Prosecutor
190 South 4th East
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647

First Class Mail
/ Hand Delivery
Facsimile

Teny S. Ratliff
Attorney at Law
290 South 2nd East
Mountain Home, ID 83647

First Class Mail
A a n d Delivery
Certified Mail
Next Day Delivery
Facsimile

I

1

J

I

i

)

MARSA GRIMME'M', ~ l m of
h thc District Court

h,,u/
D uty Clerk

-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 0'F1kH&. ;.

a

Plaintiff,

JUST
DOB:
SSN:

-_._,

..
,

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

, ..i.:r..

.,?.I.

...;.---;C 1 i

DEPUTY
1
1
1
1

,

Case No. CR-2007-1156
CR-2008-932
ORDER TO TRANSPORT

)

1
Defendant.

)

It appearing that the above-named defendant is in the custody
of the Idaho State Board of Correction, and that it is necessary
that he be brought before the Court for further proceedings.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that the Sheriff of Elmore County,
State of Idaho, bring the defendant to the Court in Mountain Home,
Idaho, County of Elmore, State of Idaho, on Monday the 5th day of
January, 2008, at the hour of 11:OO o'clock a.m.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED, that

the

Idaho State

Board

of

Correction release the said defendant to the Sheriff of Elmore
County, State of Idaho, for the purpose of the aforementioned
appearance and for the Sheriff of Elmore County, State of Idaho,
to hold said defendant until such time as he is released on
probation or ordered returned to the Board of Correction.

ORDER TO TRANSPORT- Page 1

Dated this 30th day of December, 2008.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Marsa Grimmett, hereby certify that on this 30th day of
December, 2008, a true and correct copy of the ORDER was served or
mailed, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:
Carolee Kelly
Records Administrator
Dept. of Corrections
Central Records
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110
Boise, ID 83706
Faxed to: 327-7444
Interdepartmental Mail
Sheriff
Prosecutor
Public Defender
MARSA GRIMME~T,

I

Clerk of the\nir~trictCourt

ORDER TO TRANSPORT- Page 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

JANUARY 5 , 2009

HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL

COURT MINUTES
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)

1
Plaintiff,

1
)

vs .

JUSTIN GOODGION,
Defendant.

Case No. CR-2007-1156
CR-2008-932

1
1
1

1
1
)

1
APPEARANCES :
Kristina Schindele
Prosecutina Attornev

Counsel for State

Terry Ratliff
Public Defender

Counsel for Defendant

11:lO a.m.

Call of case.

Time and date set for JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW, defendant present, in
custody.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff regarding
polygraph and requests a 30 day extension.

getting

an

updated

The Court addresses counsel regarding disclosure.
Response by Mr. Ratliff.
Discussion between the Court and counsel regarding disclosure.
The Court will retain jurisdiction for an additional 30 days and
sets this matter for JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW on January 20, 2009 at
11:OO o'clock a.m.

COURT MINUTES - JANUARY 5, 2009
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The defendant remained in the custody of the sheriff.
11:14 a.m.

End.

MARSA GRIMMETT
Clerk of the District Court

COURT MINUTES - JANUARY 5, 2009
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Reporter: N. Omsberg
Clerk: K. Johnson
Reporter's Est. 4 pages

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL

JANUARY 2 0 , 2009

COURT MINUTES
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
VS

.

)
)

1
1

Case No. CR-2007-1156
CR-2008-932

)

1

JUSTIN GOODGION,
Defendant.

)
)

1
1
)

APPEARANCES:
Lee Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

Counsel for State

Terry Ratliff
Public Defender

Counsel for Defendant

11:49 a.m.

Call of case.

Time and date set for JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW, defendant present, in
custody.
The Court advises that the Notice of Authority was. just received
today .
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff regarding the late filing.
The Court advises that it will give the State time to respond.
Mr. Fisher advises that if the Court is ready to proceed then the
State is also.
The Court advises that it will set it over on the calendar until
3:30 o'clock p.m.

COURT MINUTES - JANUARY 20, 2009
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11:52 a.m. End.
3:38 p.m.

Recall of case.

The Court advises that it has received additional case law and
will continue this one more time.
The Court set this matter for SENTENCING on February 2, 2009 at
11:OO o'clock a.m.
The Court advises that the State may respond to the citation of
case law by January 28, 2009 and Mr. Ratliff can file a reply by
January 30, 2009.
The Court further advises that this will not get delayed again
after February 2, 2009.
The defendant remained in the custody of the sheriff.
3:40 p.m. End.

MARSA GRIMMETT
Clerk of the District Court
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Reporter: N. Omsberg
Clerk: K. Johnson
Reporter's Est. 5 pages
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TERRY S. RATLIFF
R A W LAW OFFICES, CETD.
290 South Second -1 Smet
Mountain Homc, 1D 83647

Telcphonc:

(208) 587-0900

Facsimile:

(208) 587-6940

,

. ,
.:!;,t

I S

.

.

. .. .

.

.

DEPUTY +I

4

Attorney for the D e f e n h ~

M TAE DISTIUCX COURT OF THE FOURTHJUDICIAL DIsIrlRICT OF THE
.

,

1 , .
1
C='NO. CR-08-0932
1
1
1
NOTICE OF AUTHORITY
1

Plaintiff,
-vs-

JUSTIN GOODGTON,

)

1
1

Defendant.

COMES NOW The Defendant, JUSTIN GOODGION, by and through his attorncy of
rccord, TERRY S. RATLIFF of Ratliff Law Offices, Chld, and hereby subm'ts this authorily Cir
che proposition that thc Dcfcndant should either be retuned to the Rider Program, without requid

disclosue of olhm .sexual activity. unlcss hc is @vcnimrnupity for thc m e , or in thc altcrnativc,
that thc Dchdant be given probation herein
DATED This

ad7&y

of January, 2009.

RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CEITt).
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C L E R ~OF THE CGURT

ISB: 3598

TkE STArllEOF lDAHO,

v,'-

TERRY ~ R A T L I F /
F,
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

-

within and foregoing NOTICE OF AUTFIOWIY to:

,

.

.

~l&breCounty Prosecutor's Office
190 South 4n'East
..Y .O. BOX 607
Mouptain
. ~ d m e ,TD
' 83647
,
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BY: -I-land Dclivay

-Federal Express

-Certified Mgil
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STATE OF IDAHO,PlalnW-Appellant, v. ROBERT RADFORD,Defendant-

Rapondent
Docket.Na24762,2000 Opinion No. 23

SUPREME COURT OF IDAHO
134 Idaho 187; 998 P2d 8% 211W Ida LJSB 23

.
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,

. SUBSEQUENTHISTORY;
Publiation April 20,2000.
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,

PRIOR HI!iZORY: Appeal From thc Disbjct Court of
the Fowh Judicial Dlstrict of tlie State of'ldaho, Ada
County. klon. George D.Carey, District Judge. .
X,TSPO!SlTION:

.

,

March 29,2000, ~ i l c d. .

(.**I] RelgdCd f& .. .

'

. .

Reversed and remmded.

COUNSEL: Hon. Alan G. Lancc, Attomcy Genml,
Doisc, for nppellsmt. Michael A. Henderson, Deputy Attomey Oeneml, argued.
Collins* BOim' for rmpmdmr
WMbnp. McQb.
Thomas McCabc nrgued.

JUDGES: TROUT, Chief Jusdce. Justices SILAK,
SC1moEDnt
WALTERS ad

OPMION BY; TROUT
OPlNION

[*I 88] [**81] TROUT,Chicf Justice
This is an appwl from the onltr of lht distict judgc
panting the defendants motion to suppress. The defen&I.,Robcri Radford (hdfod) wns indicted for firstdegree burglary md fust-degree kidnapping. Prior to
trial, Rdford filcd a motion lo suppms s~lcmmtsmado
to law enforcement ofncers. This motion was eventually
.gnantcd by thc diutricl judgc and h c Sktc of Idaho is
now appenling that decision. The State argues the district
judgc incorrectly dctcrmincd that our decision in State v..
Cruwe, 131 fduho 109,952 P.2d 1245 11998) mandated
suppression of thc st;ltcmcnt%made by Radford.

.
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~

~
PROCEDURAI,

,
RACK-

On Scptcmbcr 1, 1991. an unknown [***2] male
entered the home of C. B. (md detained hcr with thc intmt to commit the
of rape. C. B. promptly reported
the incident to the Boisc poliec, but could not identify
her assailant. Evenmi~lly,because of a lack of Imds, the
police put rhe crw on inactivc status somc timc in 1992.

On June 22, 1995, ltodford entered into a Rule 11
.plea agrecmcnt in a completely unrelated case. The
agreement d e d for Radfod to plead guilty to a chargc
of 5axual abwc of a minor in r a m for the State ncommending a speeiflc sentence, most of which would bc
suspended with Radford placed on probation. One of the
conditions of hdford's prthtion was comuldion of the
SANE (Sexual Abwc
~ n d c d prog&.
)
SANB is a
privately operated treatment program fbr sex offikndm
a d W r fhmilior The corn accepted the plea agrecmc"~
lyld Radford was givcn the scntence recommended by
the State.

on

Prior to scntcmciny and in anticipation of the expemd sentence, Radford entered into a contract with
SAW. This contract specifically authorized Itadford's
thenpist to release information warding his tramrent to
law mforcement persom~el.Additionrrlly, the conmct
provided that Rndford ~ m h l o o dhat [**9]
"
p
i
ously committed &mes must also be reported, and may
be prosecuted
This contract mast be signed by anyone seeking entrance into the SANE program.

...."

[*lay [**82] As part of his participation in the
S A N E program, hdford prepared a written sex~llrlhistory and took a rcquincd polygmph examinatfon on Moy
28, 19%. During the polygmph, Racfford rcv~nlnlthat in
1991 hc had cntcrcd a woman's home during the nidu
and remined her. This is h e incidcnt which is involved
in tho instant appeal.
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provided to the

SANE counselor. Thc ncxt day, thc counselor met with
Radford's probntion officer, Dottie I~K~c,md disclosed
the evidence to her. Hook p u c d this informalion to Detective Anderson who then accompanied Iiook on a visit
to Mford's home that same day. During this visit, Hook
had a conversation ,with Rndford in which he described
the ,1991 incident. Radford stated that hc entercd a housc
w&ng a ski mask and inlmdcd lo mpe a woman who
lived there. I.Iowevcr, upon enterins the rcsidcncc. R d ford discovmcd'only thc intended victim's sister. He then
stated he handcuffed the sber, stayed for about an hour
and a , hdf, and then rcmovcd tho hvndcuO's and leR.
:[***4] lt,is imdisputcd that, diving the probation officer's hoke' visit, Ridford was not placed in custody and
t
I:ollowi~ig the home
no Mirundu wnrnings w ~ r given.
. visit, :betective Anderson reported, the information to
petectivo Ayottc 'who had originally invcstignted the
1991.incident After henring the story, Ayone believed
t h t Radford might have committed thc crimc against C.
B.
Radford met with llook for an oRicc visit on June 4.
1996. and both Delcctivm Ayottc nnd Smith attended the
meeting. Prior to the interview, Detective Ayottc told
Radford that he was not in custody and advised him of
his Miranh rights. hdford then signed a written
Mirmda waivur. At first Rndford rcrused lo talk about
the 1991 incident, citing the advice of his attorney; howewr, he did i y e e to talk to policc about other maucrs.
During h e course of the conversation, kidford repeatedly brought up the 1991 incident, mntwlly apmd lo
discuswthe incident, made admissions nbout it, ~d wrote
a letter of apology to the victim. Rdfmd was not arrested at h c conclusion of the intmicw; howew, following a se;uch of Wford's storage unit lator that day.
,Radfbrd was mMcd by Hook for violation [***a of
the conditions of his probation. IaIls probation in that case
was eventually revokcd and Radford is now serving his
sentence.
After a hearing involving testimony kom several
witncsscs and brieling by the panics, the distria judge
found tbe EdCts as stated above and dcnicd thc motion to
suppms. Following his Corn's dtcision in State v.
Crowe, 131 Idaho 109, 952 P.2d 1245 (1998). Radfbtd

filcd a motion for rzconsidcration. After argument on
that motion, the d i d c t judge reversed his decision and
granted tly motion LO r u p p m the slntemenk? based on
this Courts decision In Crowe. The State thm appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a viol court's ruling on a defendmt's motion to suppress, this Court dcfm lo the Vial
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court's factual findings unlms thcy arc clciuly crroncous.
Slula v. Mddlcy, 127 frluho 182, 18.5, 898 P.2d IOY3,
1096 (1995). Based upon the trial court's findings, this
Court exercises free review over whether the constitutional requirements h m been mot. Id

In.
Rdford has nrgue4 both below and on appcal, hat
his statements should be suppressed under both the Fifih
and Fourtennth [***6JAmcndm~ntsto tlrc United Storm
Conrlilrrtiorr, as well as Article I, Section 13 ofthe Idaho
Constitution. Before .discussing Radford's 'Fifih wd
Folincenth Amendment claims, we must first determine
if the'Idaho Constitition.shouldbe interpreted to provide
grenur'pmtectionh a d the U.S. Constitution in this erne.
A. ,The 1daho.ConstitutionDoos Not Provide Greater
katcction to Radfbra Undct tha Facti of this C l w .

Radford argues that his right to due proccss undtr
the Id,lho Constitution is violated in this case because he
is compcllcd by the t m s of his probation to givc honcst
[*I901 [**m ; m s w ~ sconcerning his sexual history
and is then p ~ i s h e dfor htse answets by bcing sub.Jemd to M e r prosecution. Radford argues it is h d a mentally unfsir to prasucuta him fat thc ctiuclosurers hc
was required to make and, therefore, ho is denied due
p e w of Iaw and tha statamohtv ha ma& to h a officers
on June 4th must be suppressed.
Although Ridfiord states that he is unly requesting
that the statcmtnrs be suppressed, his actual argument is
much broader. By stating that it is Amdamentally unfair
to cornpol him to give honest answers during trcatmcnt
and be subjected to hrthcr prosecution [***7J based on
hove answm, Radford appears to be arguing that Idrrha's
due process provision should be interpreted IS requiring
not jut tho suppression of my strrtotnrmtv compelled by
the ttrms of his PWO~I,
ths fluit ~ C I C Obut~
providing some Grid of blanket immunity fbr all crimes
which arc disclosed during treatment. This conclusion is
supported by Radfod's a r ~ u m n fboth in his brief and at
oral nrgumcnt, thnt the State should h v e to choose bcween requiring full disclosu~~
during court ordmd
ltratmcnt, or the ability to prosecute pmbatiarrm for
those crimes they dieclo~sRadfbrd argues the choice
should k full &closure becaw there is a grrmer h e fit to socisry in encouraging fill disclosure in order to
incrcrwc Lhc chances for successful treatmen4 than in
punishing an hdlvldual who is d m d y seeking treatment
h r hiu behavior.

In Coon v. State, 11 7 Idaho 38. 785 P.2J 163
(1989). this Court hcld that h e scopc of Idaho's duc

process provision in Article I, Section 13 of the l&o
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Con.rti~tionis not "ncccnsauily bound by the inlcrprctntion given to due process by the United States Supre~ne
Court." Id. or 40. 785 P.2d at 165. [+**8J Although thc
due process c l a w of the Idaho Constitution is interprcted independently. this Court "conside~s]the
ale u d by the United States Supreme Court in deciding
Fourteenth Amendment due process ca..cs." Schcvcrs v.
Statc,: 129 Idaho 573; 57?, 930 P.2d 603, 607 (1996).
Additiondly, this Court has applied the United Swtes
Suptcmc Court's standard for interpreting the due process
clnuse of the United States Com'tution in other due
.
v. Slate, Dept of Hca/th
process c m . See. c . ~Murcth
and WclJorre.132 IJuhu 221.227.970 P.2d 14.20 (1998)
(d& process caie involving the detmmination of whether
the plaintiff had a protectable' liberty or propcny interest);Schrrvers, 129 Idaho at 577.78, 930 P.2d at 607-CIR .
.(due p r o w s cyye involving the deprivation of n liberty
'Interest); Smirh v. Idaho Dept. of ~ori'cdion,128 Idaho
769.77~77,l
918 P.2d 1213, ,1216 (1996) (duc pmccss
involving the depdvntion of a. liberty in-).
Finally,
under the fa& of the present cosu thcrc is no compelling
reason to expand the protection of the due process provlsfon of the Idaho Constitution bayond th8t contcmplstcd
[***9] in Lhc Fomctnth Amendment with rcgnrd to the
smtunonts made by Radford to law e n f m e n t officns.
Bccauso this is not a situation where we believe h e
Idaho Constirution provides greater protections than
thosc y'vm in tho U.S. Constitution, the same analysis
used for dettrmialng whether Rdford's sEItements were
obtainod in violation of the right to due p1.6ccssunder the
U.S. Constirution will be used to determine whether
those statements wm obtaincd in violdon of thc Idaho
Constitution.

Mford also arguea that his right against selfincrimination as gumanteed by ArticIe 1, Soctiow 13 of
the Idaho Constitutfon ha6 been violated. Tn his brief,
Radford wgucs only that his statements, which were rcquirtd by the t e r n of his probation (the statements made
during the pdygmph and the winen sexual history),
were compelled ilnd therefore protected by liis right
qpinst self-inaimination. Howcvn; lbc Stale is not h p
pealing the suppression of those statements by the district judge. Ritther tho Statc is seeking only to havo thc
June 4th smtemenm declared admissible. Radford has not
; w e d that these statmncnta were obkind in violation
of Article I, Section 13 nn4 therefore, 1***101 we decline to consider R a d f d s statc constitutional claim on
this issue. B. The District Judge Erd In Suppressing
Radford's June 141th Statcmentr.
b d f d argues thot the district' judge properly
granted his motion to suppress because the ststrments
wcrc both involuntary [*I911 [**84Jand " h i t " ofthe
prior compelled sfiltemmts. We will address each ugumcnt m turn.

w

8

I. The Statements Were Voluntary.
In dctcrmininy whcthm Radford's sMrmmtJto law
enforce~ncmofXlcus on June 4th were voluntary, we first
nolc it is undisputed that R a d M was not in custody at
the time the statements were ma&. ' Even if the interview were non-custodial, Radford's statements -. Gill
inodmissiblc if thc slatmmls wcrc nbl vol~~tary.
'Scti
Beckwith v. United Slates, 423 U.S.341, 3 4 7 4 96 S. ,
Ct. 1612, 1617, 48 L Ed. 2 d 1 (1976); Statc v. Kuznrichev, 132 Idaho 536, 544, 976 P.2d 462. 470 (1999);,
Stutc v. Troy, 124 Jduho 211, 214. 858 P.2d 750, 753
(1993). In order to detmine.the voluntarin& of a con-. . .
fession, the Court must 160k to the "totality of the cir- . .
cumsmncts" and detcrminc whchcr thc dcfcndant's will
was o,verbone.See Arizona v: Fulminanre, 499 U.4.279,
.
287. I 1 I S. Ct. 1246, 12.52-53,"113.LEd. 2d 302 (1991);
[**+11] Troy, 124 Idaho at 214, ,858,P.2d.at 753..In
Troy, we st oul lhc hctors to tjt cimside~din clamin-

ing whether a confrssion was given voluncnrily. ll~ese
hctors include:
(I]

Whcthcr Mirartclh warnings wore

givm;
(2)The youth ofhu accused:
(3) Thc accused's lcvcl of education or
low in~llignce;

(4) The length of detention;
(5) The repented and prolonged nature of
thc questioning; and

(6) Deprivation of food or sleep.

+

Troy, 124 Iduhu ut 214, 858 P.2d at 753 (citing
Schvcckloth v. Busturnom 412 US.218, 226 93 S. Ct.
2041. 2047, 36 L. Ed. 2d854 (1973)).
I Radford admits hc was not in formal custody
at the time of the intentiew, although he points
out that he was rcquit~dto mOOt with his pmbtion officer on June 4th under the terms of his
probation. In Minnesota v. Muvlry, 465 US 420,
104 S Ct. 1136, 79L. Ed 2d 409 (1984), the U.S.
Supreme Court specifically held that a probationer's mgularly scheduled visit to his probation
olIiccr did not constitute a custodial sitimtion
which required Mirandu warnings, although
thoat warnings were givm to Radford.

.
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IC*+lZ1 Applying rhe above fircton to the f5ct.s of
this ccuc, wc a p wih thc disllicl judge that Radford's
statements were voluntay. ' Flrsr, Wford was siven
Miranda wruninp by Detective Ayotu prior to the interview. Kadford a&uowledgedthat he M been notified of
his rights and undmtocsd tho= righ:hts when he signed a
"Notilication of Rights" form and Laitinled the line,
which n;rd "1 understarid thcsc rights, yld'hxviny thcm
in mind. 1 wish to talk to the omcer now." +itionally,
Detective Ayotte testified that he repeatedly told Radford
hc was f - c to l a v e and did not havc to talk.to the officers. ?'he record meals thn'hdford was 29 years old'at
the time o f the intcrvicw..had yeduated &om,high
school, had anended one year of college; and: had.had
prior contact with law cnforccrnent. Thmc is no indi&don hi Rodford was somehow incapable of underaim+
ing his rights or inwpahle.of making.a knowing +in- :
tclliy~ntwiivcr of those rights. Fln~lly,the Interview
lasted only for a b u t two hours, not on utcmive length
of time.
2 Tha dishict judge's original dccision included
findings of fact supporthg his conclusion that
Radfotd's Junc 4th ytatmncnts wmc voluntary. Although the district judge rcvcned his decision
based on ow decision in Crew, he did no1
change his factunl Wings. Neither party has appealed the factual findings and, thcrcforu, wc accept lhcm.

[***l31Most of Radford's argument m
t
u
m on the
fifth criteria.tho natm of the questioning. F h t , Radford
egues that because part of the SANI? p r o m obligated
him to try rmd undcrstnnd the impact his actions had on
his vict&ns,and his probation ofacor told him that by not
disclosing tha names of his victims h8 made it appear he
didnl care about hls victims, he was thmfors coerced
into making his st;nrmentj about the 1991 &mu. Howcvcr, whilc Ihe oficcrs were catalnly uyhg to get him
to mlk, tho nwrd mvealr no ~ s r s n c amado by the oficrms or thc probation ofllcer concerning the r e q t w
of the SANE program, or any threats or promism made
conccrniny Radfonl's continued treatment.

[*I921 (**W Secondly, Radford argues that his
statcmrmts wcrc caerted because, a h a W o r d stated

&at he did not waat to talk about the 1991 incident, Detective Aye* ( I ) placcd Ihc 1991 filc an h e mblc betwem Itadford and Ayotte, and (2) told Radford that he
had mlked to the victim in the 1991 cssc and sht still
livcd in fern However, ktcctivt Ayotte did not ask
hdford any quustions about the 199I crue allcr RadCord
indicnted Ihnt he did not want to talk about it on the advice of his attorney. 1g*'14] Inskcad, according la Ayottc's testimony, which the district judge found credible,
Radford himself rcpcatcdly mfnnced tho case during

~rHrw'yaU
8

P. 006/018

Payc 4

lhc coursc of

the intmvicw. Thc rccord docs not support
Radford's argument that DctcctIve Ayone disregnrdcd
Rdford's initial request not to talk about the 1991 incident.
Third, Radfird q u e s his statements were coenxd
.becaw his probation oficcr, in mponse to Raclford's
question about wherhcr she would recommend he stay
'lrcatmcnt if hc talked to the officer, told him if hc was
totally truthfbl with the oficers she would recommend
what was bus't; According to RsdTord. this statement
meant he had .to talk because orhtrwise he would 'not
have been m l l y uuthful. J-lowevrr, it is undisputed the
probntionoficcr did not promise she would rccomrnmd
he stay in treatment even if he told the officus everything hc knew. Shc also clearly statcd shc was not ordering him'ro talk to the ofnccrs. Rather than any attcmplt to. . .
iocrcc 'Radlbrd.into making a shitcmcnf it appears the ..
probation offlcu was simply vying to give an honest
. .
answer to Radford's question. Even if the probation ofiicacr remarks could be construtd as somc type of Lhrcat or
promise Ig**1SI regarding Tcadford's probation sfatus,
that alone would not require the suppmsion of the
statements. We havc pmSously held that promises of
leniency do not ncccv.dly rcn& a confession invalunmy. Sfore v. Algcr. 1 0 Idaho 675, 680. 603 P.2d 1009.
1014 (1979). Rather, they arc only a factor to be considd under tln:totality of the chmstances. Id.

Finally. M f o r d amw his statsmontn m o t be
c o n s i d voluntary because the officershad btcn given
a copy of his writtun m a 1 history prior to their interview with him. In support of his argumcnh Fbdford rclies on the Idaho C o w of Appds case of State v.
McLuan, I23 Idaho 108,844 P.2d 1358 (Ct. App. 1992).
In M&m, the Coun of Appeals held that a second
slatcmmt given by thc dcfmdanl to police, a h they had
b m glven o copy of hls previous unwiunod smwnent to
his ptobation officer, had to be supprcwcd, In so holding
the Court of Appcrrls determined that rally was no
"secondn statumcnt Rathm, the first Ythkmcnt was simply hand delivered to the oflicers and was used during
thc questioning in order to gct morn information to add
to that alnedy in the stnttment. 1***16l Therefore, the
fim unwamcd, and thmfore hadmi&ible, statement
simply grew into the second. 1d ul 113-14, 844 P.2d d
1363-64.

In this CBVC*, unlike McLscnq there is no cvidrmco
that tho offlcsrs In any way used, or even r s f d to,
RadfbnSb writlcn s c x d hidory during thc c o w of tho
inmmiaw. Pvfinps more importantly, Radford knew the
omcm w m aware of the conwrl of his slalcmnt fw at
least six days, during which time Rdfbrd had consulted
his anamcy a d bccn d v i v c d not LO talk about thc 1991
incident. It is dimcult to see how knowing the oficers
hnd a copy of thc writlrm shlcmcnl hiid any impact in

,

causing Rndford to fcel compelled to give r second
statanent to the officers.
Wc agree with UIC district judgc that RadfordL dtcision to make statements about the 1991 incident was
voluntaly- We do not condone invcstigatlons conducted
in tho probation omce or with the probation officer pnsent bct5use of tho clear rncssaya acnt to thc prohli~ncr
that whntever is said will likely have some impact on his
probidon s w s . ~Iowevcr,based on the towlily of the
circumslanclr, presented h u t , pnrricularly the fact tlmt
Radford had consulted I***17J with an attorney.and
clearly undcrshod his ri&& wc lind Rodford's eventual
.decision to mnke statements to the officers was a product
of his frce will.

'

2. ~dibrd'sJme'4th Sutmnunh Wmc Not "Fruit" olbthc .
Eai.litr Compelled Stntemcnt.
The State argues the district judge improperly found
the Junc 4th .statcmcnts to bc [*I931 [**86) inadmissible "hitb1of the inndmissible, compelled stiltelncnt Rid-.
ford made during the May 28th polypph. In contrast,
Rodford argues even If his smtcmentswere voluntary, the
smtrments must be suppressed as a product of tho compelled statement becnusc the only rcnson tho officus
interviewed Radford about tho 1991 incident was because thcy had k n in~ormedof the stetemcnt made
during Be polypph maminotion.
As a preliminary mutter, in finding the June 4th
statements mnde by Radford were inadmissible, the district judge relied on our dccision in Statc v. Crowc, 131
Idaho 109, 952 P.2d 1245 (1998). In Crowu, we hold
dfsclosuros required by the terms of tho SANE pro~pam
were admissible in n probntion violation proceeding, but
recognized the holding in Mimtc~orpv. M . h y , 46.5 US.
420, 104 9. CL 1136, 79 t Ed 2d 409 (19#), [***I81
that my sntemems cornpsllcd during probation could not
bc uscd in a subaqucnl criminal trial becnuso it would
c o d m t t a violation of tho defendant's right not to indrninalc himsclC Thc parlies do not dispute tho statemants made by Radford during the polypph examination and a his written scxual history arc inndmissible in
any crhInal proceeding, The swtcrnents at issue in this
irppesl wtrs not mods during the
of Ihc SANE
maranent program, or otherwise compelled by the tenns
of Radford's probution. Thcnrfstc, the question is
whether the June 4th statements m forbidden fhah of the
inadmissible stitternnu fiom tho polygraph and wriltcn
history.
The Uniwd States Supreme Court has hold tho Fifth
Amendment pmlccu aplnst the use of a witnos's cornplied m m and "CVidmce d*d
thercfiom" in any
subnquenl aiminn1 wid. L q f l m i ~v.t Turly, 414 U.S.
70, 78, 948. Ct. 316 322.381.. Ed 2d274 (1973). Rad-

ford argues the June 4th statements ivc forbidden fruit of
the compelled statements because the officers never
would hnvc questioned Rndlbrd about he crime had thy
not been infomad of the substance of his compelled
statements. However, [***I91 the United States Supreme Court has sated that the test of whether subsqwnl cvidenct constitutes "f+it orthe poisonous trccwis
more than just a "but .forn test. Woag Sun v. 'Clnild
Bates, 371 US.471, 83 S Cr. 407. 9 1, Ed 26 441
(1 963). In Won$ Skur. the Court smted rhat:
We need not hold that all tvidcncc is
%it .of .the poisonous freen simply be&luc it would nbthvc come to light but
for the illc@al actions of the police.
Ralhkr, the morc apt qucstion in. such ii
'. case is "whether, panting cstablislun~nt
of ,the primary illegality. tho cvidmce to
which instnnt objection is made has been
come,at by exploitation of that illegality
or instcad by means suficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint."

l d or 487-88. 83 X Cr. tar 41 7. '
l
bquestion in the pnsent caae is not whclher the officn would not have obtained Radford's June 4th statements "bur for" their
knowlcd~c of his compelled statement, but rather
whether the June 4th statements were suflciently an act
of h e will to pwgc tho primary toint of tile compelled
statement. As the United States Supreme Court h u shtcd
Aftor an acclrssd hiu once let the
[**%I cat out of tho bng by cmi'iiing,
no mattbr what tho inducement, he is
never thatafter k c of the paychologicol
abd pmdcal disodvanmgca of bvhg
confeswd, He cam ncvm got the cat back
in the bag. The seerat is out for good. In
such a sense, a later c o n h i o n qlways
may be looked upon as b i t of the liw.
But this Corn hw nncw gone so fiu as to
hold that making a confession undcr circumstances which prccludo its uw, perp d y disables tbc c o n f i r from makin^ a usable ow after those conditions
have been removed.

United Statcs v. Bqycr, 331 US. 532, 54041, 67 S. CI.
1391,1398,91 L. Ed I654 (1947).

-

In TMor v. Alabama, the United States Supreme

cowd

k u he k
u
u
,lo
cmridcm( in d e d i n g
whnhw coaPrsion
rumclcDtlyim laof he will
so, to pw
of
primw
hint
illeg.l allat,

. .

Tht important Bctors included: (I) the lengrh in dmc
between rhe confession and the arrest; (2) the pmctlcr of
intervening circumstances; and (3) Lhc purpose w d
[*I941 [**m flagmcy of the official misconduct.
Tqylor,457 U.S. 687, n 6911, 102 S. Ct. at 2671. The
tfiIrd hctor would not be applicable, as this case lfff21)
docs not involvc any official misconduct by law mforcement; . . .
moining
finon to he
Of
&Is Appiyin8
crw, we Gnd the statements arc suficienlly distinguishable so a to be purged of the primiuy mint. The
June 4Lh statements wcrc madc a wcck aHcr thc Iirst
cornpaved 'statement . during which time, Hadford had
consulted his attorney and h d been Jdvised not to talk
nbout the. lq91 caw. Thus, thqc was on extended time
py-od between the two st;rtmants. At' the time of the
interview, Rddford wis reparedly told he was free to

l a v e and ,he did not have to talk to the officers about.the
1991 c w . Wh'm R&dTotd statcd he had bccn adviscd not
to calk nbout the incident, the officers respected this request a d asked Radford no questions about thc 1991
incident uhU'Radfordsaid he had decided to talk about
it. Finally. the June 4th .stattmnnts am sufficiently attenuated because those statements, unlike the compellcd

stalcmcnl, wcrc not m;ldc to thc same peoplc in the same
place as the earlier statement. Rother, the srntemcnts
wcrc mndc to officerswho wen not present at the earlier
statement and the interview took place in the probation
ollicc, not thc SANE treutrnent center. [**%I
While
the offlcus' knowledge of Radfonl's compellcd stattmcnt
may have initially led them to interview him, the statements he made to Ihc oficas'during thc intmricw.atthe
probation office were the result of-rn intuvcning indcpetdent act of ficc will. Wc hold that the June 4th s m p
menu were not " h i t " of the earlier compelled stntement
given by R r J f . . .

For the forog~bgre&&, we cvcrse.the 'order uf
the district judge granting Radfofls motion to suppress
his June 4th smtembts and r&and,hia m c to thc district j u d ~ ef& ftrther proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
JustiCes SILAK, S C K R O ~ E R ,WALTERS and
KIDWELL, CONCUR.
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LEFKOWITG ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YOAL

ET AL.v. TCRLEY ET

SUVRENE COURT OF TRE UNITED STATES

oftobcr 10,1973, Arppcd .
November 19,1973, Decided
,

.

.
.

PRIOR RI!WORY: APPEAL FROM THE UNITED '
STATES DlSTfUCT COURT FOR TI-lE W E S l ' m
'DTSTRICT OF NEW YORK.

DISPOSITION: 342 ESupp, 544. affirmed.

Aitu two nrchiteas refused to testio before a Now
York gnnd jury concerning thcir conh-ach with a county.
and rcfuscd lo sign wnivcrs of hnunity Dom prosecution, the District Attorney notified variou~stah con-ing authorities of thc mhitecb' conduct and called awntion to New York statutes providing that if a public cantractor rchwcv lo waive immunity h m criminal prosecution or to answer questions wlien called before a p n d
jury or g~vcmmcntaEcncy lo lcslify concming his wntrncts, his existing conmcts may be cancelled and he is
disqualified fiPm further h a n d m s with Lhc shtc f i 5
years. Thereupon, the nrchitccts instituted an action in
the United S m Distzia Court for h e Westm District
of New York, alleging thnt their adsting c o m c t s and
future conuitcting privileges wmc thrcatcncd, w d that
the Ncw YoA statutes violated the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. A 3-judge court was cont
were unconstituvened, and ic was held h a t ~ h statutes
tional under the Fourteenth lvld F@ihAmcnd~nets(342

,

suflicienl to . 'supplan1 lhc. '&vilcgc against salfhcrimbtion, without insisting tl~atthe convncror waive
such immunily,. and (2) cxpn%siny Lhc vicw of 6 mcmbus of the court, that the immunity nccesscuy to compel
such tcs6mony woir that neither the testimony nor its
hits could be used In subsequent criminal proceedings.

Brwnan, J., joined by Doughs and Marshall, JJ.,
concurred in the court's ophion cxccpl as lo holding (2)
above, expressing the view that the privilege against selfincriminalion required that thc immunity nccasssry to
permit compelled testimony was absolute immunity from
prosecution for any transaction rcvciaIed in the testimony.

[***LEdHNl]
LAW (5502

privilege agdnst self- incrhinntion
to State$

-

The Fonrtemh Amendment makes the Fflh
incrimination applicable to the states.

Amendment privilege against =If-

(+**LEdB[Nt]

FSupp 544).

On direct nppenl, the United Stiatcs Supreme Coun
affirmed. ln ;vl opinion by Whilc, J., il was hcld (I) expressing the uhanimous view of the court, that the New
York s~stutaswmc unconslitulionnl under the Fourteenth
and Fi/ih A m d m e n t s as violative of the privilege
against salf- incrimination, sincc lhu sktc could no1
compel testimony from publlc contmctors under t h m t of
cancellation of current conmctu and disqulilication
&om entering into public conmcts in the fume unless it
first offered tha conmetor immunily from prosecution

- npplicability

WITNESSES 479

.

self-Incriminntion - public eonvnclon

- irnrnunily -

State statutes whjch.(l) require thnt public contracts
contain a clause providing that i r a conbactor rcfusm to
waive immunity h r n criminal prosecution or to nnswer
qucstims when called b c f m a grsnd jury or govemmrmt
ngency to testifL concerning his conwcts with the state
or any of ib subclivisiony his existing comncts may be

a,,,,L W
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e~nccllcdmd hc shall tic disqualilied from fwrhu w s actions with the state for five yeius, and (2) require disqualification from contracting with public aulhorilics
upon the failure of my person to waive immunity or to
mswcr qdons
concerning his Lntns3~lionuwith Lhc
state or its subdivisions, are unconstitutional under the
Fowtemth and .F@h Amcndment~ violative of thc
. . piivilcge.against scllsincriminatfon, since the'stnte cannot cqmpel tmimony that has not been iminunized born
use in subscqucnt criminal proccedhgs.

self-incrimination

- proceedings to which privilege

A wilness prolcclcd by tho privilcgc against =Ifincrimination may rightfully rehse to 'ulswu unless and
until he is prolcctcd at least aminst the usc of his compelied answas and evidence derived thereffom in any
subsequent criminal case in which hc is a dcfmdwt;
absent such protection, if he is nevertheless compelled to
mrwm. his answers im inadmissible against him in a
later criminal prosecution.
.
,

-

privilege .against self-incrimination
involving public contractor
.
.

- prowedings
.

,

,

..

Thc F N ~
~&e"dhcnt priyileg= .itpinst selfincrimination is not ~npplicable,simply becnw the issuc a r i ~ in
s the kntext of.oBcid.inquiries into the job
performance of n public conthlctot: h e orditwy rule is
that the privilege is availnble to wimesses called before
grand juries Lo tmtiFy concorning their public contracts.
,

privilege against selfindminalim not 'only protects the individual against
b o b invo1un~;yUywlled ;u a witness against himself in
a criminal p r ~ c u l i o n .but also pnvilegcs him nut LO
answer official questions put to him in any other procacdink civil m criminal, formal or inlbrmal, what Lhc
answers might Incriminate him in h u e proceedings.

WMWESSES 572

WITNESSES 979

sclf-incrimination -purpose of Fihh AmcntlmcnlThe object of the FPh Amcndmmt pnvilcgc w i n s t
self-incrimination is to tnsure that a pmon shall not be
compelled, when acting as a witness in my investigation,
to give t d m o n y which might tcnd lo show that hc himself bmdfted a crime.

privilcgc against self-incrimination -- statutory in4uj.

'

'.

-

Headnolc:[S]

-

privilege against self-incrimination
ployccs wd conbgcton

- public cm-

Hcadnote:[8]
Although a sr;ue IISIS a strong, l e g i h t e interest in
mru'nlaining the integrity of its civil service and of i b
tmnsactions with independent canunctors W i n g
goody and servicm, neverthel& such interest i s not sufflciently strong to override the privilege agniast selfincrimination so as to dlow the state to interrogate employees and public contractors about their job performmcc without regard,to the Fi/rh Amcmdment, dischiuging
those who refuse to answer or LO waive the pn'vilegc by
waiving the immunity Born prosecution to which they
would othuwlse be endtlcd, and wing any incriminating
answsrs in subsequent crimind promcution.

The privilege against self-incrimination protects
witnesses in a statutory inquiry, whcthn sblc or fcdcral.

WITNESSES 579
self-incrhination - iinmunity -

-

seIf-incrimination protection of witness
Hciidnotc:l6]

-

~mdnotc:[9]
Notwithstanding fhc impatancc ofthe inmest of the
states in the enforcement of their ordinary criminal laws,

h e price for compelling incriminating answers from

P. 0 I I /018----
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third-patty witnesses is sufficient immunity &om prosecution to satisfy the i m p d v e s of tho F@h Amfndmcnt
ptivilegr against compelled self-incrimination.

--

privilege against self-incrimination waivm
Hcsdnotc:[lO]

-

A waiver of tho privilege against self-inuimination
and of immunity from subscqucnt pmscculion bascd on
compelled testimony, secured under threat of subsmntial
economic sanction, cannot be twned value;
.

either answer questions under oath about the performyncc of thcir jobs or suffer the loss of employmmt.

WITNESSES 979
self-incrimination - waiver of privilege
contractor
.

-

,

- public.

. .

Although a smte ]nay insist that public contractors
cihw mpond lo rclcvmt inquiriw isbout the pdormq c e of their contracts or suffer, cancellation of current
contrims and disqualification h r n conmcting with pub-:
lic agencies for an npproprke time in thc futllurc, ncvatheless the state may not insist that the c,ouuiictorg'~ive
heir Fijih Amcndrncnr . .ptivilcgc against .' selfincrimination and consent to the use of the h i t s of h e .
i n l ~ m p l i o nin subscquml .proceeding brought kbgnst .
tliem; if answers are to be required, the smte must ofkr
lo the witness immunity from prosecution sufficient to
supplant the privilege, (md may not insist that the witness
waive such immunity.

.

tors

self-incrimhtion. - public'tinployees and conmc-

- immunity -

,

Although due regfwd for the F@h Amendment forbids the smte &om compelling incriminating answm
fiom it$ cmployces and contractors that may ba used
against them in subsequent criminal proceedings, tho
Constitution pennits such testimony to be compelled if
neither it nor its h i t s are aydlable for such use.

l***l12]
CONTEMPT 812
WITNESSES 879

-

self-incrimi~tion immunity

-

The accommodntion between the interest of the smte
and the Fflh Amendment privile~e against selF
incrimination requires thnt the stoltt h v e means m its
disposal to secure testimony if immunity is supplicd and
~cslimotlyis still refused; thus, the couttp have power to
compel testimony, after a p n t of immunity, by use of
civil contcmpt and
imprisonment.

-

self-incrimin'ation

- immunity - public cmployccs -

Givcn adequate immunity fiom criminal prosecution

in return for waiver of the privilege awinst selfincrimination, thc

sllllc

may insist that iui cmployccs

'

'

SYLLABUS
Ncw York statutes rcquirc public contmcb to prp
vide that if a contractor refuses to waive immunity or to
tcstify concmniny his stam contracts, his misting conmcts may be canceled a d he shall be disqualitied from
tiuthcr transactions with thc State for fiw yams, and
AYthcr require dsquallflcatlon &om contracting with
public authoritia upon a pmon's failure to waive b u nity or answer questions mpecting his stale nruwdctians.
Appellees, New York-licensed architects, when summoned to testi@ before a grandjury investigating ver'ous
charges, refused ro sign waivers of immunity,
whereupon various contracting aurhorilies w o n notiiicd
of appellees' conduct and had their attention called to the
applicable disqualilication ~tzttutcs,Appellees thereafter
brought this action challenging the statutes as violntivo
of Lhuit conslilulional privilcgc against compcllcd selfincrimination. A hre-judge District Court declared the
shtutrrcr unconstitutional undcr tho Fourteenth ;wd FPh
Arnendmmts. lIuI3:

I. The F@h Amertdmerrt privilege a p h t selfincrimination is not inapplicable simply because the issue arises in the context of official inquiries into the job
performance of a public contractor. The ordinary tulc is
that the privilege is available to witnesses d l e d before a
grand juy as I ~ M apprllees
C
were, and the State's Icgitirnme interest in maintaining the integrity of its civil service and of its transactions with indcpnrdcnl contractors,
like other state concerns, cannot override the requirements of the Fvh Amendment. Pp. 77-79.

.

.,

'

,

.

'

'

.

.
.
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2. '1%~State could not compel testimony that had not
been immunized and thc wiver sought by h c Slate, undcr threat of loss of conmcrs, would have been no less
compelled than u dircct nqucsl for the testimony witbout
resort to the wdvw devicu, Gorriry v. New Jwsqy, 335
US.193; Gardner v. Rmdcrick 392 US 273; Sanitation
Mcn v. Saniratiun Cuntmk 392 U.S. 280, and there is no
constitutional distinction in tmris of compulsion b&ccn
the thrcat of job loss in hose cases and h e threat of conmct loss to a conuanor. Pp.79-84.
3. Under o propor lrccommodstion bctwe~nthe inSlate and the I:[/lh Amendment, the State cirri
require employees or conmctors to respond t o inquiries.
but only if it o~TL* thcm immllnity sullicient to supplnnt
their I;@ Amt!ndmt!nt privilege. Kastigar v. Unired
. .
8arcs. 406 U.S. 441. Pp. 84-85,
LWSLofthe

'

,

COUNSEC: B m d a Sololl: Assismnt Attomcy: G m d .
or NLV Y ork, nrgucd the muse for appelhts. 'with her
on the brief for appellants LeRowitz ct sl. wore Louis J.
l,cfkowitz, Attorney Gencrnl, pro st, and Smuel A. Hirshowitq First Assiswnt Attomcy General; A scpw&
brief wuv fil~dfor appellant Tutuska

Richard 0. Robinson mgwd the cause and fled a brief
for appelles.

dUDCES: White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which Burger, C. J.. and S t e m Blackmun, Powell,
and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, aad in which Brennan, J.,
joined by a sepame qualifying opinion. m which Douglas and Mushall, JJ., joined, post, p. 85.
OPINION BY. WHITE

OPINION
["*2781 I++J191 MZL JUSTICE wTITE
delivered the opinion of the Court.
[***LEdHRl)[l] New York General Municipal
Luw $,f 103-a and 103-b and N m York Public Authoriticar L m IJ$22601 and 2602 require public contracts to
provide that if o contnnor refirs& to waive immunity or
to answer qucstions w h ~ nd l e d to mtify concerning his
convects with the State or any of its subdivisions, his
mistiny conhcts may be canceled and he s h d be disqunlified from firrthcr nnsactions with the SMe for five
years. ' In [**321] addidon to [*72j speciQing
(***279] these contract terms, the statutes require disqualification fiom contracting with public authorities
upon fallurc of any person to waive immunity [**-801
or to [*73] answcr qucstions with rtypcct LO his tmnmclions with the Stnte or its subdivisions. The issue in this
case is whether thcso scctions [**a11 arc consislent
with the Fourruenrh [*741 Amendment insofiu its it

makes applicsblc to the Stittm tho Fph Amcmdmcnr
privilege ngninst compelled self-incrimination.

1 N. Y. Gen. Munic Luw §,6 103-u nnd 103-6
(Supp. 1 973- 1 974) provide:
Section 10341. Gmund Ibr cancellation of
conmct by municipal corpontions and tlrc districts:

"A. clause shall be inserted in all specifiations or contracts made or awruded by a municipal cotporetion or my public dcparlmcnt, agency
or official tl~ereofon or after the h t day of July,
'ninctccn hundred fifty-ninc or by a firc dimict or .
any agency or oflicinl thereof on or after the fmt
day of September, nineteen hundred sixty, for
work or s e r v i c ~perlbrmed or to be performed,
or 6oods sold or to be sold. to provide that upon
the refusal of n pwion, when called before a
p n d jury, liead of o state department, temporary
stalc commission w ohcr sClc agency, . - . h a d
of a city department, or other city agency, which
is cmpowmcd to cornpcl thc atLndrincc of witnesses and examine thein under oath, to tcstifL in
an invwtig8tion concerning my transaction or
contract had with the state, any political subdivision thereof, a public authority or with any public
department, agency or oflicinl of the state or of
any political subdivision thereof or of a public
aulhority, to s i p a wdvircr of immunity against
subsequent criminal prosecution or to answer iuiy
fclcvlvlt qucvtion concerning such transaction or
conmct,
"(a) such pcrson, and any h,
partnorship or
~rporationof which he is a member, pnrtnu, director or officer shall be disclualified from t h e e
nf\aselling to or submining'bids to or receiving
awivds fiom or entering into m y con,ntncts with
any mtlniciual cornomtion. or lie dislricL or mv
dep&tmemf rpn& or official ther'eof, f&
goods, work or scrvice?~,Tor a period of five y m
&r such refusal, and to provide also that

"@) any and all contracts made with my municipal corporation or any public department,
abmcy or official thmcof on or r r h r tho first day
of July, nineteen hundred fifty-nine or with any
fire district or my agency or official thereof on or
nftv the k t day of September, nineteen hundred
sixty, by such person, md by my firm, partnerstiip, or corpmdon of which he is a mcrnbw,
p m q director or oficer may l
x cancelled or
terminated by the municipal corporation or f r r
district without incurring ,my penalty or darnages
on account of such cancellation or taminadon,

,

.

.

'

414 U.S.70, *; 94 S. Ct.316, ";
38 L. Ed. 2d 274, ***; 1973 U.S. LEXIS 132

but any monicj owing by Lhc municipal corporation or f i e district for goods delivered or work
dons prior to thc mccllation or tcnnination shall
be paid.
"The provisions of this -on
as in force
and elTect prior lo the f i t day of September,
nineteen hundred sixty,. shall apply to specifications or contmch m d c or awanlcd by a municipal corpomtion on or after the flrst day of July,
ninctccn hundrcd lilty-ninc, but prior to Lhc first
day of September, nineteen hundred sixty."

Secriow 1034. I>isqualification to connct
wifi m&icipal corpomlioris Bnd lift disVicts: .
"Any person, who, whcn ailed before a
gmnd'jury, head of a m t e department, temporary
state'comm'ission or other state agency,
head
of a city department or otha city a6mcy. which
is cmpowctcd to compcl the nncndnnce of witnesses and examine them under oath, to tesa-fi in
an invcstiwtion conccrniny any t ~ s a c l i o not
contrnct hnd with the state, any pollticnl subdlvision tharwf. a public authorily, or wilh a public
department, agency or ofYicia1 of the state or of
any political subdivision thcrcof or of a public
nuthoriry, refuses to sign a waiver of h u n i t y
amst subsequent criminal prosecution or to answer my relevant question concvning such
triansaction or contract, and m y firm. partriership
or corporation of which he is a member, partner,
director or officer shall be disqualified from
thmclrftcr selling to or submitting bids to or rcceiving awards fiom or entering into any contracts with any municipal corporation or fire disuiq or with any public depnronmt, agency or official thcreof. for good.. work or servi~rzi,for a
period of flve years after such refusal or until a
disqwlification shall be m o v e d pucsuant to tho
provisions of section one hundred three-c of this
anicle.
"11 shall bc thc dllty orthe ollica conducting
the investigation before the grand jury, the head
of a shlc dcprutmcnl, thc chairman of lhc lrmpornry state commission or other swto apency, . .
tho hcad of a city d c p m e n t or olhcr city ngcncy
before whkh the refisal occurs to send notice of
such rcfuw~l,togcthcr with h e namcs of my firm,
pnrrnership, or corporation of which the person so
rcfusing i s known to bc a mcmbcr, p i n ; offi' c u or director, to the commissioner of tmnsportcition of tho shtc of Ncw York and Lhc approprielc
dcpnrtments, agencies and o ~ c i a l sof the state,
politiwl subdivisions thcrcof or public authorilics
with whom the person so refusing and my f i ~ n ,

.. .

.

pmtncrship or corporation of which he is a mcmber, partner, director or officer, is known to have
a contract Howevm, whcn such refusal occurs
before a body otha thnn n g t ~ jdy r , notice of
refusal shall not be sent for a period of ten days
nitu such refusal occurs. Prior to lhe cxpimlion
of this ten day period, ;my person, firm,parma. .
.ship or corpomlion which has bccomc li&lc to
the canahtion or termination of a contract or
diqmlilicalion c o n k t on account of such reh l may commence a special proccedhg at n
special tcnn of the supreme court, held within the
judicial district @ which the rcfusal o c c m d , for
iui order determining whetha'the questions in response to which 'the r c f w l occurrcd wcrc rclc. . : v a t a d material to the inquiry. . Upon the commmccmml of such proceeding, lhc ,.-ding of
.
such notice of rcfusiil to answer shall be subject
. . . to order of the court .in which the proceeding was
brought in a mnnner and on such terms as thc
court may deem just. If a proceeding is not
brought .within ten days, notice of rcfwl shall
thereupon k sent as provided heroin."
N. Y. Pub. Auth, Low $9' 2601 and 2602
(Supp. 1973-1974) provlde:
,,

Secn'orr 2601. Ground for c;mcellation of
contrnct by public authority:

"A clause shalI be insertod in a11 speciflcations or conmcta hcrcafkr made or awwdcd by
nny public authority or by my official of nny
public authority mated by thc state or any politid subdivision, for work or svvices performed
or to bc pcrfmed or go& sold 61. to be sold, to
provide that upon the refusal by a person, when
called kfm a p d jury, h d of a state d a
pnrunent, temporary state commission or o h m
Sfilt4 agency,
hcad of a city depmnent, or
other city agency, which is empowered lo compel
the attmdimw of witntsscs and mmine them
under oath, to tcsti& in M investigation conccming any a;ms;iction or conmct had with the stnte,
any political subdivision thcrmf, a public authority or with any public department, agency or o n cia1 of the state or of any polkical subdivision
thereof or of a public authority, to sign a wniver
oFimmwrily against subscqucnt criminal prosccution or to answer ;my relevant question concerning such hanuittion or contract,

...

"(a) such person, and b y frm,partnership or
corporation of which hc is a m m b a , partner, director or ol3ccr shall be disqunliiied from hcrcafter selling to or submitting bids to or receiving
a w d s from or entering into my conmcb with

414 U.S. 70, *; 94 S. Ct.316, **;
38 1.. Ed. 2d 274, ***; 1973 U.S. LEXlS 132
m y public authority or official thereof. for goods,

'

. .

'

;

work or suvices, for a period of live ycnrs ancr
such refusal, and to provide also that
"(b) any nnd all conmcls made with any
public authority or official thereof, since the efCcctive date of this law, by such pcrjdn and by
;my.fSrm, p m u s h i p or ,corpomtion of which he
k a mumbm, partner, director or officer may be
cancelled or ttrminnted by the public authority
without incurring any penalty or d a n k ~ e on
s account of such cancellation or termination, but my
monies owing by the public authority for goods
.dclircnd or work done prior 10 the c;inccllation
or tennibation s h l l be paid."
Scctih. 2602.

Disqualification to contract

. with public authority:
,

. '"Any.person, who, when called before a

djury, h.cad o r a stale dcplotmcnl, tcmporwy
stnte commission or other state ngency, .head
.of a city dcpsrtmmt, or othor city agency, which
is' empowerad to compel the nnendancc of witnesses and examino them under oath, to testify in
M investigntion concerning any rrnnsnction or
contnct had with the mte, any political subdivfsion thcrtoL, a public aulhority or with a public
department, agency or ofecial of the state or of
any political subdvision thereof or of a public
authority, rehses to s i p a waiver of Immunity
against ~ u b s e q mcriminal
t
prosccution or to wswu my relcvnnt quastions concerning such
transaction or contract, and m y finn. partnership
or wpomtion, of which he is n member, partner,
director. or officcr shall bc diaqualificd from
thaenftcr selling to or submitting bids to or rectivfng a w d s from or entering into any conm u with any public authority or my oacial of
any public authority created by the sute or llny
political subdivision, f i goods, work or serviccs,
for a period of fin yews after such refusal or UIIti1 a dsqualilication shnll bc nmovcd pursuant to
the provisions of section twenty-six hundred
thrcc of lhis title.
h

..

"It shnll be rhc duty of the officer conducting
tha invcsb'gntion bcfm the grand jury, tho hcad
of a mtc department, the chnirmnn of the temporary statc commission or other statc a~ency.

...

h e head,of a city depnrtment or other city ngency
kfom which the mfwa1 occurs to send notin of
such rcfisal, together with the names of any lirm,
partnmhip ar corporation of which the person so
rchsing is known to be a member, pnrtner, oficcr or director. to the commissioner of trianspomtion of the state of New York, or h e commis-

.

.

sioner of genenl services as the cost may be, and
h e nppmpriak dcpartmcnts, agencies ;uld oBcials of the state, political subdivisions lhcrcof or
public aulhorilics with whom the pmons [sic] so
rc&sing i ~ any
~ dfArm, partnership or corporation
of which hc is a member, p;umer, dinctor or officer, is known to have a contract. Howcvm, when
such nfuil occurs before a body. other t h n~
grand jury, nolice of rcfuvsl shall not be mt for a
period of ten days after such refusal occurs. Prior
to h e expiration of this tcn day period, any person, fum, partnership or corporation which has
bccomc lipble to the wncellation or terminntion
of n contrnct or disqualificali6n.tb.contruct on ac- .
count of such rrfusal may commence n'specid
proceeding nt'o special t q ' o f thc su-c
court.
held within tlle judicjd dhlrikt in which the re-.
fusnl occuncd, fm an o r d detemining
~
whether
the questions in response tb which the r c f w l occwrcd wcrc rclmnm and material to the inquiry.
Upon tile conuhenctm&t of such ptocecdink the
scndiny of such notice of'nfusjrl to answer shall
be subject to order of h c c o w in which tho proceeding was brought in a manner and on such
terms as the court may decm jwt. T f a proceedin&
is not brought wirhio ten days, notice of refusal
slrnll thereupon be sent es providcd herein."

r975I 1
[***L-]
FA]Appollees are two architects
licensed by the Stale of New York Tbay w m summoncd to &fl before a grand jury invcstignting various
charges of conspiracy, [YQh i ,and larceny. Thay
wmo asked, but refused, to sign waivers of immunity, the
effect of which would have been to waive their right not
to lis compelled in a crimlaal case to be a witness againat
themstlvcs. They wme thn cxcused 5nd the DMct
[**322] Attorney, as dhcted by law, notified various
contracting authoriticv of appellees' conduct and called
attention to the applicable d i s q u ~ c a t i o nstatutes. A p
pcllceri thereupon h u a t this action alleging that their
existing conacts nnd fi~tutrcontracting privileges wcrc
thmtmcd md assmtcd th;rt the pertinent statutory provisions were violetive of the constitutional privilene
against cornpcllcd self-incrimination. A threc-ju-dge ~ 6
uict C o w wns convened nnd declared tho four statutory
provisions at issue unconstitutional under the F'otu.lecnth
and F ' h Am~ndments,342 FSupp. 544 (WDNY 1972).
We noted probable jurisdiction, 410 .US. 924 (1973).
'fhe Stale appealed p m m t to 28 ti. $. C.# 1253. We
afirm the judgment of the District Court.
'

(***LWUUJ[3'J I***LEdRRQ] [4] [***I,[5] [***LEdHR6] [6]The FiJlh Amendment providcs

'

.

-

.
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that no person " h l l be compelled in ;my criminal case
to bc a wimcss against himself." The Amendment not
only p r o t a s the lndlvldual agaiast being involuntlyily
callcd as a wit~~css
against himself in a criminal prosecution but nlso prlvilegas him not to answer ofncEnl questions put to him in any other proceeding. civil or criminal, formal or informal whcrc the onewm might iucriminate him in fiturn criminal procdmgs. McCa~hy
v. Amdotein. 266 US 34,40 (1924). a q w l y held that

'

"!he privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon tlre name
of the proceedkp in which the testimony is.sought or is
to bc uscd. 11 applics alika to civil and criminnl .proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to einal mponsibility him .who,give? it. The privilege pmtects a~meri'witnessas Allly as lt does one who is..alsoa .
party ddendwLU
.
.
.. . . .
'

,

'

In this respect, McCrirthy v. ~ r n h t e i nreflected the settlcd vicw in this Ccnnt. The object of the Amendment
"was to insure that a person should not be comp~llod.
w h n acting as a wjltresa in any investigation, to give
testimony whlch d @ t tend to show that he himself had
committed a crime!* Counrclmm v, Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547, 562 (1892). See nlso Brum v. United States, 168
US. 532, 542-543(1897); Brown v. Walker, 161 US.
591 (1896); Boyd v. United S I C J ~11
, 6 US. 616, 634.
637-638(1886);United States v. Saline BonA; 1 Pct 100
(1828). This is the rule that Is now applicable to the
Smtes. Malloy v. Hogan. 378 U.S. 1 [**-I
(1964).
"It m u t be considcrcd irrclcvant that the pctltiom was a
witness in o statutory inquiry and not a dchdarit in a
criminal prowcution, fbr it has long been settled that tho
privilege protects witnesses in similar fkdml inquiries."
[*7a Id. at 11. In any of thew centcxts, therefore, a
witness protected by the privilege may rightfblly rsfirse
to answer unlesa md until he is protaetod at lcast against
the use of his compelled answers aod avidence derived
themfrom in any subsquont criminul chse in which he is
EI dehdant, Kwiigru v. United Slates, 406 US. 441
(1972). Absmt such protection. if hc is nmrcrthclcsu
compelled to answer, his answers arc inadmissible
against him in a later criminal prosecution, Brum v.
United Slates, supra; Boyd v. United Stales, mpra
backpoad9 thuc
Fflh Amenhent pivilege is
inapplicabk simply bccaus~the issue h, it d m
here, in the context of ofRcial inquiries into thc job performancc of n ~ublicc o n t r a c ~Swly,
.
the ordinary rule
is that the prkilep is available to 4hesses call& befm grsndjlnip
Urtc
Hule
v. Ifenkel, 2201 US.43. 66 (1906).
i71Aainrt

for urdng

Pap7

[**+LEdEUUl [8]It is true that the State has a strong,
Icgitimntc intcrcst in mninbining the integrity of its civil
service and of its transactions with independent conunc~ O S finishing a widc ~
g of cgoods 1*%23] and SCTvices; and New York would have it that this interest is
suficicntly strong to ovcrridc thc privilege. The suggestion is that the State should be able to interrogate employees ;md contractors about their job performance .
without rcgard 10 h c Fwh Amcndmont, to dischaqgc
those who refuse to answer or to waive the privilege by
waiving thc immunity to which.th~ywould olhcrwisc bc
entitled, and to use any incriminating answers obtained
in subscqucnt criminal prosecutions. But claims of overriding intirests are not unusual in F v h Amendment liti-.
gation and they have not fired well.

.

.

. .

'

. .. .
.[***~EdFm9]
[9]ln McCarrhy v. Arnhtein, supra, the . .
United SMcs insistcd hat bccnusc of thc sWny public
.
interest in marshaling and distributing assets .of bank- . : .
.
rupts, thc [*79] ~ # hAnntcndmcnt sh6uld not protect a
bankrupt during the omciol examinations mairdatcd by
the Bwknrplcy Ad. ' T ' M position did not prevail. The
bankrupt's testimony could be had, but only if hc were
afkded sufficient immunity to supplant the 'privilege.
And long bcforc McC'urtthy v. Arn&tein, Lhc Court meognized tliat wld~outthe compelled tastimony of knowledgeable and perhaps implicated wimesses, chc enforcement of the tnnsportiifion laws "would become impossible," but ncv&l~ss proceeded on a basis that witnesses
must be granted adequate lmmuniry lf their evldcnca was
to ba cornpcllcd. Brown v. WaIkcr, I61 US., at 610.
Sirnilnrly, rile adorcement of the nntimst laws against
privata m r p d o n s was at stake in Hale v. Hcnkel, supra, but immunity was essential to command the ttstimony of individual
Also, it would be dmcult
to ovacstimate the imporrance of the interest of the
Statss in the enforcement of their wdinrvy c r i m l ~h
I ws;
but the price for incriminating amwm h m third-paty
witnesses is sufficient immunity to satis* the [**-I
imperatives of the Ftflh Amandment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination. Finally, in almost &bevery
cont~xt~ L T Cinvulvcd, this Court hrrY only recently held
that employees of the State do not forfeit their constitutional privilcg w d hat h ~ y
may bc cornpcllcd to respond to questions about the performaace of their duties
but only if thcir answers cannot bc uscd against them in
subsequent criminal prosecutions. ~ u r r i 6v. New Jcrc
.vw, 335 US,49.3 (1967); Garher v. BrodericA, 392
U.S. 273 (1968); Suni~u~iun
Man v. &nitcation C ~ n r ' r ,
'

,

'

'

39t US 280 b01964)111

In Gawiry v. New Jersey, certain police officers
w a e wrnmoncd LO M inquiry bting conducted by tho
Attorney Genenl concerning the fixing of traffic tickets.

' ,

.
.

. .

JIIIV-LU-LUUJ~

.

I

IULI

UO; I U

~ a wurrlces, ~ h t d .
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.
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ThLy wcrc akcd qutstions following warnings
thnt if they did not answer they would be removed &om
office w d that anything thcy .wid might bc uYcd against
them in nny criminal proceedin& No Immunity of ;my
kind was o h d or available undm smk law. Thc qucslions were answered and the answers lntu used over their
objections, in their prosecutions for conspimy. The
Court hcld Ihal "he pleclion of the individual under
the Fourreenfh Amendment against coerced statements
prohibits usc in subscqucnt criminal proc,ccdings of
statements obtained under threat of removal &om offlce,
and that it cxtcnds to all. whcthcr Lhcy an: policcmcn or
other mcmbcrs of our body politic." 385 US,.. at $00.
The Coun also held'that in the context of ihrcats of r& .
moval from oficc thc act of responding to interrogation
wns not volunmry and was not an cffcctivc waiver of the
privilcgc against self-incriminalion, .he Court conceding,' . .
however, that there might bc oihcr situations '"where one
who is anxious to mllkc a clan brcusl of Lhe whol'c affair
volunlms the information." Id. at 499.

These cnses, and their predecessors, ultimately rest
on a reconciliatian of the well-recognized policies behind
thc pdvilegc of self-incrimination, Murphy v. Wutefionl
Comm'n 378 US. 52, 55 (1964). md the need of thc
SUc, as well as the Federal Governmcnl, lo obtaitl information '"to assure rl~eeffective finctioning of government," id., at 93 (WHITE,J., concurring):).Immunity
is required if thur is to be "mrional accommodation between the impmtivos of tho privilege and tho lcgitimatc
demands of government to compel citizens to testify."
Kastfgar v. United State, 406 U.6,ar 446. It is in this
scnsc lhat immunity [*82] s&tulcs have "become p m of
our con$itudonal fabric."UIImattn
v. Unired States, 350

[*SO]

'

Tlie issue in Gardner v. hodwick supra, was
whcthcr Lhu Shlc might discharge a police offlccr who,
after he was I++326)summoned before a grand jury to
testify about the palbrrnwce of his ollicid duties and
wns advised of hls right against compulsory selfinaiministion, thcn rcfuwd lo waive hat right ;ry tcquested by the Smu. Conceding that appellant could be
discharged fot mfuing Lo answer qucations about the
pcrfonnance of his ofUcial dudes, if not required to
waive Immunity, the Court hcld that lhlr oniccr could not
bt knninalcd, as he was, for refbsing to walva his consthtlonal privilege. Atthou* undor G(RT~W
my waiver
executed may have been invalid and any nnswcrs elicited
inadmissible in evidence, the State did not purport to
rccognizc as much and instead [*811 attempted to coerce n wdvu on the penalty of loss of employment. The
"testimony was dcmkdcd. before h e grand jury in par1
so thnr it might be used to pmsecuto him, and not solely
fm thc purposc of securing an accounting of b& perfomance of his public trust." 392 US. at 279. Hence, the
State's sntutory provision requiting his dismissal for his
refusal to waive immunity could not m d .
The companion case, Sunitorion Men v. Sanitation
Comm'r, supra, was to the same effect. Here spin, pub-lic employees were officially intmgalcd and advised
that rcfwl [***2&I) to answer md sign wnivvs of
immunity would lead to dismissal. H m win. the Court
hcld that the Shlc prcscnltd the employees witb "a
choice between surrendering their constitutional rights or'
thcirjobs," 392 US.. af284, nlfhough clearly they would
"subject rhemselves to dismissal ifthey refuse to account
for their performance of' heir public uust, after proper
proceedings, which do not involve an attempt to coerce
them to relinquish l h ~ iconslilulional
t
rights."Id., at 2615.

US.422,438 (1956).
In Orloflv. IYillnughhy,.33 US.83 f1953). o
dbcror inducted into the Army was denied a
commission rts an officer'iifterrefusing to divuigc
whether he was a Comrnunisl, ns required by o
loyaltytycertificate prescnied for commissioned
o&cck. Insled hc ;isscrtcd his "FcdcraI conslitudonill privilege" when tilled upon to answer
lhc qucslion. In holding thal Lhc Gov~rnmcntwas
justifled in refusing the comnlission because of
thc tirilurc to answcr, the Court had no occasion
to consider whether Orloff would have bcen exposed to criminal prosecution if hc had stated that
he was a member of the Communist Parry. The
case diffen significantly from the one before us
since the Stnte bere asks the architects to affiiotively axpose themselves to cn'mjnal prosecution
by waiving heir privilrgc against selfincrimination, or f h m Garriry, wl~erethe threat
of criminal prosecution *ria apparent bolh Gcim
the n a m of the proceeding, md the absence of
applicable slate immunity rtatuh.

. .2

'

,

,

'.'

Kimm v. R u e n b q , 363 U.S 405 f1960), is
dso inapposite. The Court there held that an
&en whose deportntion had bcen ordered was in-

eligiilc for s discretionary order pennitring his
volunmry d e p m , because he had failed to establish th;t he was not affiliated with the Communist Party. Pelilionet's imminenl dcpiulm
from the country, whether it wiu voluntary or
campelled, obviously made h e ~ h n aof
t criminal
prosecution on the h i s of his answer remote.
[ * * * m B ] [2B] [***LEdRRlOI [I O]Wc
agree with the District Court that Grrrriry. Gurdner, and
Sanitation Men control the issue now More us. The
Smte sought to intmogtte appellees about their triumctions with the [**.St& and to require Lhmn to furnish possibly incriminating testimony by demanding t h t
they waive thck immunity and by disquslifyin~thcm as
publlc conuactors when they refirsed. 11seems to us that

.

.
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the State intended to accomplish what Cmriry ripccificiilly prohibited to compel testimony that h d not been
immunizsd. The waiver sought by the State, under thrcst
of loss of contracts, would have been no less compelled
than i~
direct request for die testimony without resort to
tho w i v m dcvicc. A wrrivcr sccurcd unda threat of substantial economic sqnction cannot be [*83] termed voluntary. As already noted. Garrity [***28!iI sgccilicully
rcjecltd the claim of an effective waiver when the policemen .in that case, in the facc of possiblc discharge,
proceeded to answer Ihc questions put to them. 38s U.S.,
w 498. The same holding is implicit in both Gardncr and
Sanitafion Men.
. .
. .
The ~ k t cnevertheless
.
asserts that whitever niny be
Pus of state vployeeq a diffemt mlc is applicable lo
public contractors such as architects. Ueuuse independ'ent conmctors miry not depend entirely on ~ s i i c l i o n ~
with thc State for Lhcir livelihood, it is suggested that
'&qudiflchrion from conacting with official aguncics
for. a period of five y c w is ncith~rcompulsion within
h e meaning of the F$h Ame~drnetttnor a forbidden
penalty for refusing to answcr questions put to them
about their job perform~cc.But we agree with the Disuin Court tliat "the plaintiffs' disqu;ilifialion from public contracting for live years as a penalty for nsswzing a
constitutionid privilege is violdve of their Fflh AmcnC
mont rights." 342 F.Supp..,at 549. We fail to see a dificrenco of ~ ~ t u d o nmagnitude
al
bctwca thc Ulrctll of
job lass to an cmploytt of the Slate, and a threat of loss
of CO~MCTS to P conui~ctor.'

-

,

3 As Gatrig succinctly put it: "The option to
lose their moans of livelihood or lo pay the pena l of~ self-incrimination is the antithesis af fiee
choice to speak out or to m a i n dlent." 385 U.S
493, 497 (1967).

If the argument is that the cost to a contraclOT is
small in comparison Lo lhe cost to nn cmploycc of 10his job, the premise must be that it is hsrdn I'm a shlc
cmploycc to find cmploymen~in the private sector, thm
it is for aa nrckitect. An architect lives off his ccmhacting
fees as surely ay a sbtc cmploycc lives o r his salnry, und
fees a d salaries may be equally had to come by iv the
private scctor a& sanctions have been tllktn by 1*84]
the Smte. In some sense the plight of the architect may
be worse, for undm tho Ncw York shlulcs il may be that
any lim that employs him thereafter will also be subject
to contnct cancellation and di,qualiticalion. ' A significan1 inliingcment of constirutiod rights cannot be justifled by the speculative ability of those iilliiled to cover
the damage.
4 The contract disqunlitications apply not only
to the person who refuses ta waive immunily but

also lo "my finn, p m a s h i p or corporation of
which he is a member, partner, direnor or officer

--..
I1

[***LEdER2CJ
[2C] [***LEdHRll] [ll]
[***LEdHR12]
[I 21 . . [***LRdHR13]
[ I 31
[***UUHRlIJ'[l'4'JWe should mnkc 'clear, however,
what we have said before. Although due regard for the
F@h Amcndmmt forbids Lhc Stale LO compel incriminnting answers from its employees md contractors that may
bc uscd against them in criminal pmcccdinlp, the ConstituGon. permits that very, testimony to be. compelled if
neither it nor its hits ars 'available for such usc. Kustigar v. Unitcd $tatcv, supra-Furthermore, the accomrnodation between the .interest of the Sbtc and thc F&?h
Amcndmcnt q u i r e s that lhc Slate have mean4 at its dis.immunity is supplied and
posal tq securc~restimony~if
testimony is. still rcfwod. Thiu' is rccognid by Lhc
power of the courts to compel testimony, after a grant of
immunity, by use of civil contempt and comccd imprisondncnt. ShiIIitarti v. United Sloftrr. 384 US.364 (1966).
Also, given adequate immunity, [**32q thc Statc may
plainly insist that employees either answer questions
I e * r s 6 ] under o;dh about the pcrfbrmmce of their job
or suffix the loss o f cmploymcnt By like token, the
State may insist that the architects involved m this wsc
either rcspand 10 rclcvanl inquiries about the puformance of their conmcts or suffer wncellation of current
relationships and disquxlili~~~iion
&om contracting wilh
publlc agencies for on appropriatetime in the future. But
the State may not insist that appollocs [*%S] wru'va thdr
Fflh Arnefidin8ruprjvilege against self-inaiminationand
consmt to tho usa of thc h i t s of tho intermgetion in any
later procmdings brought against them. Rather, the Smte
must recognize what our c a , hold:
~
that answers elicited
upon the thrcat of tbc loss of employment are compelled
and inadmissible h evidence. Hence, if answers arc to
be required in such cirmrnstanccs States must offer to
the wimess whatever immunity is required to supplant
the privilcgc and may not insist that the employer: or
contractor waive sucb immunity.
,

MR. NSl'lCE BRENNAN, with whom MlL JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTTCE MARSHALLjoin.
I join h e Comb opinion in d l respects but one. It
is my view that immunity which permits tesn'mony to be
compellcci "if neirhkr it nor iis h i t s are available Tor.
use" in criminal proceedings docs not satisfy the priviIcge against self-incrimination. "1 believe that the F@
Amendmentb privilege winst self-incrimination re=

..

quircs that any jurisdiction that compels a man to incriminate himself p t him absolute immunity under its

' '

r. U I U / U I U

414 U.S.70. *; 94 S. Ct. 3 16, **;
38 L Ed. 2d 274, ***; 1973 U.S. LEXlS 132
laws &om prosecution for any transaction revealed in
that tcslimmy." Piccirillo v. Now Yo& 400 US.548,
562 (1971) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting)
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Annotation Rcfmcnm:
Adequacy, undm Fcdmvl Conrtitutitm, of immunity

granted in lieu of privilege agninst self-incrhnhtion. 32
L Ecl2d 869.

RIwmCIES
21 Am Jur 24 Criminal Law 349- 358; Am Jur, Witncsses (I st ed 44.84-91,94)
.

.

.

Wllm provisions of the Federal Constitution's Bill of
Rights arc applicable lo thc statilm 18 L Ed 26 1388, 23
L Ed 2d 985.

.

7 Am Jut PI & Pr Forms (Rev ed), Constitutional Law,
Forms 2.3; 11 Am Jur PI & k Forms (Rev ed), Ftdcrnl
Practice and +ccdurr, Forms 1991 1995
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8 Am Jur Legal Forms 24 Estoppel nnd Waiver
. 102:34
.
.
5' Am Jur Trials 33 11 Excluding Illcgnlly Obtained Evidtnrc
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Removing or discharging public officu'or employee for.
assertion of privilege against self-incrimination as violalion ol'his fed~ralcons~ilulionalrights. 17L E;cl2d..IIJI. . .
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,

'

,

,

US .LEd 'bigcst, Witnesses 79,81'
.
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,

,

A T 3 Dig*

Witnrmses BO,'81

,

t Ed Index to Annoy Wilaesses

ALR Quick Index, Self-lndmination

,
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JUDGES: Before: Melvin Brunetti, M. Margaret McKeown, and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges.

OPINION BY: M. Margaret McKeown
OPINION
[*1130] McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
Lawrence Antelope is a convicted sex offender who
shows promise of rehabilitation. The terms of his supervised release offer him treatment -- but at a price he is
not willing to pay. Antelope has repeatedly refused to
incriminate himself as part of his sex offender treatment.
He declines to detail his sexual history in the absence of
any assurance of immunity because [**2] of the risk that
he may reveal past crimes and that his admissions could
then be used to prosecute him. In response, the government has twice revoked his conditional liberty and sent
him to prison. The case he now brings requires us to de-

cide whether the government's actions violated his Fifth
A m u f h t right against compelled self-incrimination.
Because the Canstitution does not countenance the son

of government coercion imposed on Antelope, and
[*I1311 because his claim is ripe for adjudication, we
reverse the judgment of the district court.
We decide also Antelope's challenge to the release
term prohibiting him fiom possessing "any pornographic,
sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials,"
which we vacate and remand, & well as his challenge to
the term prohibiting him fiom access to "any 'on-line
compuDr sewice;,, which we arm.

BACKGROUND
The course of events leading to this appeal began
when Lawrence Antelope joined an Internet site advenising "Preteen Nude Sex Pics" and started corresponding
with someone who, unbeknownst to Antelope, was an
undercover law enforcement agent. The sting operation
proved-firuitll when Antelope ordered a child p o r n o p phy video over [**3] the Internet. Federal agents arranged a controlled delivery, delivered the video, and
then promptly arrested Antelope.
Caught red-handed, Antelope pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. $
2252A(a)(S)(B) and was initially sentenced to five years
probation. One of the probation terms required Antelope
to participate in the Sexual Abuse Behavior Evaluation
and Recovery program ("SABER), which would subject
him to mandatory "periodic and random polygraph examinations." At sentencing, Antelope raised a Fi@h
Amenchallenge to this requirement, but was told
by the district judge that the "use of that information . . .
is, I think, subject to the privilege between the counselor
and the patient." Antelope was also prohibited from
"possessing any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials" and from "possessing or using
a computer with access to any 'on-line computer service'
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at any location . . . without the prior written approval of
the probation department." Both Antelope and the govemrnent promptly appealed the sentence.

tion" for additional crimes. Antelope appealed once
more. This fourth appeal is one of the two directly before
US now.

While the appeal was pending, the district court revoked Antelope's probation for [**4] failure to comply
with several probation conditions, including the requirement that he submit to polygraph examinations as part of
the treatment program. The district judge re-imposed
probation with an additional six months of electronic
monitoring and warned that Antelope's continued refusal
to submit to the polygraph would result in his incarceration. Antelope appealed this ruling as well.

Shortly after he was resentenced, Antelope finished
serving his prison term and was released under supervision. Antelope reasserted his desire for treatment but
continued to refuse to reveal his full sexual history absent an assurance of immunity. When Antelope appeared
at a release revocation hearing, he yet again argued the
merits of his F@lh Amen&
claim. The district judge
reiterated his belief that Antelope's admissions would be
protected by an "absolute privilege under Montana law
between a counselor, psychologist and the patient"; asserted that "given the fact that [Antelope has] not said
anything yet, . . . everything is premature[a]nd until this
judicial proceeding, where he's compelled to testitjl, it
seems to me, . . . you don't have any legal arguments to
be making that are meritorious in my view today"; and
declined to rule on whether Antelope's admissions
would be protected by use immunity, apparently [**7]
on ripeness grounds. The district judge suggested that
Antelope's proper course would be to "assert[] his privilege when he goes to see Mr. [Dowty, the counselor,]
and say[], I am doing this because I'm ordered to do it. I
am nor doing it voluntarily, it's a court order, and I do it
only because VI don't do it I'm going to end up injail."

Immediately following this ruling, Antelope filed a
motion in the district court seeking to clarify whether the
order included immunity from the use of Antelope's
statements made in compliance with SABER to prosecute him. The district court never ruled on this motion,
later dismissing it as moot.
While these appeals were pending, the district court
again found Anttlope in violation of probation, At the

probation revocation hearing, Roger Dowty, Antelope's
counselor at the sex treatment program, testified that
Antelope had failed to complete SABER'Ssexual history
autobiography assignment and "full disclosure polygraph" verifying his "full sexual Mstory." Dowty explained that Antelope had been told that any past criminal offenses he revealed in the course of the program
could be released to the [**5] authorities. Dowty also
testified that he was under a legal obligation to turn over
information regarding offenses involving victims under
eighteen. Antelope argued that the autobiography and
full disclosure polygraph requirements violated his F@h
Amendhunt right, expressed his desire to continue
treatment, and sought immunity for statements made in
compliance with the program. The district court rejected
his argument, ruling that the fact of probation [*I1321
nullifies any F#% Amendment right Antelope might
otherwise have to decline to "reveal[] information that
may incriminate him," and sentenced him to 30 months
in prison. Antelope appealed a third time.
All three appeals were consolidated for appellate review, and this court issued a decision reversing in part
and remanding for resentencing. The court declined to
reach Antelope's First and Fi@h Amrndinmt claims.
See United States v. Anlclope, 65 Fed Appx. 112 (9th
Cir. 2003) (mem.).
Following remand, Antelope was resentenced to
twenty months incarceration, followed by three years of
supervised reltase. The district court again imposed the
contested conditions as terms of his supervised release.
Antelope [**6] once again objected, but the court ruled
that the objection was not ripe, and would not be ripe
until Antelope was "prosecuted or subject to prosecu-

The district court sentenced Antelope to an additional ten months in prison and twenty-six months of
supervised release with the same conditions. Antelope
appealed a final time, and we consider the issues presented by his consolidated fourth and fifth appeals.

DISCUSSION

L RIPENESS
We turn first to the government's argument that Antelope's F@h Amen&
claim is not yet ripe for review. The constitutional component of ripeness is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v.
Getman, 328 E3d 1088, 1093-94 & n 2 (9th Cir. 2003)
(noting that the question of ripeness often "coincides
squarely with standing's injury in fact prong"). Whether
Antelope's claim is sufficiently mature to justify appellate review is a question of law we consider de novo.
[**a) Laub v. United States Dep't ofthe Inferior, 342
F. 3d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003).
To determine whether Antelope suffered an injury
in fact, we must identify "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized;
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Id at 1085. Here, Antelope's appeal centers
around his claimed right to be fiee of unconstitutional
compulsion: Under his theory, the government violated
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his FijW Amcndincnl [*I1331 right when it conditioned
his probation and supervised release on the submission
of a sexual autobiography that we may assume would
have revealed prosecutable offenses. From Antelope's
perspective, in whose shoes we stand when deciding this
threshold issue of justiciability, he has already suffered
the very serious and non-hypothetical injury of imprisonment after he invoked his FijW Amendmart right. In
other words, "if his legal argument is correct, he has already suffered constitutional injury." United States v.
Purvis, 940 F.2d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding
ripe the defendant's challenge to his supervised release
condition, which he had been reincarcerated [**9] for
violating). Antelope's case history reads like a neverending Ioop tape: he asserts his constitutional rights, the
district court advises him that surely his statements will
be confidential but that he must comply with what he
views as a violation of his constitutional rights, he refuses to comply, his release is revoked, and Antelope
ends up incarcerated. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a
more paradigmatic "injury in fact" than actual incarceration. We therefore conclude that Antelope's F@h
Amendment claim is ripe for review.

-

IL THE FIFlH AMEh'DMENT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

RIGHT

Having determined the question justiciable, we adAmrndinal
dress next Antelope'r claim to the
privilege against compelled self-incrimination, an issue
that has dominated the five appeals Antelope has filed
throughout the c o m e of these proceedings. Antelope
contends that the
Amenrestrains the government from forcing him to admit prior wrongdoing
unless his statements are protected by use and derivative
use immunity in accordance with [**lo] Kastigar v.
United States, 406 US. 441, 32 L. Ed 2d 212, 92 S. Ct.
1653 (1972). Whether there i9 merit to Antelope's argument is a legal matter, which we decide without deference to the judgment of the district court. See United
States v. Rubio-Topete, 999 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir.
1993).

Fm

We ground our analysis in well-settled principles,
starting with the Constitution. The Fm Amendment
guarantees that "no person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." US.
Const. amend V. This right remains available to Antelope despite his conviction. See Minnesota v. Murphy,
465 US. 420, 426, 79 L. Ed 2d 409, 104 S. Ct. I136
(1984) ("A defendant does not lose this protection by
reason of his conviction of a crime . . . ."); c$ McKune v.
Lile, 536 US. 24, 48-54, 153 L. Ed 2d 47, 122 S. Ct.
2017 (2002) (O'Comor, J., concurring in 4-1 -4 decision)
(applying the full-blown F@h Amendhat analysis to a
prisoner's claim that the prison's requirement that he par-

ticipate in a sex offender treatment program violated his
constitutional right). '
1 Abiding by the rule that when "no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
five Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds," Mark v. United States, 430 US. 188,
193, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260, 97 S. Ct. 990 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted), we treat Justice
O'Connor's opinion in McKune as controlling.
Two of our sister circuits considering this question have anived at the same conclusion. Ainsworth v. Stanley, 31 7 F.3d I , 4 (1st Cir. 2002)
("Justice O'Connor's concurrence [in McKune] is
arguably more narrow than the plurality's and
therefore constitutes the holding of the Court.")
(internal quotation marks omitted); Searcy v.
Simmons, 299 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 2002)
("Because Justice O'Connor based her conclusion
on the narrower ground that the [Kansas] policy
was not compulsion under the Fifrh Amendment,
we view her concurrence as the holding of the
Cowt in McKune.").

rn

h

[**Ill [*I1341 To establish his
Amendment
claim, Antelope must prove two things: (1) that the testimony desired by the government carried the risk of
incrimination, see Murphy, 465 US. at 435 n. 7 (explaining that the state may compel answers "as long as it . . .
eliminates the threat of incrimination"); Minor v. United
States, 396 US. 87, 98, 24 L. Ed 2d 283, 90 S. Ct. 284
(1969) (rejecting a F@& Amm&nent challenge because
the risk of incrimination was "only imaginary and insubstantial . . . rather than . . . real and appreciable" (internal
quotation marks omitted)), and (2) that the penalty he
suffered amounted to compulsion, see L e m i t z v. Cunningham, 431 US. 801, 806, 53 L. Ed 2d 1, 97 S. Ct.
2132 (1977) ("The touchstone of the Jlj2h Amrndinal
is compulsion . . . ." ); cf Lile v. McKune, 224 F.3d
1 1 75, 11 79 (10th Cir. 2000) ("The privilege has two
components: incrimination and compulsion."), rev'd,
536 US.24, 153 L. Ed 2d 47, 122 S. Ct. 2017 (2002)
(holding the state-imposed repercussions insufficiently
coercive to amount to compulsion).
A. Incrimination

[**I21 The Fifrh Amendment privilege is only
properly invoked in the face of "a real and appr&iable
danger of self-incrimination." McCoy v. Comm'r, 696
F.2d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation
marks omitted). "lf the threat is remote, unlikely, or
speculative, the privilege does not apply . . . ." Id Thus,
the Constitution offers no protection to an individual
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who, for example, asserts a general intent to refuse to
answer any questions at a court hearing. See United
States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1977)
(holding that the probationer's Fijih Amendment claim
could not be evaluated because he had tendered an unspecific "blanket refusal" to answer any questions at a
district court hearing designed to probe his financial
condition). Nor does its umbrella shelte~statements
whose ability to incriminate is "highly unlikely." Seattle
Times Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 845 F.2d 1513,
1520 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J . , concurring); see also
Minor, 396 U.S. at 98 ("Imaginary and insubstantial hazards of incrimination . . . [do not] support a Fijih
Amendment claim." (internal quotation [**I31 marks
omitted)).
Instead, because the Fifrh Amendment's selfincrimination clause was designed "to effect [the] practical and beneficent purpose" of preventing inquisitorial
interrogation, Brown v. Walker, 161 US. 591, 596-97,
40 L. Ed. 819, 16 S. Ct. 644 (1896), it may only be invoked when the threat of future criminal prosecution is
reasonably particular and apparent. Cf: id at 598 ("If a
prosecution for a crime . . . is barred by the statute of
limitations, [a witness] is compellable to answer."); Neal
v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 833 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that a prison treatment program requiring inmates to admit guilt of the crime for which they were imprisoned
did not violate the F@h Amendment because double
jeopardy and the terms of their plea agreement insured
that "no admission . . . could be used against them").
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telope of having committed prior sex offenses. The
treatment condition placed Antelope at a crossroads
comply and incriminate himself or invoke his right
against self-incrimination and be sent to prison. We
therefore conclude that Antelope's successfbl participation in SABER triggered a real danger of selfincrimination, not simply a remote or speculative threat.

-

We have no doubt that any admissions of past
crimes would likely make their way into the hands of
prosecutors. Dowty made clear that he would turn over
evidence of past sex crimes to the authorities. As he explained at Antelope's probation revocation hearing,
Dowty has reported his clients' crimes in the past and his
reports have led to additional convictions. The SABER
release form, which Antelope signed, specifically authorizes Dowty to make such reports. ' And, were Antelope
to reveal any crimes involving minors, Montana law
would require Dowty to report to law enforcement. See
[**I61 Mont. Code Ann. JJ 4 1-3-201 to -202 (2003)
(requiring counselors who suspect child abuse to report
to the authorities).
2 The SABER release form provides: "I hereby
allow SABER to report to the appropriate authorities . . . any and all information concerning
my behavior which is related to sexual offending."

This is not to say, however, that the prosecutorial
sword must actually strike or be poised to strike. To the
contrary, an individual "need not incriminate himself in
order to invoke the privilege," [**I41 McCoy, 696E2d
at 1236, but may simply refuse to make any statements
that place him at risk. Accord Seattle Times, 845 F.2d at
1520 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) ("It is appropriate for a
defendant to raise aJiPh amendment objection at the time
he is required to [make the potentially incriminating
statements.]"). And as a general rule, countervailing government interests, such as criminal rehabilitation, do not
trump this right. Thus, when [*1135) "questions put to
[a] probationer, however relevant to his probationary
status, call for answers that would incriminate him in a
pending or later criminal prosecution," he may properly
invoke his right to remain silent. Murphy, 465 US. at
435.

In sum, the evidence shows that, setting the privilege
aside, Antelope would have to reveal past sex crimes to
the SABER counselor; the counselor would likely report
the incidents to the authorities, who could then use Antelope's admissions to prosecute and convict him of the
additional crimes. Viewed in this light, very little stands
between Antelope's participation in SABER and future
prosecution. When he invoked his F&h Amenhunt
right, Antelope's situation presented a "real and appreciable danger," not a "remote, unlikely, or speculative"
risk. See [**17) McCoy, 696 F.2d at 1236. We conclude that Antelope has shown a sufficiently real possibility of incrimination.

In this case, Antelope's risk of incrimination was
"real and appreciable." The SABER program required
Antelope to reveal his fill sexual history, including all
past sexual criminal offenses. Any attempt to withhold
information about past offenses would be stymied by the
required complete autobiography and "full disclosure"
polygraph examination. Based on the nature of this re-

The second prong of the self-incrimination inquiry
asks whether the government has sought to "impose substantial penalties because a witness elects to exercise his
Fim Amen&tent right not to give incriminating testimony against himself." Cunningham, 43 1 U.S. at 805.
We are mindful that an individual choosing silence does
not get a fiee pass against all possible repercussions. See,

B, Compulsion
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e.g., Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272,
286, 140 L. Ed 2d 387, 118 S. Ct. 1244 (1998) (a stat
clemency board may draw "adverse inferences" from an
inmate's failure to testify on his own behalf at a clemency hearing). Only "some penalties are so great as to
'compel' such testimony, while [*I1361 others do not
rise to that level." McKune, 536 U.S. at 49 (O'Connor,
J . , concurring). The Supreme Court's decision in McKune
requires us to conclude that this level has been breached
in Antelope's case.

*i

In McKune, a plurality of four justices concluded
that the penalties faced by the inmate [**I81 in that
case, Robert Lile, for rehsing to make disclosures required under Kansas's Sexual Abuse Treatment Program
("SATP) did not amount to compulsion under the Fifrh
Amendment. Id at 29. Lile brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials, alleging that they had violated
his Fifih Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
by reducing his privildges and transferring him from medium-security housing to maximum-security housing as a
result of his refusal to disclose his sexual history as required by SATP.
The plurality rejected Lile's argument that his case
was controlled by "the so-called penalty cases" like
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 US. 493, 497-98, 17 L. Ed
2d 562, 87 S. Ct. 616 (1967) (striking down state statute
forcing public employees "either to forfeit their jobs or to
incriminate themselves"), and Spevack v. Klein, 385
U s . 511, 516, 17 L. Ed. 2d 574, 87 S. Ct. 625 (1967)
("The threat of disbarment and the loss of professional
standing, professional reputation, and of livelihood are
powerful forms of compulsion to make a lawyer relinquish the privilege."), where lesser penalties involving
the potential loss [**I91 of economic livelihood were
held unconstitutional. The plurality distinguished those
cases because they "involved free citizens" and were "not
easily extended to the prison context." McKune, 536
US. at 40-41. Relying instead on prisoner-specific cases
like Murphy, 465 US. at 434-39 (concluding that there
was no FNh Amendment violation where petitioner
claimed he felt compelled to incriminate himself because
he feared absent truthful statements his probation would
be revoked), and Woodard, 523 U.S. at 286-88 (concluding that there was no compulsion where a death row
.inmate had to choose between incriminating himself at a
clemency interview and having adverse inferences drawn
from his silence), where the Court found no FiJh
Amendment violations despite the use of far harsher penalties such as longer incarceration or execution, the plurality wrote that "lawful conviction and incarceration
necessarily place limitations on the exercise of a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination."
[**20]
McKune, 536 U.S. at 38.
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In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor explained that
penalties severe enough to offend the Fifrh Amendment
privilege include: "termination of employment, [ Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York,
392 US. 280, 20 L. Ed 2d 1089, 88 S. Ct. 191 7 (1968)],
the loss of a professional license, [ Spevack v. Klein, 385
US. 511, 17 L. Ed. 2d 574, 87 S. Ct. 625 (1967)], ineligibility to receive government contracts, [ LejRowitz v.
Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 38 L. Ed 2d 274, 94 S. Ct. 316
(1973)], and the loss of the right to participate in political
associations and to hold public office, [ LejRowitz v.
Cunningham, 431 US. 801, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1, 97 S. Ct.
2132 (1977)J." McKune, 536 US. at 49-50. In contrast,
an inmate's "reduction in incentive level, and a corresponding transfer fiom a medium-security to a maximum-security part of the prison" were not "serious
enough to compel him to be a witness against himself."
[**21] Id at 50.
Significantly, Justice O'Comor did not attempt to
establish the governing standard for all cases, noting that
she did not "need [to] resolve this dilemma [of setting
forth a comprehensive theory of the self-incrimination
privilege] to make [her] [*I1371 judgment in"
McKune. Id at 54. Nevertheless, though Justice O'Connor's concurrence does not delineate the limits of the selfincrimination clause's protections, it makes clear that the
Court likely would conclude that the penalty Antelope
faced for not participating in SABER was constitutionally impermissible.
Although Justice O'Comor agreed with the plurality
that Lile's "reduction in incentive level, and . . . corresponding transfer fiom a medium-security to a maximum-security part of the prison" were not penalties "sufficiently serious to compel his testimony," Justice
O'Connor said that she "did not agree with the suggestion
in the plurality 6pinion that these penalties could permissibly rise to the level o f . . . penalties [like] longer incarceration and execution [which] are far greater than those
we have already held to constitute unconstitutional compulsion." [**22] Id at 50, 52. Justice O'Connor did not
accept the plurality's reasoning that the different outcomes in the "penalty cases" and the Court's decisions in
cases like Murphy and Woodard could be explained on
the basis of the citizen-prisoner distinction and that the
key factor in assessing a prisoner's self-incrimination
claim was whether the disputed penalty, in the plurality's
language, amounted to an "atypical and significant hardship" within the prison context. Justice O'Comor explained:

I believe the proper theory should recognize that it is generally acceptable to
impose the risk of punishment, however
great, so long as the actual imposition of

395 F.3d 1128, *; 2005 U.S. App. LEXlS 1327, **

such punishment is accomplished through
a fair criminal process. . . . Forcing defendants to accept such consequences seems
to me very different fiom imposing penalties for the refusal to incriminate oneself
that go beyond the criminal process and
appear, starkly, as government attempts to
compel testimony . . . .
Id. at 53 (internal citation omitted).
Thus, under Justice O'Connor's opinion in [**23]
McKune, the compulsion inquiry does not dispositively
nun on the status of the person claiming the F$h
Amendment privilege or on the severity of the penalty
factors may bear on the walvolling issue is the state's purpose in
Although it may be acceptable for
penalties on defendants when it
has legitimate reasons for doing so consistent with their
conviction for their crimes of incarceration, it is a different thing to impose 'penalties for the refisal to incriminate oneself that go beyond the criminal process and
appear, starkly, as government attempts to compel testi-,
Applying these principles here, we reject that the
state could sanction Antelope for his self-protective silence about conduct that might constitute other crimes.
We do not doubt that SABER'S policy of requiring convicted sex offenders to give a sexual history, admitting
responsibility for past misconduct to participating counselors, serves an important rehabilitative purpose. See,
e.g.. [**24] id. at 33 (plurality opinion) ("An important
component of [sex offender] rehabilitation programs
participants to confiont their past and accept
responsibility' for their misconduct. . . . Research indicates that offenders who deny all allegations of sexual
abuse are three times more likely to fail in treatment than
those who admit even partial complicity.") (citing U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Nat'l Inst. of Con., A Practitioner's
Guide to Treating the Incarcerated Male Sex Offender 73
(1988) and B. Maletzky & K. McGovern, Treating the
Sexual Offender 253-55 (199 1 )). Often sex offenders
repeat their past offenses, and informed counseling can
only help protect [*I1381 them, their potential victims,

r

and society. The imconcilable constitutional problem,
however, is that even though the disclosures sought here
may serve a valid rehabilitative purpose, they also may
be starkly incriminating, and there is no disputing that
the gove-ent
may seek to use such disclosures for
prosecutorial purposes. In fact, Antelope's SABER
counselor testified that he routinely transmits to authorities any admissions his clients make about past sex
crimes, and that such reports have led to [**2$ more
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prosecutions and convictions. Cj: McKune, 536 U.S.at
40-41 (plurality opinion) (arguing that a "critical distinction" between McKune and the penalty cases where the
Court found F@h Amcndkrrnt violations is that "there is
no indication that the SATP is an elaborate attempt to
avoid the protections offered by the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination").
Justice O'Comor made clear in her McKune concurrence that she would not have found a penalty of "longer
incarceration" such as that here to be constitutionally
permissible. Id. at 52. The strength of Justice O'Connor's
opinion as precedent is reinforced because it seems certain that the four dissenters in McKune, who argued that
a loss of discretionary privileges and a transfer to less
desirable living quarters under similar circumstances
were sufficiently compulsive to violate Lile's privilege
against self-incrimination, would find a F i m Amendment violation where the district court revoked Antelope's conditional liberty and sentenced him to an additional ten months in prison. ' On the basis of McKune,
we hold that Antelope's privilege against selfincrimination [**%] was violated because Antelope
was sentenced to a longer prison term for refising to
comply with SABER'S disclosure requirements. '

1

3 Indeed, the McKune plurality, even with its
more stringent standard, might here hold that the
Fifrh Amendment's self-incrimination clause was
violated, given that the McKune plurality declared that Kansas had not used the information
gathered in SATP for prosecutorial purposes, id.
at 34, and that Lile's refbsal to participate in Kansas's SATP did not result in an "extenrsion ofj his
term of incarceration." Id at 38.
4 The Court's pre-McKune decision in Murphy
is consistent. In Murphy the defendant challenged
a condition of his probation requiring him to "be
b-uthful with [his] probation officer 'in all matters"' or "return to the sentencing court for a probation revocation hearing," arguing that this condition unconstitutionally forced him to choose between making self-incriminating disclosures or
returning to prison. 465 US. at 422. The Court
held that there was no FYI1) AmmhaU violation because the defendant "could not reasonably
have feared that the assertion of the privilege
would have led to revocation," given that the
state would have provided a hearing before revocation, and defendant could have raised the privilege as a reason for noncompiiance, and that the
defendant could point to no case in which Minnesota revoked probation when a probationer "rehsed to make non-immunized disclosures concerning his own criminal conduct." Id at 439.
The Court said that the outcome would have dif-
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fered if the state "expressly or by implication, asserted that invocation of the privilege would lead
to revocation of probation," because this would
have resulted in "the classic penalty situation."
Id at 435. Here we have the "classic penalty
situation" contemplated in Murphy; Antelope's
supervised release ended because he would not
make potentially self-incriminating statements as
required by SABER.
[**27] Our holding comports with the case authority in our sister circuits which suggests that the conditions must not only be sufficiently coercive, but also
more than merely hypothetical. When probation and suervised release terms are at issue, a court must determine whether the alleged Fifih Amendment problem truly
implicates the defendant's conditional liberty. In [*1W9]
United States v. Lee, 315 F.3d 206, 212 (3d Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 540 US.858,157 L. Ed 2d 106, 124 S. Ct.
160 (2003), for example, the Third Circuit rejected a
defendant's challenge to his supervised released condition because Lee offered "no evidence that [his] ability to
remain on probation is conditional on his waiving the
Fifrh Amendment privilege with respect to future criminal prosecution." In Lee, the prosecutor had stipulated
that Lee's failure "to pass a polygraph examination, in
and of itself, likely would not result in a fmding of a supervised release violation." Id. Without the real risk of
revocation, the polygraph's effect on Lee could not
amount to constitutional compulsion.
The First Circuit likewise faced a Fifth Amendment
challenge to a supervised release [**28] condition imposing a polygraph exam requirement in United States v.
York, 357 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2004). The twist in York was
an ambiguous provision in the release condition: "When
submitting to a polygraph exam, the defendant does not
give up his Fifh Amendment rights." Id at 18. The First
Circuit grappled with York's Fifh Amendment challenge,
acknowledging that "the polygraph requirement may
implicate York's Fifrh Amendment rights, depending on
how the district court's order is understood." Id. at 24.
The York court carefully avoided interpreting the release
condition to mean "that it flatly requires York to submit
to polygraph testing as a condition of his supervised release, so that York's reftlsal to answer any question -even on valid Fifh Amendment grounds could constitute a basis for revocation." Id Rather than impute this
"constitutionally problematic" meaning to the release
condition, the First Circuit simply construed it to mean
that "York's supervised release shall not be revoked
based on his vaiid assertion of Fifh Amendment privilege during a polygraph examination." [**29] Id at 2425.

--

Although the First and Third Circuits found an interpretative way around the F@h Amcnrlinrnl issue, the

path of constitutional avoidance taken in York and Lee
is unavailable here. Whether Antelope's supervised
lease is actually conditioned on his participation in SABER is a question whose answer is certain. Antelope has
already suffered repeated revocation of his conditional
liberty as a result of invoking his F@h Amcndmcnl
right. And, we have no doubt that Antelope's loss of
liberty was as "substantial" a penalty as, if not more serious than, the ones imposed upon the litigants in the line
of cases fiom Spevack to Cunningham -- and totally
unlike the mere transfer fiom one part of a prison to
other, as in McKune.
Here, the district court tried to walk a fine line between the government's absolutist view that full disclosure without immunity was a condition of release
and Antelope's view -- that fill disclosure without F&&
Amenrlinenl protection was a no-win proposition. Although this effort was laudable and the district court was
sensitive in recognizing Antelope's Catch-22 predicament, its ruling left Antelope [**30] in legal limbo. U1timately, the district court revoked Antelope's supervised release as a result of his refisal to disclose his sexual history without receiving immunity fiom prosecution.
Because the government and district court have consistently refused to "recognize[] that the required answers
may not be used in a criminal proceeding" against Ante
lope, Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 n. 7, we hold that the
revocation of his probation and supervised release violated his F@h Amendhat right against selfincrimination.

--

--

C. Antelope's Entitlement to Kastlgar
Immunity
The nature of Antelope's entitlement to immunity
for incriminating statements [*I1401 is subject to some
dispute between the parties. We find it appropriate to
resolve their disagreement because the issue is intimately
bound up with the resolution of the merits of Antelope's
F@h Amendhat claim. The govenment argues that
Antelope has no entitlement to an assurance of immunity
before he makes incriminating statements. See Kastigar,
406 U.S. at 453 (holding use and derivative use irnmunity under 18 U.S.C. jj 6002-6003 coextensive with the
F@h Amendwmt [**31] privilege). It contends, in effect, that the government has the right to compel Ante
lope to incriminate himself, prosecute him, and force
him to litigate the admissibility of each piece of evidence
in future criminal proceedings. Only then, according to
its view, can Antelope properly assert his F@l Amen&
mew privilege. We disagree.
As the Supreme Court has explained, adoption of the
government's position would all but eviscerate the protections the self-incrimination clause was designed to
provide. See, e.g., Turley, 414 U.S. at 78 ("[A] witness
protected by the privilege may rightfilly refuse to an-
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swer unless and until he is protected at least against the
use of his compelled answers and evidence derived
therefrom in any subsequent criminal case in which he is
a defendant." (emphasis added)). More recently, Justice
Thomas, speaking for four members of the Court, reaffirmed this principle: "By allowing a witness to insist on
an immunity agreement before being compelled to give
incriminating testimony in a noncriminal case, the privilege preserves the core FiJh Amendment right fiom invasion . . . ." [**32] Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760,
771, 155 L. Ed. 2d 984, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003) (Thomas,
J., in a plurality opinion joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
O'Connor, J., and Scalia, J.) (emphasis in original).
That this protection should be the law is only logical; "the failure to assert the privilege will often forfeit
the right to exclude the evidence in a subsequent 'criminal case."' Id. (citing Murphy, 465 U.S. at 440). Without
a pre-testimonial assurance of immunity, the witness
would scarcely be better protected than if there were no
privilege at all. See id. ("If the privilege could not be
asserted [before making the incriminating disclosure],
testimony given in those judicial proceedings would be
deemed 'voluntary' . . . ." ). Our conclusion in this case
gives effect to Justice Thomas's admonition that "it is
necessary to allow assertion of the privilege prior to the
commencement of a 'criminal case' to safeguard the core
Fifrh Amendment trial right." Id.
In the face of the vast weight of precedent to the
contrary, see, e.g., [**33] Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429-40
(discussing circumstances where the Flfh Anrenciinrnt
privilege is triggered the moment a defendant is compelled to give statements which might incriminate him in
criminal proceedings, even if such proceedings have yet
to be initiated), the government contends that Chavez
stands for the proposition that Antelope may not assert
the FiBh Amenllhrent right until the moment a compelled statement is used in a criminal proceeding against
him. But Chavez did not, as the government suggests,
unseat decades of Supreme Court law. Instead, the government's argument reveals a f'hdamental misunderstanding of Chavez.
Chavez was a civil rights suit filed under 42 U.S.C. $
1983 by a plaintiff alleging that a police officer who aggressively questioned him violated his F@h Amendment
right. Six justices agreed with the defendant police of%cer that the cause of action premised on a Fifh Amendment violation could not survive summary judgment. See
Chavez, 538 US.at 766-67 [*1141] (Thomas, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., O'comor, J., and Scalia, J.); [**34]
id. at 777-79 (Souter, J., concuning, joined by Breyer,
J.). But Chavez left unaltered the Court's commitment to
safeguarding the FiJh Amendment's core guarantee under
the circumstances presented here -- a point the government chooses to ignore. Critical to the reasoning of all
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six justices was the simple principle that the scope of the
F@h Amendment's efficacy is narrower when used as a
sword in a civil suit than when used as a shield against
criminal prosecution. See id. at 772-73 (Thomas, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., and Scalia, J.)
("Rules designed to safeguard a constitutional right [such
as that protected by the selflincrimination clause] do not
extend the scope of the constitutional right itself. . . .
Accordingly, Chavez's failure to read Miranda warnings
to Martinez . . . cannot be grounds for a $ 1983 action.
And the absence of a 'criminal case' in which Martinez
was compelled to be a 'witness' against himself defeats
his core Fifh Amendment claim." (internal citations
omitted)); [**35) id at 777-78 (Souter, J., concurring,
joined by Breyer, J.) (explaining that while case law "requiring a grant of immunity in advance of any testimonial proffer . . . . is outside the Fifh Amendment's core,"
the privilege's protections will only be expanded where
"the core guarantee, or the judicial capacity to protect it,
would be placed at some risk in the absence of such
complementary protection," and concluding that it was
not "necessary to expand protection of the privilege . . .
to . . civil liability"). Simply stated, the holding of
Chavez is tightly bound to its J 1983 context.

.

Were Antelope to turn the tables and sue the government, Chavez would direct our inquiry to the "core
constitutional right" -- and, in such a posture, the government's argument might well prevail. But here, where
Antelope is on the defensive, F m Amcndknt case
law offers him protection beyond what the Chavez plurality called the "core" right. Thus, whether we describe
our decision as arising out of a "prophylactic" or "constitutional" rule, the same result obtains: Antelope followed the appropriate course of action by refusing to
answer the sexual history question [**36] until he was
assured that his answers would be protected by immunity.
5 The scope of the immunity should be consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453 (holding that "immunity
fiom use and derivative use [provided by 18
U.S.C. $$ 6002-60031 is coextensive with the
scope of the privilege against selfincrimination"). Kastigar, of course, does not insulate Antelope fiom prosecution altogether, just
fiom the "use and derivative use" of compelled
admissions in trial against him. Id.

IIL THE PROHIBITION ON "ANY PORNOGRAPHIC MATERIALS"
Antelope also challenges as unconstitutionally vague
the provision of his supervised release prohibiting him
from possessing "any pornographic, sexually oriented or

395 F.3d 1128, *; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 1327, **

sexually stimulating materials." In United States v.
Guagliardo, 278 E 3 d 868 (9th Cir. 2002), we held
impermissibly vague a similar supervised release term.
Guagliardo was prohibited from possessing "'any [**37]
pornography,' including legal adult pornography." Id at
872. Because "a probationer cannot reasonably understand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on
'pornography,"' we remanded for clarification. Id. We do
the same here. The condition imposed on Antelope is
indistinguishable from the one imposed on Guagliardo.
Here, instead of "any pornography," we have "any pornographic . . . materials."
The government contends that "sexually oriented or
sexually stimulating" should be [*I1421 read to define
"pornographic." We decline to adopt this grammatically
unnatural reading. The release term explicitly lists three
types of materials that Antelope may not possess: "any
pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stimulating
materials." Because the condition imposed on Antelope
suffers from the same defect as the one struck down in
Guagliardo, we vacate and remand for clarification.
Upon reconsideration, the district court may take note of
the condition imposed in United States v. Rearden, 349
F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 2003), which passed constitutional
muster.

IV. THE PROHIBITION ON "ACCESS TO ANY
ON-LINE COMPUTER SERVICE"
Antelope's final [**38] argument challenges as
overbroad the supervised release term prohibiting him
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fiom "possessing or using a computer with access to any
'on-line computer service' at any location (including employment) without the prior written approval of the probation department."
As Antelope acknowledges, we recently rejected
precisely such a challenge in Rearden. See id at 620-21.
He argues, however, that his case should be treated differently because his crime involved less use of the Internet and was less severe than Rearden's. Although there is
some appeal to this nuance, the Internet was nevertheless
essential to the commission of Antelope's crime: He fmt
contacted the federal agents through joining a child pornography-oriented online group. Added to the evidence
suggesting that Antelope's crime was one step on a path
towards more serious transgressions, there is enough to
justifL the imposition of the term "to protect the public
from Auther crimes of the defendant" and "to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct." 18 U.S.C. $3553
(a)(2)(B) & (C). We a f f i the imposition of this provision of Antelope's supervised release.
CONCLUSION

[**39] Accordingly, the decision of the district
court revoking Antelope's supervised release because he
invoked his F@% Ammdwaenl rights in connection with
the SABER program is REVERSED, the imposition of
the release term prohibiting access to "any pornographic
materials" is VACATED and REMANDED. and the
release term prohibiting "access to any 'on-line computer
service'" is AFFIRMED.
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RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
SUBMISSION OF CASE LAW FOR
RETAINED JURISDICTION REVIEW
HEARING

Plaintiff,
vs.
JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, The State of Idaho, by and through Lee Fisher, Elmore County Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby responds to the Defendant's submission of case law as follows.
BACKGROUND AND FACTS

Defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated battery reduced fiom rape in case number CR2007- 1 156 and was sent on a rider. During the rider, he was interviewed by law enforcement regarding
two other potential victims. Based on that interview, this matter was filed with two counts ofrape. The
Defendant returned&om his lintrider with arecommendationto relinquishjurisdiction. The Defendant was
placed on probation in case number CR-2007-1156pending the resolution of this matter. The Defendant
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entered a guilty plea to one count of rape in this matter and was sent on arider in both caseswith the Court
reserving the issue of sex offender registrationin this case and restitution in both cases. During his second
rider, the Defendant completed a sexual history as part ofhis treatment. He submitted to a polygraph to
determinethe truthhlness ofhis sexualhistory. The polygraph indicated that he had not been truthfbl and
he subsequentlyadmitted that he had left anothervictim out ofhis history. The Defendant did not invoke
his Fifth Amendment rights at any time during this process.
LAW
The case of Statev. Crowg governs this matter. In Crowe, the Defendant was placed on probation
and required him, as conditions ofhis probation, to complete a specialized sex offendertherapyprograrn
through SANE and have no unsupervised contact with minors following a conviction for sexual abuse of
a minor. State v. Crowe, 131 Idaho 109,110-11 (1 998). The Defendant failed a polygraph examination
as part of his SANE treatment. "When contionted about this," the Defendant admitted that he had
mpervised contactwith his ten-year-old niece and had inappropriatelytouched her buttocks. Id. at 111.
The Defendant, at the SANE counselor's request, "made verbal and written admissions to his probation
officer about the incidents."u. The statementsto the counselorand probation officer, including the written
statement,were admitted at the probation violation hearing. The Defendant was found to have violated his
probation, and his sentence was imposed. See id.
On appeal, Crowe argued that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated by the admissionof the

statement to his counselor at the probation violation hearing. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected that
argument. The Court .firstnoted that"lilt is well-establishedthat the Fifth Amendment must be invoked by
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the person claiming the privilege or the privilege is deemed lost."
not assert his Fifth Amendment right.

u.at 112(citationsomitted). Crowe did

u.The Court then reviewed the United States Supreme Court

decision in Minnesota v. Mmhy. TheCmwe court noted that

held the "Fifth Amendment applies,

even if not invoked, if the Statecompels an individual to foregothe Fifth Amendmentprivilege by a threat
to impose a penalty if the privilege is invoked."u. The court in Mumhythen limited its own holding, " 'a
State may validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions and hence sensibly administer its
probation system, as long as it recognizes that the required answers may not be used in a criminal
proceeding and thus eliminatesthe threat of incrimination.'

"u.(quoting Minnesotav. Mmhy, 465 US.

420,436 n. 7, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1146 n. 7 (1984) (citation omitted)).
The Crowe court held that a probation violation proceeding is not a subsequent criminal
proceeding. See id. Therefore, the admission of the statementsto the counselor did not violate Crowe's
Fifth Amendment rights. See id. A copy of the Crowe decision is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
The case of Madison v. Craven is a civil rights violation case involvingMr. Madison, "a prison
inmate," who sued the Executive Director of the Commissionof Pardons and Parole and two therapists
at the Idaho Department of Correction. Madison v. Craven, 144Idaho 696,698,169 P.3d 284,286 (Ct,
App. 2007). Madison's claims included that his Fifth Amendment rights wereviolated when he was forced

to tell a counselorthat he was "sexually attracted to his daughter who was the victim ofhis crime." 144
Idaho at 699, 700, 169 P.3d at 288. The Idaho Court of Appeals noted that there was no Fifth
Amendment violation for two reasons, the admissions did not incriminateMadison and were never used
against him in a criminal pr0ceeding.u. at 700,169 P.3d at 288. The Madison court went on to quote
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State v. Crows in support of this holding, noting that there was no violation in Crowe because the
statements had not been used in a criminal trial. & d.,144 Idaho at 701, 169 P.3d at 289.

Madison also notes that if a Defendant does not claim the F i f i Amendment privilege and answers
voluntarily, the privilege is lost, i.e. the answers are not consideredto be compelled within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment. seeid. at 700,169 P.3d at 288 (citingMinnesota v. M u n , h ~465 U.S. 420,42728 (1984)). A copy of Madison is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
The case of Statev. Radford, submittedby the Defendant, also supportsthe State's position. In
Radford, the Defendant was requiredto participate in counselingthrough SANE. As part of the counseling,
he completed a sexualhistoryand was given a polygraph on that history. Statev. Radfmd, 134Idaho 187,
189(2000). "During the polygraph, Radford revealed" that he had committed a separate offensein 1991.

Ig.Radford had signed an agreement with SANE that SANEwould disclose "information regarding his
treatment to law personnel" and the contract specificallystated that "pnmouslycommitted crimes must also
be reported, and may be prosecuted. ..."U.
at 188.After the disclosureto the counselor, Radford met
with his probation officer and made the same statement to the probation officer. At a later date, Radford
met with his probation officer and two detectives. At that meeting, Radford was Mirandizd, told he was
not in custody, and signed a "Miranda waiver."u. at 189. Radford then made admissions regarding the
same prior crime. See id.
Radford was charged with new crimes based onhis statements and filed amotion to suppressthe
statementsas being obtained in violation ofhis Fifth Amendment rights. At first the district courtjudge
denied the motion to suppress. Seeid. After the Crows case discussed abovewas decided, Radford filed
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amotion to reconsider, which the district court granted and suppressed all ofthe statements. See id. The
State then appealed only the suppression of the statement made to the detectives. See id. at 189,190
(noting that the Statedid not appeal the suppression of the statements in the new case that were required
by the polygraph as part ofhis probation). The Radford court then held that the statementsto the detectives
should not have been suppressedbecause they were voluntary and were not the f i t s of the polygraph
statements. &g

d.at 191-93.
ARGUMENT

Based on the foregoing cases and the fads in this matter, the Defendant's Fifth Amendment rights
have not been violated. First, the Defendant did not invokehis Fifth Amendment right. He omitted a victim
fiom his sexual history and failed the polygraph examinationbecause ofhis omission As the cases above
note, the failure of the Defendant to invoke his Fifth Amendment right waives the right.
Second, even if the Courtwere to find no waiver, there was no Fifth Amendment violation because
the law inIdaho is clearly settled that statements made to a SANE counselor as part ofprobation cannot
be the basis for a new criminalprosecution. Crowq specificallyheld that such statements can be used for
a probation violation hearing but not in anew trial. State v. Crowq, 131 Idaho 109,112(1998); see also
State v. Radford, 134 Idaho 187,193 (2000) (noting the Crowe decision stands for the premise that
disclosures required by probation were admissible in a probation violation proceeding but not in a
"subsequent criminal trial"). This is a retained jurisdiction hearing. The Defendant has even fewer
constitutional rights on a rider than he would have on probation. This proceeding is not a new or subsequent
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criminal trial but is more akinto a probation violation hearing. Sincethe Defendant's omission is not being
used in a new prosecution, there is no violation of the Defendant's Fifth Amendment right.

Third,as noted above, the law is clearlysettled in Idaho that the Statecannot use the incriminating
statements of a person in a new case when such statements are made pursuant to a requirement of
probation. Here, the Defendant made the false statementspursuant to the requirementsofhis treatment on
the retainedjurisdiction program, which should be consideredto be akin to the probation situation. The
Statehas long recognized that it cannot use these statementsfor a new prosecution. The State cannot use
the Defendant's admission that he has anothervictim as evidencein anew case. The most the Defendant
faces from his admissionsor failures to admit are the imposition of sentencein this matter, which clearly
does not implicatethe Fifth Amendment under the bindingIdaho authoritydiscussed above. Therefore, the
State's use of the Defendant's lies on his sexualhistory in this matter does not violatethe Fifth Amendment.
Sincethe Defendant was not at risk for a new criminal proceeding ifhe had revealed his other
victim, the persuasive case ofcrnited Statesv. Antelopedoes not indicate a different result. The Antelo~q
court's holding provides that if there was immunityfrom prosecution for the answers to the sex offender
treatment counselor's questions, there would be no Fifth Amendment violation. See. es.. Antelopq, 395
F.3d 1128,1141 (9th Cir. 2005). The Antelo~ecourt also aflirmed that for the Fifth Amendment to be
implicated "the government has [to seek] to 'impose substantialpenalties because a witness elects to
exercisehis Fifth Amendment right not to giveni-

. .

g testimonyagainst himself' "Antelow at 1135

(quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunninehm, 43 1U.S. 801,805 (1977)). The Defendant's other case is similarly
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unavailingof any additionalrelevant standard in light of the binding, directlyrelevantdecisions of the Idaho
courts in Crowe, Madison, and Radford.
CONCLUSION

The Defendant cannot prove a violationofhis Fifth Amendmentrights. The State is fiee to argue
his failureto discloseanother victim on his sexualhistory and the subsequent fded polygraph togetherwith
any other arguments arising therefiom as reasons to impose his sentence.
DATED This

Lv Kday of January 2009.
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I

BY: /A+
,
V
Lee Fisher
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131 Idaho 109; State v. Crowe; 952 P.2d 1245
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John David CROWE, Defendant-Appellant.
[Cite as State v. Crowe, 13 1 Idaho 1091
No. 23325.
Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, December 1997 Term.
February 27, 1998.
Following conviction on defendant's plea of guilty to sexual abuse of a minor, the Fourth Judicial
District Court, Ada County, Joel D. Horton, J. revoked defendant's probation, and defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court, Silak, J., held that admission of defendant's statements to sex offender counselor
that he had fondled his niece's buttocks, in violation of probation agreement, did not
Page 110

violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Affirmed.
Alan E. Trimming, Ada County Public Defender, David J. Smethers, Deputy Public Defender, Boise, for
appellant. David J. Smethers argued.
Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, Kenneth M. Robins, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Kenneth M. Robins argued.
SILAK, Justice.
This is an appeal fiom an order revoking probation. At the probation revocation hearing,
incriminating statements made by the probationer to his counselor and probation officer were admitted.
The appellant claims that admission of the statements at the hearing violated his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination. We affirm the decision of the district court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant John David Crowe (Crowe) was indicted on charges of lewd and lascivious conduct on
September 25,1990. He subsequently pled guilty to an amended charge of sexual abuse of a minor on
October 2, 1990. Crowe was placed on probation.
The relevant terms of the probation included Crowe's completing a specialized sex offender therapy
program through the Sexual Abuse Now Ended (SANE) program, Crowe's abiding by all laws of the
State and Crowe's not "associat[ing] with any juveniles unless accompanied by [a] responsible adult as
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Page 2 of 4
approved by the probation officer and
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therapist." The terms of the probation also included Crowe submitting to polygraph examinations upon
request of a probation officer. As a condition of the treatment at SANE, therefore a condition of the
probation, Crowe was required to report any contact with minor children and to submit to polygraph
examinations upon request.
At the SANE facility, Crowe signed a treatment contract which allowed counselors during treatment
to disseminate information to Crowe's probation officer. During a SANE treatment session around May
15, 1996, Crowe underwent a polygraph examination as part of his SANE treatment. Crowe failed the
examination. When confronted about this, Crowe related to D.F., his SANE counselor, that he had failed
the examination because he had been alone with his ten-year old niece, and had improperly touched her
by placing his hand on her buttocks. At the counselor's request, Crowe made verbal and written
admissions to his probation officer about the incidents. Crowe was arrested for violating his probation.
On May 28, 1996, a motion and order for a Bench Warrant for Probation Violation was filed. After a
violation hearing, at which the statement to D.F., the statement to the probation officer and Crowe's
written statement were admitted, the district court found that Crowe violated his probation by having
unsupervised contact with a minor and committing the crime of sexual abuse of a minor. The district
court ordered Crowe's probation revoked and ordered the execution of the previously suspended
sentence, a unified sentence of ten years imprisonment, with three years fixed.

ISSUE ON APPEAL
Whether Crowe's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated at his probation
revocation hearing by the admission of statements Crowe made to a counselor during a sex offender
counseling session required by his probation agreement.

ANALYSIS
A. Standard Of Review.
[I, 21 This Court exercises fkee review in determining whether "constitutional requirements have
been satisfied in light of the facts" found by the trial court. State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449,452, 776 P.2d
458,461 (1989) (quoting State v. Heinen, 114 Idaho 656,658,759 P.2d 947,949 (Ct.App.1988)).
Deference will be given to the findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.

B. Additional Issues Raised For The First Time On Appeal At Oral Argument Are Not
Properly Before This Court.
[3,4] Preliminarily, we note that counsel for Crowe tried to raise at oral argument the issues of
whether an extra-judicial confession was sufficient to convict Crowe absent more corroborating
evidence and whether Crowe's right to confront witnesses at the probation violation hearing had been
violated. These issues were not presented by Crowe's counsel in the statement of issues or argued in the
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briefs. Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(4) requires that a list of issues be presented on appeal. This Court has
acknowledged that this rule will be relaxed when the issues are supported by argument in the briefs.
State v. Prestwich, 116 Idaho 959,961, 783 P.2d 298,300 (1989), overruled on other groundr, State v.
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981,842 P.2d 660 (1992). Counsel for Crowe did not argue these additional issues
in his brief. Therefore, these additional issues are not properly before this Court and will not be
addressed on appeal.
151 Additionally, Crowe's counsel argued at oral argument that the Idaho Constitution provides
greater protection than the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The appellant's brief did
not argue for a different interpretation of the Idaho Constitution nor was there any authority cited for a
different interpretation. Therefore, this issue also was not properly raised on appeal. The only issue
properly before this
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Court is the application of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution to the present facts.
C. The District Court Was Correct In Holding That The Admission Of Statements Made By
Crowe To His Court Ordered Counselor Did Not Violate The Appellant's Fifth Amendment Right
Against Self-incrimination.

[6] It is well-established that the Fifth Amendment must be invoked by the person claiming the
privilege or the privilege is deemed lost. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,427-28, 104 S.Ct 1136,
1142,79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984); Garner v. US., 424 U.S. 648,654,96 S.Ct 1178, 1182,47 L.Ed.2d 370
(1976). It is undisputed that Crowe did not assert his Fifth Amendment right.

[7] Crowe relies on Minnesota v. Murphy in arguing that his statements to his counselor should be
suppressed because the questions posed to him forced him to answer or to be punished as a probation
violation for asserting his privilege against self-incrimination; thus, he argues he was forced into the
"classic penalty" situation. The Court in Murphy held that the Fifth Amendment applies, even if not
invoked, if the State compels an individual to forego the Fifth Amendment privilege by a threat to
impose a penalty if the privilege is invoked. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434,104 S.Ct. at 1146. The Court in
Murphy limited this exception to situations in which the statement obtained was to be used in a
subsequent criminal proceeding. The Court in Murphy stated:
[A] State may validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions and hence
sensibly administer its probation system, as long as it recognizes that the required answers
may not be used in a criminal proceeding and thus eliminates the threat of incrimination.
Under such circumstances, a probationer's "right to immunity as a result of his compelled
testimony would not be at stake," and nothing in the Federal Constitution would prevent a
State fiom revoking probation for a rehsal to answer that violated an express condition of
probation.
Id. at 436 n. 7, 104 S.Ct at 1146 n. 7 (quoting Sanitation Men v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S.
280,284, 88 S.Ct. 1917, 1920,20 L.Ed.2d 1089 (1 968)). In this case, the statements were used against
Crowe in a probation revocation hearing, not a subsequent criminal trial. A probation revocation
proceeding is not a separate criminal proceeding. Id. at 435 n. 7, 104 S.Ct at 1146 n. 7. See also, United
States v. Phelps, 955 F.2d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 1992) ("a person may not claim the self-incrimination
privilege merely because his answer to a question might result in revocation of his probationary status.
His answer, however, cannot be used against him in a criminal prosecution."); United States v.
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Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485, 1489 (9th Cir. 1985) ("in general, a probationer is not entitled to invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination in response to questions about his probation status.").

This case does not present a "classic penalty" situation. The statements were not used in a
subsequent criminal proceeding. We hold that the admission of the statements to the counselor at the
probation revocation proceeding did not violate Crowe's Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.

CONCLUSION
The order of the district court revoking Crowe's probation and placing his previously suspended
sentence into execution is affirmed.

TROUT,C.J., and JOHNSON, SCHROEDER and WALTERS, JJ., concur.
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169 P.3d 284; MADISON v. CRAVEN; 169 P.3d 284
MADISON v. CRAVEN
169 P.3d 284 (ID 2007)
Carl Lewis MADISON, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Olivia CRAVEN, Ed Chenney and David Trial, Respondents.
No. 33710.
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
August 6,2007.
Review Denied October 15,2007
Page 285

This Page Contains Headnotes.
Appeal from the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, Daniel C. Hurlbutt, J.
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Carl Lewis Madison, Boise, pro se appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; William M. Loornis, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for
respondent.
LANSING, Judge.
Carl Lewis Madison, a prison inmate, filed an action against the Executive Director of the
Commission of Pardons and Parole ("Commission") and two therapists at the Idaho Department of
Correction, requesting that certain information be removed fiom his prison record and not considered in
any future parole proceedings because the information was allegedly obtained through violations of his
privilege against self-incrimination. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing the action,
and Madison appeals.

BACKGROUND

In 1997, Madison was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor under sixteen, Idaho Code § 18- 1506,
for which he received a sentence of fifteen years with three years determinate. During the course of his
incarceration, Madison participated in a sexual offender therapy program. He contends that during that
program, he was forced to falsely(fh1) admit a sexual attraction to the victim, his daughter, and was later
terminated from the group when he accused the therapists and Department of Correction personnel of
colluding to make him appear to be a serial pedophile. In May of 1999, he was denied parole. The
minutes of that parole hearing contain a notation that Madison had molested fifteen victims. Madison
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later asserted that this statement in the minutes was false and that he had only one victim.

On November 14,2003, Madison filed a prisoner civil rights complaint asserting that the therapists'
acts and the allegedly false information in the parole hearing minutes violated his civil rights. The
district court treated Madison's complaint as a habeas corpus petition and dismissed it when Madison did
not pay the filing fee. He appealed, and in Madison v. Craven, 141 Idaho 45, 105 P.3d 705
(Ct.App.2005), we reversed and remanded. After remand, Madison amended his complaint.
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The nature of the claims that Madison intends to be presenting in his pro se complaint and
subsequent filings is difficult to discern or characterize. His general claim seems to be that various posttrial admissions he made, including those contained in the presentence investigation report (PSI), and
statements made at the parole hearing and during sexual offender treatment, were obtained in violation
of his F i f i Amendment right against self-incrimination and must therefore be purged from his record
and not considered in any future therapy or parole proceedings. He also contends that he has been
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, and raises several other related claims.
The district court initially characterized the amended complaint as a habeas corpus petition before
deciding to handle it as an action for violation of civil rights. Ultimately, the district court dismissed the
action on the respondents' summary judgment motion. Madison appeals, asserting that the district court
misinterpreted one of his claims, did not address several others, and misapplied the law.

ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment may be entered only if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). See
also Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745,747,890 P.2d 33 1,333 (1995); Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass% v.
City of Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740,742, 890 9.2d 3 2 , 3 2 8 (1995). On review, this Court liberally
construes the evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and
conclusions in that party's favor. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,272,869
P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994). If the evidence reveals no material disputed factual issues, however, only a
question of law remains over which this Court exercises fiee review. Roell v. Boise City, 130 Idaho 199,
200-01,938 P.2d 1237, 1238-39 (1997).
In this case, there are no disputed issues of fact; the respondents' summary judgment motion did not
challenge Madison's allegations that the minutes of the parole hearing erroneously state that he had
fifteen victims or that Madison's therapist required him to make statements regarding his sexual
attraction toward the victim. Therefore, the issue presented is whether these alleged events violated
certain of Madison's constitutional rights. Because we exercise de novo review over this legal issue,
Madison's assertions that the district court misinterpreted his arguments or erred in its legal analysis
need not be specifically addressed.

B. Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-incrimination
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Madison's primary argument on appeal is that information elicited after his conviction-including the
statement in his parole hearing that he had fifteen victims, statements made during therapy regarding his
sexual attraction to his daughter, and information in the PSI report-was obtained in violation of his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination and must therefore be purged fiom his record. The thrust of
his argument is that these statements were elicited to make him appear to be a serial pedophile, which he
contends has undermined his ability to trust his therapists and participate in therapy. He notes that this
will make it difficult for him to be paroled, and speculates that if this characterization of his criminal
nature remains in his record, it could be used against him in future matters.

The Fifth Amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." It has long been held that this prohibition not only permits a person to refuse to
testify against himself at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant, but also "privileges him not to
answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where
the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings." LeBwitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70,77,
94 S.Ct. 316,322,38 L.Ed.2d 274,281 (1973).
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See also Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,426, 104 S.Ct 1136, 1141,79 L.Ed.2d 409,418 (1984).
The availability of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination "does not turn upon the
type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission
and the exposure which it invites." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,49,87 S.Ct 1428, 1455, 18 L.Ed.2d 527,
558 (1967). A witness protected by the privilege may rightfully refuse to answer unless and until the
witness is granted immunity from the use of the compelled answers in any subsequent criminal case in
which the witness is a defendant. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 426, 104 S.Ct at 1141,79 L.Ed.2d at 418. If he
or she is nevertheless compelled to answer without immunity, the answers are inadmissible against the
witness in a later criminal prosecution. Id. An individual does not lose this protection by reason of
conviction of a crime; notwithstanding that a person is imprisoned at the time he or she makes
incriminating statements, if those statements are compelled they are inadmissible in a subsequent
criminal trial of that person. Id.; State v. Curless, 137 Idaho 138, 143,44 P.3d 1193, 1198
(Ct.App.2002).
1. Statement that Madison had fifteen victims

To the extent that Madison contends that the inclusion of the statement at the parole hearing that he
had fifteen victims violated his right against self-incrimination, this argument is undermined by
Madison's own assertions. He does not suggest that he was unlawfully compelled by the parole board to
admit this fact, but claims that he did not say it. Accordingly, the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination is not implicated here.
2. Statements contained in the PSI
Madison also argues that any statements he made to the presentence investigator should be purged
fiom his record. A defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies both at the
sentencing hearing and in presentence evaluations. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558,563, 149 P.3d833,
838 (2006); State v. Wilkins, 125 Idaho 215,217-19,868 P.2d 1231, 1233-35 (1994); State v. Lanvord,
1 16 Idaho 860,871,781 P.2d 197,208 (1989). However, if a defendant desires the protection of the
Fifth Amendment, he generally must claim it or it will be lost. That is, if one who is being questioned
does not assert the privilege and instead voluntarily responds without protest, the responses are not
considered to have been compelled within the meaning of the Fiflh Amendment. Murphy, 465 U.S. at
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427-28, 104 S.Ct. at 1142-43,79 L.Ed.2d at 419-20; Curless, 137 Idaho at 143,44 P.3d at 1198 (holding
that the defendant's failure to assert the Fifth Amendment during a psychosexual evaluation precluded
him fkom asserting the privilege on appeal). In this case, Madison has presented no evidence suggesting
that during the preparation of the PSI, he claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege and was nevertheless
compelled to answer, nor that compulsion prevented him from asserting the privilege. Because Madison
never asserted the privilege, he is not entitled to its protections, and his claim that the presentence
investigation interview violated his Fifth Amendment privilege therefore fails.
3. Statements made during therapy

We next examine whether Madison's Fifth Amendment rights were implicated by the allegedly
compelled admission, during treatment by a Department of Correction therapist, that he was sexually
attracted to his daughter who was the victim of his crime. We hold that this claim is without merit for at
least two reasons. First, there has been no Fifth Amendment violation because Madison's statements
were not used against him in a criminal proceeding and, second, the statements were not incriminating.
In Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760,123 S.Ct 1994, 155 L.Ed.2d 984 (2003), the United States
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had no cause of action for damages for violation of the Fifth
Amendment where his allegedly compelled statements were never used against him in a criminal
prosecution. In that case, Martinez brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 8 1983 on the theory that his right
against self-incrimination was violated
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by an officer who interrogated him while he was in an emergency room receiving treatment for several
gunshot wounds. Martinez was not charged with a crime, and his answers were never used against him
in any criminal case. A four-justice plurality of the Supreme Court was of the view that when statements
have been compelled by police interrogations, "it is not until their use in a criminal case that a violation
of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs." Id. at 767, 123 S.Ct. at 2001, 155 L.Ed.2d at 993. The mere
use of compulsory questioning, without more, the plurality said, does not violate the Constitution. Id.
Two additional justices who did not join in the plurality opinion nevertheless also rejected Martinez's
argwnent that the questioning alone was a completed violation of the Fifth Amendment subject to
redress by an action for damages under 5 1983. Id. at 777-79, 123 S.Ct. at 2006-08, 155 L.Ed.2d at
1000-01 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
The Idaho Supreme Court earlier reached the same conclusion in State v. Crowe, 13 1 Idaho 109,952
P.2d 1245 (1 998), where the defendant had been required to participate in sex offender therapy as a
condition of his probation. During therapy, he admitted that he had fondled a minor while on probation,
and this statement was used against him in a subsequent probation revocation hearing. The defendant
argued that his right against self-incrimination had been violated. The Idaho Supreme Court held that no
violation had occurred because the statements were used in a probation revocation hearing, not in a
criminal trial. Thus, we conclude that because Madison does not assert that any of his allegedly
compelled statements were used against him in a criminal prosecution, he has not alleged a cognizable
civil claim for violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Madison's claims also fail for the additional reason that he has not shown that the allegedly
compelled admissions were incriminating. The Fifth Amendment provides a privilege against answering
official questions "where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings." Murphy,
465 U.S. at 426, 104 S.Ct. at 1141, 79 L.Ed.2d at 418 (quoting Lefkowitz, 414 U.S. at 77,94 S.Ct. at
322, 38 L.Ed.2d at 281). That is, the privilege applies only if there is some rational basis for believing
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that the answer to a question will incriminate the individual and no assurance has been given that neither
the statement nor its fruits will be used against him in a subsequent prosecution. Murphy, 465 U.S. at
429, 104 S.Ct. at 1143, 79 L.Ed.2d at 420; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591,599-600,16 S.Ct 644,64748,40 L.Ed. 819,821-22 (1896). In dicta, the Murphy Court observed that the Fifth Amendment
privilege is not available when a defendant is being questioned about violations of conditions of
probation that do not constitute new criminal acts because the answers could not be used to incriminate
the probationer in another crime. While the answer to the questions might result in termination of
probation, the Court said, a probation revocation proceeding is not a separate criminal proceeding.
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 n. 7, 104 S.Ct at 1146 n. 7,79 L.Ed.2d at 425 n. 7. Thus, information is not
incriminating if disclosure poses no realistic threat of criminal prosecution.

In this case, Madison's admission that he had been sexually attracted to his daughter could not be
used against him in a criminal prosecution, for he had already been convicted and sentenced for
molestation of his daughter before he made the statement. Double jeopardy protections insure that he
cannot be reprosecuted for this offense.(W) Madison speculates that his statement could negatively
impact potential future parole eligibility proceedings, sex offender classificationproceedings, eligibility
for prison therapy programs, or civil cases. None of these, however, are criminal proceedings. See Folk
v. Pennsylvania, 425 F.Supp.2d 663,667-68 (W.D.Pa.2006) (no violation of defendant's
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right against self-incrimination when parole board declined to grant parole after defendant refused to
admit guilt to sexual crimes during therapy, for parole eligibility proceedings do not constitute a
criminal cases); In re Mark; 292 Wis.2d 1,7 18 N.W.2d 90, 100 (2006) (statements regarding the crime
of which defendant was convicted, or confession to activities that are not criminal but violate conditions
of parole, are not incriminating for Fifth Amendment purposes); Bankes v. Simmons, 265 Kan. 341,963
P2.2d..4.1.2,
419 (1998) (statements compelled during prison sexual abuse treatment program may be used
against inmate in a civil commitment proceeding as a sexually violent predator). Because the
proceedings in which Madison alleges that his statements could be used against him aie not criminal
proceedings and the statement does not implicate him in a separate crime, he has no Fifth Amendment
claim.(fh3)
C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Madison also alleges that forcing him to falsely admit a sexual attraction to his daughter, in
combination with the allegedly incorrect statement that he had fifteen victims, constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. He contends that he is being stigmatized by family, friends, inmates, and prison
officials as a serial pedophile, that he is no longer able to trust his therapists and prison officials, and that
he experiences mental anguish at being forced to say that he perceived his daughter in a sexual light.
The Eighth Amendment, which restrains the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments" on those convicted of crimes.
The Supreme Court has explained its application as follows:
[Tlhe Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may not, for example,
use excessive physical force against prisoners. The Amendment also imposes duties on
these officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must
ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must
"take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates."
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[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met.
First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, "sufficiently serious"; a prison official's
act or omission must result in the denial of "the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities."
The second requirement follows from the principle that "only the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment." To violate the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, a prison official must have a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." In
prison-conditions cases that state of mind is one of "deliberate indifference" to inmate
health or safety.
Fanner v. Brennan, 5 1 1 U.S. 825,832,834,114 S.Ct 1970,1976,1977,128 L.Ed.2d 8 11,822,823
(1 994) (internal citations omitted). When considered against this articulation of what constitutes "cruel
and unusual punishment," it is readily apparent the unpleasant emotional and social conditions of which
Madison complains are not sufficiently serious to amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.
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D. Other Issues
Madison's pro se appeal brief also mentions several other claims that he contends were alleged in his
civil rights complaint, but were not addressed by the district court. As to these additional claims, we
have either considered them and find them to be without merit or have been presented with no coherent
legal argument that we are able to identie and address.

CONCLUSION

Madison's factual allegations and evidence, even when accepted as true and liberally construed in his
favor, show no right to relief in this civil rights action on any of the theories he has advanced. Therefore,
the district court correctly granted summary judgment dismissing the action. Summary judgment for the
respondents is affirmed.
Chief Judge PERRY and Judge GUTIERREZ concur.
Footnotes:
FN1. He advances the theory that he should not be branded as a pedophile because he imagined his
victim as an adult when he molested her.
FN2. The time for appeal of Madison's conviction has long since passed, as has the statute of
limitation for any post-conviction action challenging the conviction. Madison does not contend that
there exist any pending post-conviction actions challenging the validity of his conviction or any other
proceeding that could lead to a new trial on the charge for which he was convicted, such that the
admission of sexual attraction to his daughter could be used against him in a new trial.
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FN3. A fbrther word concerning the scope of Fifth Amendment protections is appropriate to ensure
that our holding in this case will not be misunderstood nor applied too expansively. We have addressed
today only whether an individual who did not invoke the self-incrimination privilege and who made
statements allegedly under compulsion may obtain the remedy of removal of the statements fiom his
prison records. We do not address the quite different issue of whether the government may penalize a
person who, not having been offered immunity, legitimately invokes the privilege and refuses to provide
potentially incriminating information. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Chavez did not
overturn decades of precedent allowing the self-incrimination privilege to be asserted in contexts other
than criminal cases and granting relief where the government has penalized persons for their refusal to
waive the privilege. To the contrary, the Chavez plurality expressly recognized the continuing authority
of those decisions and characterized them as establishing "prophylactic rules" that are necessary to
protect the "core constitutional right." Chavez, 538 U.S. at 768 n. 2,770-72, 123 S.Ct. at 2001 n. 2,
2002-04, 155 L.Ed.2d at 994 n. 2,995-97.
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-VS-

JUSTIN WODGION,

Defendant.

1
1

MEMORANDUM

1

1
1

COMES NOW The Defendant, JUSTIN 000DGION, by and through his attorney of
record, TERRY S. RATLIFF of Ratliff l a w Ollias, Chtd., and hcrcby submits this Mernonndum

I

in support OF his desire to bc pfaccd on supervised probation.
Essentially, the issue b e b e thc Court is whether Justin should be pIaced on probation,

the & that the 'Ride? personnel rclcascd him f2om the progam fy failing to

disclose ,thefacts and chmmtmces surrounding a yr?xual encounter that is allcgcd to have ocamed

andrd&
rcq&rcd to,bcliscloPcd to co'mplncthe SANE program.
'Chc Defendant concedes ittat he m y bc compefld to give up his Fifth Amendment rights .

against sclf-incrimination in order to get lreatment, so long as such disclosurt docs not subject him

-

MEMORANDUM Page 1

II

1

I

I

to new and additional criminal sanctions. State v. Crowc, 131 Idaho 109 (1998). However, in this

case,Justin did not have the knowledge to assert thc Fifth hmcndrnent, and in fact did not asat the

m e , he just simply kept his mouth shut, basuse nobody told htn what his rights were, or gavc
him'accds to his ap&ntr:d' counscl, xithat he could make knowing and in~elligentdecision! : '.
.

htcad, thc " ~ i d d

. ..

have simply c~ncludedthat Justin should k kicked out of the

program, since he won't disclose.. Them
. . is nothing in the record, provided by thc Statc, to support :
thc ~ondvsionthat Justin shpihould be 'flopped' basal on his nondisclosure. SANE agreement

.
,

. .

'
'

.

,

'

hdditibdy, the caselaw proscntcd by thc State deals with piobatib* vioiiiion

Jlegotians, which Crowe has depicted as not being "a s q m t c criminal proceeding." Id at 112.
'kis ,being the 'law of the cast,' it seems to me that it is totally within thc Court's discretion
w h d m to, at this time, place Justin on probation or send llim to the penitentiary, Of note,

however, is the statcmcnt in the report from Mr. Vogel stating that "1 see no reason why he

would not be a successful candidate for supervision in the community."
Given the rule bf lenity, and thc way thc Court is to interpret the sentencing statuteg, it'
would be appropriate to give Justin a chance at probation As has been previously set forth in the

w e law, '5t is a well-settlcd rule of statutory construction in Idaho that words of a statute arc

gvcn their plain, usual and ordinary mcaning, in the absence of any ambiguity." Miller v. Miller,
1 13 Idaho 4 15,745 Y .2d 294 (1 987); Walker v. Hemley TrucRing, 107 Idaho 572,691 P.2d 1 1 87

(1 984); S I L I I ~ VMoore,;
..
1 1 1 Idaho 854,727 P3d 1282 (CkApp. 1986). "As a general rule, "![i]t is'
,

.

well d s d thra pmal statutcs am subject to a strict construction. More accmtcly, it may bc said
that such laws arc to bk in~erpretcdstrictly against the state and libenlly in favor of the accused."
73 AMJUR2d Starutes, 5 293 (1974). "Idaho courts havc followed the general rule in holding

-

MEMORANDUM Page 2
,

22.4

.

.

,,

,
'

'

.

.

.

.

that criminal statutes arc strictly construed in their substantive cfcmcnts and in their ,wctions."
. .

State v. Thumpson, 101 Idaho 430, 614 P.2d 970 (1980); State v.

McKuughen, 108 Idaho 471,

700 P.2d 93 (CtApp. 1985).
'

.DATEDThis

7
3@
day of January,2009.

.. .

RATLIFF LAW OPFICIES, CHTD..

CERTIFlCA'I'E OF SERVICE
..

I HEREBY CERTIFY That T have on this*
within and foregoing MEMORANDUM to:
'

Lee .Fishm
Elmorc County Prosecutor's Office
190 South 4' East
P.0, Box 607
Mountain 1-Iorne,lD 83647

-
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BY:

f&y
ff

of January, 2009, served a copy of thc

Hand Delivery
Fdml Express
-Certified Mail

-

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

FEBRUARY 2 , 2009

HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL

COURT MINUTES
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs .
JUSTIN GOODGION,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES :

)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-2007-1156
CR-2008-932

1
1
1
1
)

1
1

Lee Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

Counsel for State

Terry Ratliff
Public Defender

Counsel for Defendant

11:35 a.m. Call of case.
Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant present, in custody.
The Court reviews the file.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff regarding CR-2007-1156.
Response by the Court.
The Court continues to review the file.
All parties have received and have had adequate time to review the
materials.

Mr. Fisher had no corrections.
Mr. Ratliff had no corrections.

COURT MINUTES - FEBRUARY 2, 2009
Page - 1

The defendant had no corrections.
No testimony or statements.
Statement made by Mr. Fisher.
Mr. Fisher's recommendations:
That the Court relinquish jurisdiction and asks that the Court
reserve the restitution. And if it is needed the State will
notice it for a hearing. That the defendant register as a sex
offender.
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff.
Mr. Ratliff's recommendations:
That the defendant be placed on probation.
No statement made by the defendant.
No legal cause shown.
The Court imposes the underlying sentences in both cases. The
defendant will receive sex offender treatment. In case CR-20071156 the defendant is sentenced to incarceration for a period of
15 years with 5 years fixed and 10 years indeterminate with credit
for 688 days against the fixed portion of the sentence. This
sentence is to run concurrent with CR-2008-932. In case CR-2008932 the defendant is sentenced to incarceration for a period of 25
years with 10 years fixed and 15 years indeterminate with credit
for 340 days against the fixed portion to run concurrent with CR2007-1156. The Court using its discretion under Rule 35 reduces
the sentence in CR-2008-932 to 29 years with 6 years fixed and 19
years indeterminate.
While the defendant is incarcerated the
Court recommends that he receive cognitive based programs, sex
offender treatment, anger management treatment, and such other
programs deemed appropriate by prison personnel.
The Court advises the defendant of his right to appeal.
The defendant understands his right to appeal.
Copies of the materials returned.
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the sheriff.
Statement made by Mr. Fisher regarding custody.

COURT MINUTES - FEBRUARY 2, 2009
Page - 2

The Court advises that the defendant will be required to register
as a sex offender for the remainder of his life in case CR-2008932. The Court will reserved restitution for a period of 90 days.
The Court set this matter for RESTITUTION HEARING on May 4, 2009
at 9:00 o'clock a.m.
12:11 p.m. End.

MARSA GRIMMETT
Clerk of the District Court

COURT MINUTES - FEBRUARY 2, 2009
Page - 3

Reporter: N. Omsberg
Clerk: K. Johnson
Reporter's Est. 36 pages

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D I m c q ?

01

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
)

Plaintiff,
vs .

)

JUSTI
DOB:
SSN:

Case No. CR-2008-932

ON,
)

I

ORDER RELINQUISHING
JURISDICTION

Defendant.

TO:

STATE OF IDAHO BOARD OF CORRECTIONS:

On the 2nd day of February, 2009, before the Honorable
Michael E. Wetherell, District Judge, personally appeared Lee
Fisher, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Elmore,
State of Idaho, and the defendant with his attorney Terry
Ratliff, this being the time for jurisdictional review in this
matter.
At which time the Court relinquished jurisdiction and the
defendant is hereby remanded to the custody of the Idaho State
Board of Correction for execution of the original sentence
for a period of twenty-five (25) years with ten (10) years

ORDER RELINQUISHING JURISDICTION - 1

229

fixed and fifteen (15) years indeterminate to run concurrent
with Elmore County Case CR-2007-1156.

The Court however

chooses to exercise its power pursuant to Rule 35 and reduces
the sentence of the defendant in this case CR-2008-932 to a
period of six (6) years fixed and nineteen (19) years
indeterminate for a total of twenty-five (25) years based upon
the finding contained on the rider review report that the
defendant may be considered as appropriate for sex offender
treatment.

The Court recommends that the defendant receive

cognitive based programs, relationship and parenting programs,
sex offender treatment, anger management treatment, and such
other programs as are deemed appropriate by prison personnel;
That pursuant to Idaho code Section 18-309, the defendant
shall be given credit for the time served in the Elmore County
Jail in this case of 340 days, including the retained
jurisdiction time.
The defendant shall submit a DNA sample and right
thumbprint impression to authorities pursuant to I.C.

§

19-

5506.
The defendant will register as a sex offender for the
remainder of his life.

ORDER RELINQUISHING JURISDICTION - 2
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All of the defendant's fines, fees, and costs are forgiven
due to his incarceration and the resulting indigency.
The defendant is to have no contact with his victims while
incarcerated or while on parole should he be granted parole.
The Clerk shall deliver a certified copy of this Order to
the said Sheriff, which shall serve as the commitment of the
defendant .
Dated this

2-day of February, 2009.
2.1
EL WETHERELL

ORDER RELINQUISHING JURISDICTION - 3

*
5

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

day of February,

2009, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the

within instrument to:
Lee Fisher
Elmore County Deputy Prosecutor
Interdepartmental Mail
Terry Ratliff
Elmore County Public Defender
Interdepartmental Mail
Central Records
Idaho Department of Correction
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110
Boise, Idaho 83706
Elmore County Jail
Interdepartmental Mail

MARSA GRIMMETT!/
Clerk of the ~DidtrictCourt
'

ORDER RELINQUISHING JURISDICTION

-
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I

TERRY S. RATLIFF
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CIFII).
290 South Second East Street
Mountain Home, ID 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-0900
Facsimile: (208) 587-6940
I.S. B. No. 3598
Attorney for Appellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR TBE COUNTY OF ELMORE
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,
VS.

JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
Appellant.
TO:

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Case No. CR-2008-0932

NOTICE OF APPEAL

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND ITS ATTORNEYS,
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE; LAWRENCE G. WASDEN ATTORNEY GENERAL,
STATEHOUSE, BOISE, IDAHO 83720; AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
COURT:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above-named Appellant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, appeals against the above named
Respondent to the February 4, 2009, Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction, by the Honorable Michael E.
Wetherell, District Judge, presiding.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Decision

described in paragraph 1 above is applicable for an Appeal order under and pursuant to Rule 1l(c)(l)
and or (9), I.A.R. and Idaho Rule of Criminal Procedure 1l(a)(2).

-

NOTICE OF APPEAL 1

I

I

I

3.

Issues on Appeal:
(a) Whether the District Court abused its discretion, when it relinquished jurisdiction

of Justin, due to the allegation that "on 12/05/08 he was DECEPTIVE" during a polygraph
examination conducted while he was on a second rider..

. .

(b) Whether the District Court denied Justin due process of law pursuant to the Fifth
and Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, by revoking probation of him, when he was
required to participate in a polygraph examination, as set forth above, without allowing him
access to his court appointed attorney pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, nor advising him of
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, prior to and during the polygraph
examination.
4.

The Pre-Sentence Investigation Report is routinely sealed by the Court, and is

requested herein.
5.

(a) Is reporter's standard transcript requested? Yes.
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's

transcript as defined in Rule 25(b), I.A.R.:

(1) Hearing held on 9/17/07 Case No. CR-2007-1156
(2) Hearing held on 4/07/08 Case No. CR-2007-1156
(3) Hearing held on 7/07/08 Case No. CR-2007-1156
(4) Sentencing hearing held on 2/02/09
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.

a. All memorandums or briefs filed herein.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

b. Addendum to the Pre-Sentence Investigation and Cover Letter dated

12/08/08,by Darh Maqueda.
7. I certifl:
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter.
(b)

( 1 ) T h a t either the reporter of the clerk of the district court or

administrative agency has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of the transcript.
.' .

( 2 ) X T h a t the appellant is exempt fiom paying the estimated transcript fee

because this is a criminal appeal. The Appellant is also indigent.
(c)

(1)-That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record

has been paid.
(2)-That

the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the

preparation of the record because this is a criminal appeal. The Defendant is also indigent.
(d)

(1)-That

the appellate filing fee has been paid.

( 2 ) x T h a t appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because
this is a criminal appeal. The Appellant is also indigent.
(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to

Rule 20. (And the Attorney General of Idaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), Idaho Code.)
DATED this

/7

7
day of March 2009.
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES,CHTD.

Attorney for ~ppeliant

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That I have on this

/ 7 hay of March 2009, served a copy of the

within and foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to:
Kristina Schindele
Elmore County Prosecutor
P.O. Box 607
Mountain Home, ID 83647

BY:

Lawrence Wasden
Attorney General
Attention: C-al
Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

BY:

Molly J. Huskey
State Appellate Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703

BY:

Nicole Omsberg
Court Reporter
Elmore County Courthouse
Mountain Home, ID 83647

BY:

Steve Kenyon
Idaho Supreme Court
451 State St.
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101

BY:

Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Certified Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission

P

Er

Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Certified Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission

-Hand Delivery

Federal Express
Certified Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission

-Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Certified Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission
-Hand Delivery

Federal Express
Certified Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission

,/1

Terry ~ P t l i f f
Attorney for Appellant

-
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TERRY S. RATLIFF
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CHTD.
290 South 2ndEast Street
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-0900
Facsimile: (208) 587-6940
Idaho State Bar No.: 3598

;i t , t % . ~ . ;

d i r f i i IC

iI

CLERKOFTHECOURT
DEPUTY

C.7-,LL-

Attorney for DefendantIAppellant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
STATE OF IDAHO
Case No.: CR-2008-0932
Plaintiff,
VS.

JUSTIN W. GOODGION,

1
)
)
)

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT
OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER

Defendant.
COMES NOW the Defendant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, by and through his attorney,
Terry S. Ratliff of Ratliff Law Offices, Chtd., and hereby moves this Court for its Order pursuant
'to Idaho Code $19-867, et seq, and Rule 13 (b), (12) and (19) appointing the State Appellate
Public Defender's Office to represent the above-named Defendant-Appellant in all M e r
appellate proceedings and allowing trial counsel for Defendant to withdraw as counsel of record.
This motion is brought on the ground and for the reason that the Defendant-Appellant is
currently being represented by this Counsel and Office, as Public Defender in and for the County
of Elmore, and the State Appellate Public Defender is authorized by statute to represent the
Defendant-Appellant in all felony appellate proceedings.

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENJ)
arnr

Further, it is in the interest of justice for that Office to represent the Defendant-Appellant
in this case since the Defendant-Appellant is indigent, and any further proceedings in this case
will be at the appellate level.
DATED this

(8day of March, 2009.
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CHTD.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this /g day of March, 2009, served a copy of the
within and foregoing MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER to:
Molly J. Huskey
State Appellate Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703

By:

Kristina Schindele
Elmore County Proiecutor
P.O.Box 607
Mountain Home, ID 83647

BY:

Hand Delivery
Federal Express
Certified Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission

7

-Hand Delivery
Federal Express
7U.S. Mail
Facsimile Transmission

Legal Assistant

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER - Page 2
amr
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TERRY S. RATLIFF
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CHTD.
290 South 2ndEast Street
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-0900
Facsimile: (208) 587-6940
Bar Number: 3598
Attorney for DefendantfAppellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,
VS.

JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
Defendant.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Case No.: CR-2008-0932

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT
OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER

The Court having reviewed the Defendant's Motion for Appointment of State Appellate
Public Defender and Defendant-Appellant being indigent, and good cause appearing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That Molly J. Huskey of the State's Appellate Public
Defender's Office is hereby appointed as Counsel for the Defendant and Teny S. Ratlie of Ratliff
Law Offices, Chtd. is hereby withdrawn as counsel of record.
DATED this&

A day of

,2009.
--7

ORDER FOR APPOMTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER - 1
amr

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that 1 have on this ?&day
served a copy of the within and foregoing ORDER to:
Kristina Schindele
Elrnore County Prosecuting Attorney
190 South Fourth East
P.O.Box 607
Mountain Home, ID 83647

Terry S. Ratliff
Ratliff Law Office, Chtd.
290 South Second East
Mountain Home, ID 83647
Molly J. Huskey
State Appellate Public Defender
3627 Lake Harbor Ln.
Boise, ID 83703

By:

_'Ha Delivery
-Federal Express
-Certified Mail
-U.S. Mail
-Facsimile Transmission
-and
Delivery
-Federal Express

-Certified Mail
-U.S. Mail
-Facsimile Transmission

-Hand Delivery
-Federal Express
-Certified Mail
A . S . Mail
-Facsimile Transmission

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER - 2
arnr
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, 2009,
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In the Supreme Court of the Statfi,q&J&#poo
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
Defendant-Appellant.

1
1

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

-

u

ORDER CONSOLIDATING APPEALS
Supreme Court Docket No. 36364-2009
(36365-2009)
Elmore County Docket No. 2007-1 156
(2008-932)

It appearing that these appeals should be consolidated for all purposes for reasons of
judicial economy; therefore, good cause appearing,

IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that appeal No. 36364 and 36365 shall be
CONSOLIDATED FOR ALL PURPOSES under No. 36364, but all documents filed shall bear
both docket numbers.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare a CLERK'S
RECORD, which shall include the documents requested in the Notices of Appeal, together with

a copy of this Order.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Reporter shall prepare a
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT, which shall include the transcripts requested in the Notices of
Appeal.

~ of April 2009.
DATED this 1 0 day

cc:

9

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Court Reporter

24 1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
1

Plaintiff/Respondent,

)

vs .

)
)

JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
)

Defendant/Appellant.

Supreme Court
Case No. 36364-2009
(Case No. 36365-2009)
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF
EXHIBITS

)

1

I, MARSA GRIMMETT, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Elmore, do hereby
certify:
That the following is a list of exhibits which were offered or
admitted into evidence during the trial in this case:
There were no trial exhibits in these cases.
AND

I FURTHER CERTIFY that the

following will be

submitted as

exhibits to this Record:
Pre-sentence Report dated Sept 11, 2007(Confidential Exhibit)
APSI Report dated February 19, 2008 (Confidential Exhibit)
Mental Health Report dated July 1, 08 (Confidential Exhibit)
APSI Report dated Dec 8, 2008 (Confidential Exhibit)

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - Page 1

I N WITNESS WHEREOF,

seal o f t h e s a i d C o u r t t h i s

JULU

I h a v e h e r e u n t o set my h a n d a n d a f f i x e d t h e

z!d

day of

,

2009.

MARSA G R I M M ~ T T
C l e r k of t h e District Court

BY

blDw
lCC)
eputy C l e r k
C

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

-

Page 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

1
)

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

1
1
)
)
)

JUSTIN W. GOODGION,
Defendant/Appellant.

1

Supreme Court
Case No. 36364-2009
(Case No. 36365-2009)
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)
)

I, MARSA GRIMMETT, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Elmore, do hereby
certify that the foregoing Record in this cause was compiled and bound
under my direction and is a true, correct and complete record of the
pleadings and documents requested by Appellate Rule 28.
I further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above
entitled cause, see Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits, will be duly lodged
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's
Transcript and Clerk's Record.
I further certify that the following will be submitted as
exhibits to the Record on Appeal:
Pre-Sentence Report dated Sept. 11, 2007 (Confidential Exhibit
APSI Report dated February 19, 2008 (Confidential Exhibit)
Mental Health Report dated July 1, 2008 (Confidential Exhibit)
APSI Report dated December 8, 2008 (Confidential Exhibit)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

-

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal
of the said Court this

&I$+day of ,)tC\Y

,

2009.

MARSA GRIMMETT
Clerk of the District Court

BY

~
I W !
Dkputy Clerk
l

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

I N THE D I S T R I C T COURT O F THE FOURTH J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T O F THE
STATE O F IDAHO,

I N AND FOR THE COUNTY O F ELMORE

STATE O F IDAHO,

vs.

1
1

J U S T I N W.

)
)
)

GOODGION,

Supreme C o u r t
C a s e No. 3 6 3 6 4 - 2 0 0 9
( C a s e No. 3 6 3 6 5 - 2 0 0 9 )
CERTIFICATE O F SERVICE

1

I, MARSA GRIMMETT,

C l e r k of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e F o u r t h

J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t of t h e S t a t e of Idaho, i n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of
E l m o r e , do h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t I have p e r s o n a l l y served o r m a i l e d ,

by U n i t e d S t a t e s M a i l ,

one copy of t h e REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT and

C L E R K ' S RECORD t o e a c h of t h e a t t o r n e y s of record i n t h i s cause a s
follows:
L a w r e n c e G. Wasden
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Statehouse M a i l
P . O . B o x 83720
B o i s e , I D 83720-0010
I N WITNESS WHEREOF,

the s e a l of

the

M o l l y Huskey
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
3 6 4 7 L a k e Harbor L a n e
Boise, ID 83703

I have h e r e u n t o s e t m y hand and a f f i x e d

s a i d Court

this

213%day

of

x&f

2009.
MARSA GRIMMETT
C l e r k of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

C E R T I F I C A T E O F SERVICE

,

